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Auditorium
Whittier College School of Law
Los Angeles, Californ
November 19, 1982

CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS:
morning. This is ~he
Assembly Judiciary Committee hearing on
parenting.
Ordinarily, I would introduce the members of our Committee to
you, but, as you can see, we don't
members attending.
As yet, we don't have "surrogate
" so w~'ll
to
do the best we can.
The rna
purpose of today's
ing is to es
ish a
record as it relates to this most significant and controversial
issue. We intend to
a closer look at arrangements in which
a woman agrees to bear a child for a
who is physicallv
incapable of having their own children.
I am sure that you have
heard about this extremely controversial arrangement and AB 3771,
the bill to legitimize surrogate parent contracts. We hope
the testimony at this hearing will he
us to examine the legal,
social, and ethical implications of these contracts.
Because of the number of people on our agenda, I will be
asking witnesses to come forward in groups for testimony.
I'd
like for each witness to keep his or her testimony as brief as
possible and to avoid repeating what a previous witness has said.
I want to give everyone on the agenda an opportunity to speak.
I
would also ask that anyone who has testimony in writing to,
rather than read that testimony, simply give us a synopsis and be
prepared to answer questions.
Without further delay, we'll go to our first witness, the author
of AB 3771, Assemblyman Mike Roos. Welcome.
ASSEMBLY~~N MIKE ROOS:
Welcome to Los Angeles.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would only sav that I regret that other members of the
Committee aren't here hut, since there has been an unusually high
turnover in the Legislature, it is understandable and I'm glad
that we're going to have a chance to have a written record
documenting some of the fine witnesses, diverse witnesses that we
have today.
I think the most important member of the Judiciary
Commit.tee is here -- the only one that I really care about -because I believe that if I can convince you, then the rest of
the members of the Committee will fall in line. You're the best
attorney on the Judiciary Committee.
Last year, I thought we had some good hearings on this,
as good as any I have ever witnessed in the Legislature.
Clearly, the concept of surrogate parenting is one that can be
readily accepted by a legislative body.
In fact, the obstacles
seem to be in the words of art that we use to clarify this as a
matter of law.

That's
my remarks are going to be very brief.
It's
just to cast an overview and to say that the reasons
my
continued
to push this bill have not abated.
In
il
among women is high
ion pool are low; need for
ldren continues to be one of
most remarkab
When you put all of those three
,
l mass, and
explos
i
at
sts
l
s the problem that
slature must address.
It's that there
going
this soci
that I don't
we
condone,
outright
sell
b
lorable putting together of
can create
logically def
that ne ther the biological
nor
ld wants that baby, and you just
soc
I believe that the framework
I've la
out is one
is a good point of departure, one
we can ref
, one
that makes a lot of sense for contemporary soc
and the way
that contemporary society is now about the bus
putting
lies together.
In that line, it's interesting to me
Angeles Times of yesterday, November 18th, there was an
on page 36 of the "Vie\>\' 11 section, "Feminists Have Their Own Sperm
Banks". ~ust to quote a couple of these things:
"The idea of a
feminist sperm bank might startle those who perceive feminists
and artificial insemination as threats to the traditional family.
Health center officials, however, say that they favor all
lies, whether heaned by one parent or two, and whether the
mother is heterosexual or a lesbian." "'To take the position
that there must be a male figure is a slap in the face of every
single woman raising a child in this country ... '" I guess what
I'm telling you and those who read this transcript is that every
there are substantial transformations in how
lies are
formed, not only in this state but on this planet, and in these
two quotes that I just read are practices that have been legally
sanctioned by the State of California. That practice is legal.
I believe that my approach of allowing an infertile woman the
same opportunity to have a child as an infertile man, if you
will, is a far more conservative approach than some of the kinds
of practices that are already going on that are legal
sanctioned by the State of California.
That's whv I would, Mr. Chairman, appreciate your
indulgence in listening carefully to use your incredibly good
lawyer skills to help find and flush out the right terms of art
to make this work in the next legislative session.
I think that
the society demands it, and I think that there are individuals
out there who have a crying need to make sure that in fact that
eventuates. Otherwise, vou're going to have a lot of hurt
people, both economically as well as emotionally, because they're
going to indulge in some kind of practice, some way, to get
-2-

children.
I believe that it is in the best ends of our commun:i.ty
and our state to make sure that we have a way that produces the
best outcome for all parties.
Thank you very much.
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
Mr. Roos, f
st of all, it's
remarkable that you would take on this complex and controversial
subject.
It's very complicated. Certainly it's breaking new
ground in the area of law, and I think that you're to be
congratulated for having the courage to deal with this issue.

Secondly, I'd like to ask if you would be willinq to
join me on the podium because one of the things that I'd l
to
do is focus on questions as to how detailed legislation of this
nature might be.
I don't think there's
question in my mind
that this is an area that we should attempt to define some
parameters, even if it's just for purposes of future litigat
that may result from disagreements as to the nature of a
surrogate relationship or who, in fact, is
rightful
of
a child who comes from such a relationship.
I would really
appreciate it, if you have the time to spend it with us and ask
questions of witnesses.
I would like to ask the first witness to come forward.
In fact, it's a group of witnesses, group numher one. William
Handel, William Karow, JilJ and Bill Jamieson.
DR. WILLIAM G. KAROW:
I am Dr. William Karow, an
infertility specialist ;n Los Ange s.
I have been in the
practice of infertility now 21 years and have dealt with a group
of people that we're talking about today all of my medical life.
The problem certainly is presented ~hat we have 15 to 20
percent of the married couples in the United States that are
infertile, and they are infertile for a number of reasons.
More
recently people are starting families later.
They are developing
careers so we have a group of people now that are coming into the
forefront in their 30's where they used to get pregnant in their
20's. As a consequence of this, they have developed some of the
medical problems like endornetreosis that precludes or cuts down
significantly on their chances of pregnancy. With the sexual
mores having changed, the use of contraceptives -- IUD's -exposure to the incidence of infection and permanent sterility
have increased so we have a population of infertile people who
are on the increase, not the decrease.
Methods of treatment are basically these.
Infertility
treatment -- with this we can take care of about half the
problems where these couples can have a child. Adoptions, this
dav in time, with the tremendous number of abortions that occur,
are significantly down.
In this county, last vear and the year
before, there were less than 2,000 adoptions completed. The
biggest agency, Children's Horne, had close to 7,000 applications
last year and placed less than 500 children. A childless home is
a solution. That's not a very good one when a child in the
-3-

the American way.
donor insemination, the
Legislature passed a law several years ago which is a
that
s al
to
age, and i~ is a
male is
, and
In vitro
test-tube
se is
on
own, but
15
ago.
In the Un
States, we're up to
now.
been some str
s,
s
year or two, but we have on
15
s
15 years. So
date, does not answer the prob
well, and we have
Now, I
parenting is
the law,
I think, belong with
But, I
, as far as we're concerned,
we
obligations
from the medical side as far as the surrogate
the adopting
coup
We have to,
a sense, protect the surrogate from
ings that might happen to her. We have to be sure that this
husband of the adopting couple is not going to give the surrogate
a disease that would render her permanently
le. We have
to be sure that
a reasonable
get pregnant
from his sperm so
she and the coup
up spending
weeks and months
the hope of getting
We have to, on
the other side, adequately evaluate the surrogate to be sure that
she stands a reasonable chance of getting pregnant. These
couples have put time and effort, their future, and their heart
into this as a last resort, to have a child in their familv, and
if the surrogate is not adequately worked up ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Excuse me, Dr. Karow.
I don't want
to interrupt your testimony, but all of the things that you're
saying are things that there really is no conflict in the
Legislature about, not only the background but the fact that it
does work. The problem really does seem to be in the way that we
write the law. The problem seems to eventuate with legislators
who ask, "Well, what happens if the baby is biologically deformed
and neither the biological mother nor the potential adoptive
mother and the biological father wants the child?" That's one
issue area.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Or particularly if there's been a
violation of the contract. The surrogate says that she will
swear off drugs or alcohol and in fact does use drugs or alcohol
during the term of her pregnaLcy.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

And she's seen

a bar ...

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Those are the kinds of things, and
maybe if you could quickly address them or defer to Mr. Handel or
do whatever you think appropriate. How do we allay the fears of
the members of this Legislature that we are creating a legal
nightmare, that we are creating more problems than we are trvi.ng
-4-

to solve? Therein lie the real problem and the obstacle in my
getting their vote.
I really believe that they understand the
necessity. They understand the num~ers, the low supply of babies
and the number of people who want babies.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Since we've already interrupted your
testimony, at this point let me take the time to introduce
Assemblyman Dave Stirling, who has joined us.
DR. KAROW:
I think I real
don't have a whole lot more
to say, but basically, from the other side, you have to give us
some necessary minimal guidelines in evaluating the surrogate
In other words, we have to be sure the surrogate is not walking
into this in a way that she's going to hurt herself, that she is
not going to get hurt.
If we have adequately spent time with the
surrogate and screened her well, then it is unlikely that she's
going to be on drugs and so forth.
I think if you 1
us down
some good guidelines that we follow, then they become standard of
care.
If we fail to do that, then the law has recourse in the
way of malpractice, if nothing else. You qive us some guidelines
so that we will sit down and at least adequately evaluate and
screen all the people involved. Then you will have very few of
the problems that you have described.
That ends my testimony.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you very much, Doctor.

MR. WILLIAM W. HANDEL: My name is Bill Handel.
I'm an
attorney at law. My partner, Bernard Sherwyn, and I have a huge
law firm consisting of two attorneys that specialize in surrogate
parenting law. This is our primarv field of endeavor. We have
over 50 couples that we've already signed contracts for, and we
basically have two problems whenever couples come to us.
Obviously, they're infertile. Obviously, they have generally
come from someone like Dr. Karow after several years of surgery,
have been put on a waiting list, and have been determined that
they, in effect, will not have children. This is their last
chance.
I have to tell these couples when they walk in the
door ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Let me interrupt you. When we're
talking about surrogate parenting, are we always talking about
the surrogate mother?
mother.

MR. HANDEL: Yes, in this case, it's the surrogate
Sperm donor is very simple, it's just ..•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
part of the woman then?

So the infertility is always on the

MR. HANDEL:
In this case, under the surrogate parent
law. When the male is infertile, you simply qo to Dr. Karow, who
has a bank, and he artificially inseminates the fertile wife.
It's a very simple concept.
-5-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

And there's no problem there.

MR. HANDEL: No, the law allows it under the sperm donor
act of 1975.
It is perfectly legal, and, more importantly, the
sperm donor has no rights as a father and has no liabilities as a
matter of law.
The two things that I have to tell these couples when
they walk in the door -- number one, I have to look them in the
face and si'ly, "We may be committing a felony." vJe may be
committina a crime such that we are conspir
to commit a felony
f the courts deem this to be baby-sell
We may be committing
a misdemeanor if the courts hold that this is payment for
adoption. We adve
se
surrogate mothers on behalf of the
couples.
If that is illegal, because the law does state that
advertising for adoption other than through a licensed adoption
agency is illegal, we're looking at, techn
lly, 20 years.
That's the first step. That's fairly easy to dispense with
because most of us in the legal profession think that those laws
are clearly unconstitutional when applied to surrogate parenting.
This is not buying or selling bab s, particularly when the
practitioners have done a thorough job, as they should.
The main problem is the enforceability of the contract.
The couple has paid out between 20 and 25 thousand dollars, and
the first thing they ask is "What if the surrogate changes her
mind? Is that child ours?" We have to say, "We don't know."
The law says that a biological mother bearing a child is the
mother of that child.
If that surrogate is married, under the
law today, it is possible that the father, the man who has
donated his sperm, the man that we can prove is the father of the
child, who has paid $20,000, who has probablv hocked his house,
taken out seconds on everything he owns, borrowed money from
evervbody he's ever met -- there's a very good chance he doesn't
even have the right of standing in court to determine that he is
the father of that child.
It's a very frightening thing for
these couples to then say, "Well, we need a child. We need it
badly. We're going to take a chance anyway." Thank God that
we've never had a problem where a surroaate has changed her mind,
at least in our contracts or with the practitioners here in
southern California, because of the care that we use in selecting
surrogate mothers.
Tha-t care is incorporated in the law that you
see before you, the proposed Surrogate Parent Act that
Assemblyman Roos wrote.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Let me ask you right there whether we
should exclude married women from being surrogates.
MR. HANDEL:
I think that that would be completely
unconstitutional if you were to ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
HR. HANDEL:

Why?

I think it's illeaal discrimination.
-6-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

cannot

To tell a woman that

surrogate
MR. HANDEL:
If she is married or unmarried because
is not re
whether she can
a
ld or not.
It's
law that says
husband is
sumed to be the
's
the problem, not the
that she is
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I'm really not c

ASSEMBLYMAN DAVE STIRLING:
year.

here.

I

st

On
MR. HANDEL:

That

sumption has

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANDEL:

len?

Yes.

So much for that.

CHAI~~N HARRIS:
Anyway, as to that consti
issue, I'm not as clear on it as you seem to be.

onal

MR. HANDEL: Okay.
I don't think that vou can
1
married from unmarried. First of all, on a practical level we
generally like women to be married. You will hear testimony from
a surrogate who is married. It's a verv emotional issue.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
have any rights at all?

If she's married, does the husband

MR. HANDEL: We don't know. Here's the situation.
Assuming that a surrogate mother changes her mind and is married,
and her husband claims paternity, the real father, to my
understanding, may be precluded from claiming paternity even if
we can prove he is the father of the child because
the
presumptions that now exist in the law. These are conclusive
presumptions.
As the laws in California are written, when applied to
surrogate parenting they make absolutely no sense. The
California Legislature has said that a biological father, one who
is the father of the child, whom we can prove is the father of
the child -- if he donates his sperm and inseminates someone
other than his wife, through a physician, he is not the father of
the child. He has no rights. He has no liabj_Jities of support.
In effect, that child is fatherless.
On the other hand, as to a
surrogate mother, who in effect does the same thing (although
differently biologically, obviously), donates her egg and carries
that child for someone else -- in effect donates that concept -not only does the law not say, as it should, that she is not the
mother and has no rights, but the law says that she probably is
the mother, the real father may not have rights to stand up and
claim paternity, and her husband may be the father of that child.

-7-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Let me ask aga
I just want to make
sure.
I don't want to explore it too long
I'm not sure
we can answer my question here.
It would seem to me that if you
have a woman who is married, her husband may in fact have some
legal rights, that he could put into the
s to
whether or not this is an interference wi
s marr
MR. HANDEL: He certainly could.
I
on
go back to
practicalities.
In our practice,- the husband is integrally
involved in the contract. When we use a
husband is at group sessions. Her husband
negotiations at all times. Her husband has to s
document the surrogate signs, and, in effect,
of
them, the team that produces the child for
e.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: We aren't a
to do that as a
matter of law. That's a matter of your own
MR. HANDEL:

That's a matter of my

ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: That becones a problemat
1
for legislators who are hearing this for the f
t time -- trying
to separate out what a practice has done to insure zero error, if
you will, versus what the law states and all of the
s
lities
that can happen under the law. That's what troubles my
colleagues. They see us writing a bill that simply says that a
surrogate can be anyone. They envision, perhaps, a surrogate who
may not use your particular service, who may go to another
attorney and maybe she's separated, maybe she had a quarrel,
maybe she sees economic necessity and doing this versus doing
something else and so she gets involved.
It's not that carefully
screened because we only have minimum levels of screening
the
bill, and six months later she is pregnant and her husband is
outraged and files suit for damages.
MR. HANDEL: That is the reason why the parameters in
the bill are included, why there are safeguards
the bill. We
can do it in one of several ways.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS:

Show them what the safeguards are.

MR. HANDEL: All right. For example, if you'll turn to
page three of AB 3771, the first thing that we do is we place the
entire contract and the conduct of the parties directly within
the jurisdiction of the court, the superior court of the State of
California, probably the County of Los Angeles or depending on
the county that you're in. The court has to agree to the
petition.
In fact, the court has to okay, prior to the
insemination, that this contract can go ahead.
It's almost a
declaratory relief action in the sense that you're asking the
court to okay conduct prior to it's occurring.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROOS: Now the Judicial Council is going to
come up here and sav that they don't like that because that's
prior approval of a contract.
-8-

MR. HANDEL: What we're going to argue is that it's very
similar to a conservatorship where, in effect, you're asking the
court to okay ct transfereuce of one's estate to someone else
prior to it happen
and we're s
ly asking for these
safeguards to be met. The way that the bill is envisioned, once
this checklist has been basically checked off by a judge, I don't
see any problem with the Judicial Council. There isn't a
of
work.
In effect,
is the work of the attornevs to do. What we
have to do is we have to give an executed copy of the contract
which both sides have signed to the judge.
We have to have evidence of the
fe's in rtility.
think that this should not be a matter of convenience, that
people who are infertile should go take the
are
involved in surrogate parenting.

We

Evidence of the medical evaluation of
husband and
the surrogate -- we think this is critical, both the
and the husband ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
reasons ...

Excuse me, what if a woman, for

lth

MR. HANDEL: That's defined.
Infertility is def
as
an inability to bear children or, because of health reasons,
cannot bear children -- because of high blood pressure or because
of various other reasons. Dr. Karow can certainlv give you much
more information on that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

But this doesn't say that.

MR. HANDEL: Section (a), page two, 7502. As used in
this act, "infertile couple" means a husband who is capable of
producing viable sperm and his wife who has been determined by a
licensed physician to be incapable of conceiving or carrying a
child to term without significant risk to her life or who has
been unable to conceive for one year. That's a determination by
a physician, obviously, if she's incapable of conceiving without
risk either to her life, and, we would go even further, risk to
the child, assuming that she has some hereditary disease that she
does not want to pass on to her child and yet she still wants a
child.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm just thinking about the
requirements as evidence of the wife's infertilitv ...
MR. HANDEL:
"Infertility" as defined by Section 7502.
Evidence of the medical evaluation of the husband and the
surrogate -- it just so happens that in our practice we utilize
Dr. Karow, who probablv provides the most extensive and thorough
medical evaluation which you could ever imagine. We think that
that is imperative, that both the adopting father, the natural
father, and the surrogate be thoroughly screened. As part of
that screening, a psychological evaluation must be done on the
-9-

surrogate to at least determinP that she's not as crazy as a loon
or in some way is going to jeopardize the entire contract.
Proof that the funds to be paid to the surrogate,
medical bills, et cetera are deposited in a trust account prior
to the insemination.
It's pretty difficult to start asking
people to come up with money after the pregnancy has occurred.
Obviously, you can't change your mind and say, "No." We don't
want to encourage abortion. We don't want to encourage children
that are not wanted, so these are some of the safeguards that are
used.
We obviously want evidence of the ability of the
infertile couple to care for the child.
This can be done via a
home study. This can be done with the psychological report. The
bill holds that a home study by a licensed agency is enough, and
we tend to agree, and of course evidence of the marriage of the
infertile couple. Now, these are wide parameters.
We also give the discretion to the judge that, if he has
any doubts whatsoever, he can bring in any of the parties to see
that in fact no coercion is taking place, that the woman is not
doing it out of destitution, that she is doing it because she
truly wants to do it. Now, t.hat is not to say that someone who
is doing it simply for the money is not a valid surrogate. We
don't know.
It's too early in the game.
Last, but not least, both sides must be represented by
counsel.
It's very important that in a contract of this nature,
with the ramifications involved, both sides be apprised of their
legal rights.
These are the parameters as we've seen it. Hy
partner and I think that either these parameters or just a very
simple bill limiting surrogate parenting to him or myself would
he just fine.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Should we include penalties, civil or
otherwise, for those individuals who may not conform to the
requirements of the law?
MR. HANDEL: We certainly can't see criminal penalties.
Our contract allows for a cause of action of intentional
infliction of emotional distress upon ~he adopting couple should
the surrogate arbitrarily abort or change her mind or no~ give up
the child, because of the great distress that would occur to the
couple.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I guess I'm trying to see whether or
not there's something that would in fact encourage people to
comply with the law because the alternative is ...
MR. HANDEL:
I think fear of the civil remedies -- we
have breach of contract in the damages that may result, and the
damages would be more psychological.
In addition, of course,
there is rescission of the contract. At this point, let's say
-10-

that you've already spent 12 or 15 thousand dol
s should the
mother change her mind, but that would not be the
of the damage. The damages would
far
You
have a ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Should we state
in the law
surrogate, for
requ
s are not
1
with?
MR. HANDEL:

I think that a

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That the
surrogate and the custody belongs to
MR. HANDEL:

No.

a pre
rest of
that.

to
surrogate?

I think ...

CHAIR¥~N HARRIS:
Why don't we put a burden on the
people who are in fact going to seek out a surrogate to
with these contractual and legal provisions?

MR. HANDEL: Well, the burden is al
they've already gone through five or ten
rs of
work, they're spending $20,000, and they have gone
rigmarole of trying to obtain a child.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, but what if they haven't compl
with the law? What if they just found a woman walking down
street and said, "Will you have a child for us?
MR. HANDEL: Under those circumstances, I think that
same remedies-- but I don't know-- who would ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What I'm saying is v1hy should somebody
comply with the law if there aren't protections that are
guaranteed to the infertile couple under the law that aren't
available outside the law.
MR HANDEL: Who would be damaged, assuming that someone
were to do that? I don't understand. See, the damage that we're
dealing with here ...
CHAIRNAN HARRIS: What we're trying to do by this
legislation is to clear up the ambiguity that nay result from a
surrogate having a child and then there being a dispute as to
custody or parenthood. Right?
MR. HANDEL:

I think-- I think ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Otherwise, why have a law?

MR. HANDEL: Okay.
I think the ambiguity, as best as
can be done without writing a literal tome on the various ways
that the law could address this issue, is addressed in the hill
and that is, one, civil remedies -- whatever they are -- mav
-11-

apply, including specific performance. Specific performance -turning the child over, going to a doctor.
Obviously, we have a situation where we've qot certain
Supreme Court cases, particularly Roe v Wade [410 u.s. 113
(1973)], which holds that we cannot force-a-woman to abort or not
abort or go to a doctor or do anything to her body. But, does
that mean that if she fails to do that-- let's say that the
contract says, "If, in the event we have a severely retarded or a
Down's child~" --and the couple decides that they want to abort
-- or, on the other chance, they say they don't want to abort and
they want the child, no matter what -- and the surrogate says, "I
don't care.
I've got a child, and I want to produce the child
anyway."
We know that we cannot force a woman to do one or the
other. But, does that mean the damages don't lie? I don't know.
I don't know if that can be addressed in a statute. As to a lot
of these issues, unfortunately, all we can do is attempt to try
to clear them up as best we can.
I really think that a lot of
these major issues are going to take U. S. Supreme Court
decisions to determine exactly where the parameters are.
DR. KAROW:

Mr. Harris, could I make a comment or two?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, please, Doctor.

DR. KAROW: Mr. Handel mentions the psychological
screen.
I think one of the obligations of the psychological
screen is to be sure the surrogate is not getting herself in a
situation in which she doesn't belong.
In other words, I think
where, from the lawyers' standpoint, they are much more
representing the adopting couple, the physician is actually much
more the surrogate's doctor.
He has much more to do with her so
he has an obligation to be sure she is not going to do something
that's detrimental to herself.
In this situation, there is
recourse.
In other words, we get attacked all the time by the
law in the way of malpractice suits.
If we fail to observe
reasonable guidelines as you set up, then there is recourse to
come back and blame us.
I think you probably have the same
things with the lawyers.
If they fail to follow reasonable
guidelines that you establish, you can always go to the
malpractice method of recourse.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. HANDEL:

Okay.

I don't believe I have anything more to

add.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

Thank you.

As I said, there are probably going to be a million
questions that are 9oing to emanate as a result of this subject,
and, unfortunately, the reality is that many of these things arc
-12-

up
have
vvri te a

it re
s to case law. We're going to
the courts might be heading so we don't
to be unconstitutional and
11 and
who has
her husband.
She
As a matter
IS
or

Next, I'd 1
to
couple. She is a
le

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We
name is Jill Jamieson.
I
a
, Bill. Right now, I am WRiting
don't know.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We were waiting

the big moment!

(Laughter
questions

JAMIESON:
you wou

It has been too recent.
like to ask?

Do you have

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You've heard the brief background and
obviously the complications in all of these things.
I'm just
wondering whether or not, from your perspective, you think there
are legal protections that should be included in such a law to
protect your interests as a surrogate mother or whether or not
you think there are any other specific things that ought to be
included
the law.
MRS. ,JAMIESON:
I believe the bill that is presented
does cover everything.
It protects the surrogate; it protects
the adopting couple.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

May I ask a question?

Go ahead.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about the fee? Do you think
it should just be open-ended or should there be any kind of a
statement as to what the fee ought to be or guidelines for the
setting of the fee?
MRS. JAMIESON: No.
I believe it should be whatever the
couple can a
whatever the surrogate agrees on.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let. me ask another question. The
issue was raised relative to the right of the surrogate mother to
control her own body. What do you think about that? Obviously,
I don't see what we can do to prevent an abortion or to force an
abortion. What do you think should happen to the child if in
fact there's a contract and the pregnancy mav not run a full
-13-

term?
If the surrogate chooses to have the child and, for snme
reason, the adopting parents, or the contracting parents, decide
that they don't want the child because they think, as a result of
the amniocentesis test, for example, the child is going to be
mongoloid or something like that, what do you think should happen
to the child?
MRS. JAMIESON:
refuses the child?

You're saying if the adopting couple

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let's say that you are in fact
pregnant and in the sixth month of pregnancy amniocentesis tests
are taken and there's a good likelihood the child's going to be
retarded. The adopting parents say that they don't want a
retarded child.
MRS. JAMIESON:
child into the world.

I don't believe in bringing a retarded

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
In your case, then, that would be the
answer, but if you say that you don't believe in abortion, whose
child is it?
MRS. JAMIESON: Then it would be the responsibility of
the surrogate because she wanted it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

That's one interesting

point.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Could I just pursue that?

Sure.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: On that issue, counsel, what do
you do if that arises? Has that scenario ever occurred in your
experience?
MR. HANDEL:

Thank God, no.

Because .•.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Are you familiar with any cases
that have arisen along those lines?
MR. HANDEL: No. The only case that we're familiar with
is where a woman changed her mind ~- in California -- just simply
aid not turn the child over. Mr. Keane, an attorney from
Michigan, will be able to speak a little bit more clearly on that
later.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
If that did occur, where the
surrogate was going to give birth ...
MR. HANDEL: Then, we have the classic situation -instead of everybody fighting for the child, we have everybody
saying "We don't want the child." Our position is that ...
-14-

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

What would you do with your

contract?
MR. HANDEL:
contract ...

I would say that the surrogate breached the

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But it wouldn't be a matter of
breaching the contract, in the sense that the adopting parent, if
you will, doesn't want the child. Would you not bring the
parties in ann simply change the contract? What would you do to
simply get them off the hook, or does
law have to deal with
that?
MR. HANDEL:
I don't understand your question. Let's
say that we have a retarded child that we find out through
amniocentesis has Down's syndrome, and the adopting couple sa
"We don't want the child." Our contract ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANDEL:

The surrogate mother wishes to ...

... wishes to go ahead.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

... proceed with delivery.

MR. HANDEL: Well, we've never had that problem, because
of the psychological screening and because the kind of women we
choose would not do that.
In the event that that woul0 happen,
two things happen. One, I think the attorney has committed
malpractice if we had reasonable notice that would happen, if a
woman said, "I don't believe in abortion, and I'm not going to
abort, come hell or high water," and we went ahead and used
her ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What would you do to avoid the
malpractice that you referred to?
MR. HANDEL: By simply choosing a surrogate and a couple
that basically believe the same way. Most of our surrogates
believe the child they are carrying does not belong to them.
They are carrying the child of an infertile couple.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Suppose she ends up stuck with
it? Accept that she has decided, even though it's going to
perhaps be malformed, that she is going to give delivery.
MR. HANDEL: Once she has decided that, she is, in a
sense, under that scenario, breaching the contract and saying,
"We contracted for a child, that we co11ld do everything possible
to produce a healthy child and if it were not ... "
ASSEMBLY~ffiN STIRLING:
an act of God, in a sense.

It's a breach of contract.
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It's

MR. HANDEL: That aspect is certainly an act of God.
The aspect that is not an act of God is the woman has a right to
abort, and most of the couples, to be honest with you, would ask
the surrogate to abort if the child were to be deformed. That's
one of our principle ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
What would you suggest happen?
MR. HANDEL:

And at the time, she says, "No. 11

We've never had that .•.

suggest?

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I know that, but what would you
We're talking about the law.

do I do?

MR. HANDEL: You give me a scenario in 30 seconds.
I'd hit the books .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANDEL:

What

I know that.

I'd probably •..

ASSEMBIJYMAN STIRLING:
be in some way addressed?

Do you feel that that has got to

MR. HANDEL:
I don't think it can be nddressed.
I don't
think there's any way it can because we have two situations here.
\-ve have Roe v Wade, that gives t.he woman the absolute right to do
\vi th her body asshe wishes, and we have a couple who has hired a
woman to carry their child.
In one sense, it is their child, and
they have a right to determine how they want their child to be
born, except someone else's womb happens to he carrying it.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, they can definitely get out
of the contract. There's no auestion about that under those
circumstances we just talked about.
MR. HANDEL:

I don't know.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, that's got to be an
absolute, it seems to me, under the circumstances.
MR. HANDEL:
I think vou have a conflict there that is
almost insurmountable because ~hat we're saying is that, in
effect, it's a personal service contract.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, don't you have a provision
in the contract that says that the child that they want will be a
heal thy ..•
MR. HANDEL:

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANDEL:

t'Vhy not?

Because that's an act of God.
-16-

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

They don't ask for that?

MR. HANDEL: Well, they ask. What we have in the
contract says that whatever child is born belongs to that
adopting couple.
It is their child, no matter what. The only
problem is that they have a right in the contract to ask for an
abortion if the child is deemed to be seriously deformed or
seriously retarded.
If they ask for an abortion, with the
physician's consent, then the surrogate agrees to go ahead and
have the abortion. The problem is what happens if she says,
"No." We've never had that problem, and that is, as my partner
says, the inevitable nightmare. That's the very worst thing
could ever happen, and I don't know if that can ever be addressed
legally.
It may ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

What happens to the fee if she says,

"Yes"?
MR. HANDEL: She gets paid. Up to that point, there is
no question. She has done everything she is supposed to do, and
it is an act of God.
It is absolutely not her fault whatsoever.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
testimony.

Okay.

Thank you.

I appreciate the

Is there anything that anyone would like to add?
MR. HANDEL:

Could my partner add one aspect of it?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. BERNARD SHERWYN:
I'm Bernard Sherwyn.
I'm an
attorney, practic1ng in Los Angeles, in surrogate parenting, and
I'm Bill Handel's partner.
I believe there was a question regarding the fact that
the Judicial Council might be concerned about approving a
contract prior to its performance. The provisions of the bill
really don't address -- they are not approving the contract.
What they are doing is approving the entire factual setting.
They are saying, "All of the items that arA required in the act
are there; therefore, we will deal with this arrangement.
If a
problem occurs, we will review the problem at the time it occurs,
and we are petitioned by one of the parties to address it." They
are not asked to deal with every possible situation ahead of
time, and they are not asked to deal with the contract, except
for the fact that it has the provisions that the bill requires
and the evidence of the screening and the funds being on deposit
-- those items that are required -- the minimum elements -- the
court is saying, "Yes, those minimum elements are there." They
are not saying, "This is a good contract. We will go this way or
that way if something happens."

-17-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I understand.
that point.
It was very helpful.
MR. SHERWYN:

Thank you for covering

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, may I ask Mr. Keane and Mr.
FitzRandolph to come forward, please?
MR. NOEL P. KEANE: Mr. Harris. Good morning. My name
is Noel Keane, and I'm an attorney from Michigan.
I've been
involved in surrogate parenting for the past seven years.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm giving you a lot of publicity
is this your book?
[The Surrogate Mother]
MR. KEANE:

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
So, obviously, you've spent a lot of
time dealing with this new subject.
MR. KEANE:
I've spent about 100 percent of my time for
the last four years on this area.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

What is your background?

MR. KEANE: Well, as an attorney in general practice,
for the past 12 years. But ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
How did you get into this unique
field? Did you have an experience that directed your attention
to this, or was it just circumstance?
MR. KEANE:
It was circumstances that occurred in
Michigan, where a couple came in who were infertile and they
wanted a biologically related child. Adoption was not for them.
He was of Lebanese decent, and it was important for him to father
his own child. His wife was infertile though, so we just started
looking into it.
In about six months, we will have delivered our
forty-third child, working with couples all around the world,
including several couples out of this state.
We, too, have proposed legislation in Michigan.
It's
presently with the House Judiciary Committee. We started out
with a bill that was almost as complete as the one we're talking
about here today.
After holding several public hearings, we
backed off and came in with a different type of legislation that
gives the bare minimals that acknowledge that surroqate parenting
is going on, and it acknowledges that you can enter into this
type of agreement without getting too specific. We thought it
might be better to let problems arise, to see whether or not it
is necessary to enter into legislation restricting or prohibiting
it.
-18-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you favor that kind of an approach
as opposed to a detailed approach?
MR. KEANE:
I don't think that you're ever going to get
a
11
way it's dra
here today.
I read the bill,
and I've also read some of
comments
to it. Even the
courts don't want the authority
ing them to take in
s bill here.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

•

Say that

MR. KEANE: There's an objection to the
11,
in the group o
that I have in
of me, that
courts don't want this responsibility, as was pointed out
earlier, of approving a contract that's dra
before you ever
get into it.
I
we re asking them to take too much
respons
lity. They're waiting for a dispute to arise also
before they want to hear things.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you think that
's a need for
any penalties for those who do not in fact conform to the law? I
guess if you
a general law then there's real
no ...
MR. KEANE: The penalties wouldn't be necessary.
think breach of contract would be in there.

I

I also want to address that one question that you asked
Mr. Handel earlier, about having a retarded or deformed child.
In Michigan, we have a form called "Notice of Intent to Claim
Paternity." We file that notice as soon as we know that there is
a conception. We place a presumable burden that this child to be
horn is from this man and he is responsible.
I think that would
take care of the State's interest, in the event a woman agreed to
abort but did not. This man, up front, says, "That's my child."
The State has already said that, if you father a child, you have
responsibilities.
I think that would take car8 of the State's
interest to care, at least economicalJ.y, for that child that was
born, even though the surrogate said that she would abort it if
there was determined to be somethina wrnnq with it, even though
you still may have your brearh of contract ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
be responsible?
MR. KEANE:

That the biological father would

That's correct.

It's his child ...

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But he only agreed to the
surrogate for the purpose of propagating a healthy child.
MR. KEANE: We're talking about the natural father, who
is going to end up with this child, under the agreement. We're
assuming that if we had a defective child, in one way or another,
that he wouldn't take that child.
I'm simply saying that, if we
-19-

fi
between
11 be
not

f intent and establish the legal relationship
that child, as far as the State is concerned he
le for the maintenance of that child, whether or
s possession.
If the
, who agreed to abort
sn't do so, maybe a c
1 breach of contract
maintained between those two. But, for the State's
child is maintained.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

c
area?

Under the Michigan approach, how
in interpreting the
called
to
into this

What we're trying to do, I think, is to avoid that, to
let the Legis
make those determinations and avoid that,
rather than
the court make all the law.
MR. KEANE:
I agree.
I wish that would happen in
Michigan,
have both things going on. We have court
actions going on, and we have proposed legislation being
discussed.
I
the court action is making the legislation
move forward.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
here, too.
(Laughter)

Well, it happens that way out

MR. KEANE:
I would like to point out to this Committee
that I'm almost certain, and most professors would agree, that
there's an inherent constitutional right of a man to have a
ld, whether he's married, whether he's single.
If that
important privacy right is there, then surrogate parenting is
going to go on without anybody being able to restrict it or
prohibit it.
In other words, a man will be able to pay a woman
to carry his child if his wife can't do so. So ...
CHAIID"..AN HARRIS:

Isn't that true for the wife as well?

MR. KEANE: Sure. Married or single for each. She can
go to a sperm bank and be inseminated, and nobody can stop that.
The only point I'm trying to make is that you must have
legislation of some type, to restrict and protect and so forth,
because it's going to go on. The worst thing that you could do
is try to pass legislation that would drive it underground.
ASSEr.1BLYMAN STIRLING:
It's my understanding that you
have filed action to question the validity of the baby-selli.ng
laws in Michigan.
MR. KEANE: Yes, that's correct. We filed an action
against the attorney general and the prosecutor in the State of
Michigan as to whether or not the prohibition of payment in
conjunction with an adoption applies to a surrogate arrangement.
The trial court -- circuit court -- of Wayne County held that the
prohibition would stand. We appealed that decision to the court
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of appeals, and they sustained the circuit court action, saying
"We are not going to prohibit and prevent a man from having a
child in this manner, but we are not going to let you use the
adoption statute to further that type of activity."
[Doe v
Kelley, 6 FLR 3011 (BNA), 106 Mich. App. 169, appeal denied, No.
67308]
So, what they have done, now, is allowed the child to be
born. You allow the man's name to be placed on the birth
certificate, but they're not going to let the woman's name go on
the birth certificate, and that's absurd. That case has been
appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court~ they refused to hear it.
Last week, we filed
with the U. S.
Court under writ of
certiorari. We have not heard whether or not they're going to
hear it yet.
But they have not prohibited the act
We can do
this. We can make the payment; we just can't do the adoption.
What they've caused now is couples to search out
le states
that will allow us to do the adoption, where the reporting of a
fee is not a requirement. For instance, Florida, California -where you have a step-child adoption law that doesn't require the
reporting of expenditures in conjunction with the adoption,
because one person is already the biological parent or adoptive
parent of that child. The activity is going on, and it would be
foolish to say it's not.
It's going on in 15 states now, and
still there hasn't been a Jaw passed.
I really don't. have much more to add unless you have
some questions.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm sure we have a lot of questions.
Unfortunately, the questions are sort of open-ended. They lead
to other questions, and we'd like to have some conclusionary
questions
questions that would help us to reach some specific
ends, but it is obviously very, very difficult.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Keane, relating your
experience in Michigan to your experience in the Pasadena case ...
MR. KEANE: The Pasadena case was a young lady who
volunteered to be a surrogate for a couple out of New York.
I
had never met her, and, at that time, we were working only with
volunteer surrogates, meaning that they were not paid a fee for
carrying the child. She said that she wanted to help someone.
We neither had medical personnel nor psychological personnel at
that time to help us do a proper screening.
I simply said,
"Would it be all right if I gave your name to a couple in New
York?" She was impregnated in New York. Later she was
impregnated in Pasadena, and in her fourth month of pregnancy,
she read about another woman who was paid a $10,000 fee for doing
this. She said, "I would like to have $7,500 to complete this
transaction." This couple wasn't sure if it was legal, nor did
they have $7,500 to pay her, so we came out here and started a
custody action for that child.
It later was resolved in that she
kept custody by an agreement, and his name was placed on the
-2.1-

birth certificate. There were no orders entered by the court in
any way. What that has done for me ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. KEANE:

Was that a settlement?

It's an out-of-court settlement.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
settlement ...

I can't imagine that as a

MR. KEANE: What
's done -- we've come a long way
since then, doing the psychological screening, also working with
a fee, and having their own lawyer appointed for them, and so
forth.
ASSEMBLY~~N

STIRLING:

So, it really doesn't help us too

much in retrospect ...
.HR. KEANE: Not at all. That issue has never been
determined -- what the courts are going to do if she does
withhold.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

Thank you.

f-1r. Fi tzRandolph.

PROFESSOR JOHN A. FITZRANDOLPH: Mr. Chairman, as the
dean of the law school here, let me welcome you all and thank you
for being here.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

PROFESSOR FITZRANDOLPH: About three years ago, Bill
Handel, whom you heard earlier, who is a graduate of this
institution, came to me with a problem. He said, "I'm
representing some couple, and I think I'm breaking the law." And
he probably wa~.
It's a classic case.
If he was, it's a law
that was never intended to prohibit surrogate parenting.
I'm
sure the Legislature had never heard of the phrase when they
passed that law, and it was being imposed, theoretically at
least, on a situation which is so new -- technically new -- and
as a policy matter, quite new.
As a result of that, he called my attention to the
problem, and a class at this school on legislation, which I
teach, drafted the initial bill in this area. We took it to
Assemblyman Roos, who had the foresight and wisdom to introduce
it. As it appears here today, it is not substantially different
from the way it was as it came out of the class.
The policy choices which you will have to make are the
same ones that this class wrestled with, only yours matter
because they're qoing to affect people's lives. One of the
choices was to just do as Mr. Keane suggested Michigan may be
-22-

considering, which is to pass a bill saying that surrogate
parenting is excluded from the baby-selling prohibition. That's
how we started, with that premise.
Is that all we ought to do?
On thinking it through and discussing it with various
, it seemed like some more detailed procedure was necessary
because there are some people here in this situation who need
protection, not the least of which, is the child.
I think that
in defense of this system, putting it in the courts, outlining in
some detail some minimal contract provisions and having the court
supervise it is •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you prefer this detailed approach,
as opposed to a more general one?
PROFESSOR FITZRANDOLPH:
I think so.
I think that it
makes some sense and only because all the alternatives don't make
as much sense.
I realize it's a potential burden for the courts,
but I think that, if you think in terms of what we've done here,
this bill is set up to help married couples who are infertile to
acquire a child through the only way that may be available to
them at this time.
Why put it in the courts? I guess the parallel is to
adoptions.
If we can use that analogy -- it seemed to be the one
that motivated the class and, I think, is to be viewed here.
It's parallel to an adoption situation because, as a matter of
fact, as to one of the parties it is an adoption.
The parallel
breaks down on a few particular instances, but it's the closest
thing we could find.
Courts do get involved in adoption, and the
Legislature has created some law about adoption.
The defense of this, I think, is perhaps that, while the
enforceability of the contract is a difficult issue, it seems to
me that if people are forced to go to a court, appear in a court,
they'll take the whole matter more seriously and they'll realize
there are legal consequences to breaching a contract.
I have no answer for some of the questions -- nobody has
answers for some of these questions -- except to say that it
would be judicially supervised, which, when the choice is no
supervision, seems to me to make more sense than no supervision,
no policy input from the Legislature or the courts, and the
activity continues, unabated, with no protection for anyone.
That's the justification, I think, for this more complex system.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you.
You've framed the issues
very well. Thank you very much. We appreciate your hospitality
and appreciate your being at the hearing.
Next, Marilyn Berger and Nina Kellogg.
MS. ~~RILYN BERGER: Yes, I am Marilyn Berger, president
of Infertility Resources.
I'd like to address you today on the
-23-

issue of surrogate
as seen from the idea of the
infertile couple and some of the
that we have to go
through
My name, aga , is Mari
Berger.
I have a master's in
counseling and guidance.
I
fertile woman, and I'm an
adoptive mother of two. My son, Matthew, is six and he was
adopted through L. A. County after a five-year wait and a
four-month home study previous to placement, and a year home
study after placement before the legalization took place. My
baby is two. He was found independently and adopted through the
services of Mr. David Leavitt, whom you will be talking with
later.
In my position as
s
of Infertility Resources and
counselor, I have spoken to over 600 people in the last five
years.
CHAIP~N HARRIS:
Are all these individuals who wanted
children but were unable to have them?

MS. BERGER:

Right.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Exact

How

they find you?

MS. BERGER: Through their doctor8, through agencies,
through Planned Parenthood ...
CHAIR}~N HARRIS:
access to information

I'm just wondering how people get

MS. BERGER: Not easi
like money. We're a non-prof

We have trouble advertising,
organization.

With Dr. Kel
, over
last four years -- the two of
us have counseled probably over 400 people in my home.
As you've been told, one out of six couples is
infertile. Out of those one out of six, perhaps half of them can
be helped through the services of a doctor, like Dr. Karow, to a
birth child. The rest must go on to alternative means.
97
the

On the other side
rcent of unwed
babies.

f
bi

ASSEMBLYt.1lAN STIRLING:

co , you have the problem that
mothers in
s state keep
How many?

What percent.age?

MS. BERGER: Ninety-seven percent of unwed teenage birth
mothers, and, nationwide, accord
to Time magazine last spring,
it was 96 percent nationwide. That is why it is so difficult to
find adoptable infants of any race.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

May I just ask ... ?
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Not that it's directly relevant
s subject -- in fact, it's not even indirectly relevant to
ject. Is there any particular cause that vou would be
aware of why that is happening?
to

MS. BERGER:

Well, back in ...

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Briefly -- I don't want to get
off on another subject. Do you have an impression s to why
that's occurring?
MS. BERGER: Like, 25 years ago, when I was in high
school, it was the thing for a teenage unwed mother to leave
town, to have her baby, to give it up for adoption, and then come
back.
It was a very guilty thing. Society has changed. It is
much more accepting of the unwed teenage birth mother. Society
and high schools have set up programs for her, so that she is
able to continue high school and still have her baby.
Now, there are a great many children out there for
adoption.
I really want to address this issue because I think it
is so important. Infertile couples want babies. We started out
to make babies.
I was on a great many infertility drugs for two
and a half years.
It is a long process; it is an expensive
process; it is a hurting process. What we want, just as you do,
is a healthy baby.
There are a lot of older children out there. There are
sibling groups. There are kids who have been battered. There
are kids who have gone from foster home to foster home to foster
home.
It's a tragedy, but it's a tragedy that needs to be taken
care of by all of society, and not to he the burden of the
infertile couple. You don't need to be infertile in order to
adopt.
It is also my opinion that an adopting couple should be
experienced parents if they are going to take on a child with
problems.
Now, as you've heard, these surrogate parenting groups
are springing up all over the country because couples are looking
for infants. It's time for you, the Legislature, to make a
decis
either to pass a law making surrogate parenting
illegal or to consider the needs of all the parties who are
concerned.
The surrogate needs to be screened carefully. There
need to be safeguards and standards and support for her, such as
Dr. Kellogg provides. The infertile couple needs the same kind
of protection. They need to be screened; they need to be
supported; they need to have safeguards. There need to be
standards because the result of all of this is a baby, and that
baby deserves and needs the protection of the law, as well as the
protection and care of loving parents.
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The scenario of a baby being put in a foster home while
the surrogate and the adopting couple fight it out over the
custody means a loss to everybody. It doesn't matter who wins
the legal battle; everybody loses emotionally. The child loses,
especially, because he's been in foster care for four or five
years. The foster mother loses. Whoever lost the suit loses.
Even whoever won the suit loses because she hasn't had custody of
the child for that number of years.
There is an intense need, and surrogate parenting is
going to go on, and it's up to you to decide whether it's going
to go on under the protection of the law or whether it's going to
go on surreptitiously.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
specific bill before us?
MS. BERGER:

Do you have any comments on the

Personally, I think that it's a fairly good

bill.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

Thank you.

Yes, Dr.

Kellogg.
DR. NINA KELLOGG: My name is Nina Kellogg.
I'm a
psychologist, and I am a practitioner in the field of surrogate
parenting.
I brought with me three ladies who are very dear to my
heart, so that you can look at them sitting at the table. We
have Nancy, Sue, and Becky. These are three surrogate mothers.
I think it is very important that they be seen. One of the
reasons that it's important is to get out of the concept of "What
kind of a lady can have a baby and give it away?" These are
three ladies who have convinced me that it is possible.
For me, this is the heart of the issue. The heart of
the whole issue, I think, is the surrogate mother.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
questions?
DR. KELLOGG:

Are they willing to testify or answer

Sure.

Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Have all of you had children by
fathers in a surrogate parent arrangement?
DR. KELLOGG:

They are in the process, at this point.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
that right?
DR. KELLOGG:

Okay.

Right.
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You haven't had them yet.

Is

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Well, then, some of the
questions I was go1ng to ask won't apply.
DR. KELLOGG:

Can I say just a couple things?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

DR. KELLOGG:
In addressing the bill, and as a
practitioner, I have some things that I would very much like to
add.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Certainly.

DR. KELLOGG:
I would like to see added into the bill
that there be a psychological support system built in for the
surrogates. These ladies are going to spend nine months and more
of their lives involved in the process. They will run into the
slings and arrows of society that say to them, "What are you
doing? You're crazy." I think it's enormously important, and I
think this could be included within the bill, that there be
psychological support built in.
Now, I think ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

What does that mean to you?

DR. KELLOGG: Well, the way I do it is that they are
seen in an on-going group now, every other week, so that ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Who pays for that?

DR. KELLOGG: The coup
is now paying for it.
I call
them the adoptive couple -- the father and the adopting mother.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
ss, and they pay you?
DR. KELLOGG:
ASSEMBLY~~N

No.

Is that part of the single fee

I'm being paid by the couple.

STIRLING:

As well as the fees and expenses

paid by the couple?
DR. KELLOGG:

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
understand, but ..•
DR. KELLOGG:

Exactly.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
DR. KELLOGG:

Whatever's negotiated, I

We're going to get to ...

But most of the fees are being paid by the

couple.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: We're going to get to a point
where, and it has happened ln every other area of the law, the
court's going to, at some point, say, "Just because a couple
doesn't happen to have substantial resources and therefore can't
afford this, doesn't mean that they don't have the right to have
a child, whether it be by a surrogate or in some other fashion.
That has happened in the criminal law. That has happened in
other areas.
It is eventually, I think, going to happen in this
area.
Why should a couple who is poor not have the right to
have a child through a surrogate parent, whereas one who has the
money can do so?
DR. KELLOGG: Let me tell you. Almost everything to do
with infertility is unfair.
It was unfair from the beginning ••.
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING:
get past that ••.
DR. KELLOGG:
that.

Well, I understand that.

Let's

No, no, no •••

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I appreciate that.
It's all unfair under those circumstances.

I understand

DR. KELLOGG:
Infertility work-up has always been far
more available to those who can pay for it. Most of the
insurance companies don't cover it. Right now, if you are poor,
and you are infertile, you don't even get infertile care.
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING:
I know, but we're past that
point. Abortions are granted, and we don't worry about whether
they have a television set or whether they spend the money on
something else. Medi-Cal pays for it. We get right down to the
same issue here. You don't foresee that ever happening?

DR. KELLOGG: Could be, but we're not past it, the way
you're describing it, because Medi-Cal does not pay for
infertility work-up.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
DR. KELLOGG:

It's going down hill now so I ••.

ASSE.r.lBLYMAN STIRLING:
DR.

KELLOGG~

It doesn't now.

I understand that .

... think it's even less likely if you're

poor ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I'm just talking about the
general approach of whether or not -- now, you're talking about a
psychological support ...
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DR. KELLOGG:
I feel very strongly, if it gets to the
surrogate parenting can get within the realms of the
of average fo
, then I think that, whatever the
(again,
price), that this is a crucial
You cannot, in my opinion, and I've been two years doing
it now, a
these ladies to do
without a support system for
them. However you want to arrange it, they should not be left
there all by themselves to carry this load, with all of society
on
ir back.
's where, I think, great problems will occur.
I
are much more likely to change their minds, in terms
the child and giving it to the couple.
I think the screening needs to be for the couple -- with
my program, it is that way. The couple is screened as well as
surrogate, and they are matched together and they meet each
other.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Okay. Now, in certain
licized cases, obvious , there is the pressure of
concept, and therefore that is focused on the
How does the publicity come about in our normal
s
, where one party dec
s to change his or her mind?
I'm talking about the pressure that you're talking about -support systems. Where do the surrogates get that
ssure?
DR. KELLOGG:
It's very, very simple. Most of my
s are working women.
If you are bearing a child, at a
number of months down the line, you have the large
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

And they're not married ••. ?

It doesn't matter.
DR. KELLOGG:
without being visibly pregnant.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
same pre
ce.
DR. KELLOGG:
a woman ...

Nobody bears a child

But, if you're married, you don't

You're a man, sir.

Listen one minute from

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What he's saying is that, if you're
married
you re pregnant, people are not going to know that
someone else is the father of that baby.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
pressure on you?

And they're not going to put
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you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: They're not going to put pressure on
Let's not get crazy. We're not .••

DR. KELLOGG: Wrong. Here are the kinds of places it
comes up. Married or single, my belly is out to here. My
co-workers say, "Can we give a shower for you?" I have to say,
"Whoops!
I'm not keeping this baby." This is a surrogate
baby ... "
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, don't tell me that.
"No, you can't have the shower."
(Laughter)

Just say,

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You don't have to have
psychological support for that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't have to go through an
explanation. Nobody makes you have a shower. There's no
constitutional right to a shower.
(Laughter)
Let's not get
crazy.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
he's absolutely correct.
DR. KELLOGG:
constitutional right.
CHAI~~N

That's how far we've come, but

Yes, I'm sorry.
(Laughter)

HARRIS:

You're right.

Let's hope not.

It's not a

(Laughter)

DR. KELLOGG:
No, but, for instance, the other children
of the surrogate -- her own children -- may get pressure.
"Oh,
your mommy is having a baby. What are you going to name the
baby?"
"We're not naming the baby." There are pressures that
come within the parameters ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I understand that. 'Vve' re also hoping
that people have some degree of discretion.
You know, if you're
telling people, then you obviously don't feel that there's
something that you have to worry about in terms of pressure.
DR. KELLOGG:

I agree, but I just think that things come

up •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm not sure. Let me interrupt you.
Understand this.
I don't think we're disagreeing that there's a
need for counseling, that there's a need for support. Let's not
get off on a tangent.
I think what Assemblyman Stirling is indicating is that
there are obviously other considerations as well, in terms of
economics, whether-or not the public policy may change to insure
that other people will have the right regardless of their
economic status. All of these ramifications have to be explored.
We can't ignore them and say that they're not there and not to
worry about them. That's all we're saying.
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DR. KELLOGG: All right.
I'll modify.
I think optimal
would be counseling all the way through.
If not optimal, then I
would think that you should have a requirement for counseling, in
terms of the selection of the surrogate, so that you do the best
possible to be sure that you have a stable person who is totally
aware of the contract that she's entering into, and what its
ramifications are and time length is.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I want to give you a couple of minutes
to make an uninterrupted statement, and then we'd like to ask
some questions.
DR. KELLOGG:
I see it as a triangle.
I'm not very
worried about the baby. Babies have been born, to a great
extent, healthy and normal forever.
I'm not very worried about the adoptive couple because
adoption has occurred for generations, and that has worked out
pretty well.
The big question mark I have, both as a practitioner and
as a woman, is whether surrogates -- ladies -- can indeed have
babies and give them away and remain psychologically and mentally
healthy.
You have to do it to find out.
Just as I make a lot of noise and I say this to you
right now, trying to get this started --- if two and three years
from now, down the line, as I have had an opportunity to work
with any numbers that are significant and I find that we are
damaging people, I will also make a public statement about that.
But, you can't answer the question because we don't have the
numbers until we do it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Okay. Let me ask a question now, if I
might.
I said that I didn't have any for the surrogates, because
I was going to ask originally, in the case of anyone who had
already had a child, what the experience was like and whether or
not they'd be willing to do it again. That's obviously an
inappropriate question, as they've never had the child. But, let
me ask this ...
DR. KELLOGG:
I have had two surrogates, though, whom I
have followed from beginning to end and who have birthed the
child and given it away, and they are in very good shape. We
have had a number of surrogates who, at least initially, say, "I
want my couple to know that, if they want a second child, I would
be willing to do that."
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Let me ask a question, ladies,
if I might, either individually or collectively, if all of you
would like to answer it. We will stipulate that, certainly,
there's a need for counseling and there's a need for support, but
do you find that there are undue, severe pressures on you for
having a child as a surrogate? I guess I just don't know how
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many people get that involved, other than those people who know
you personally, and I assume that your friends understand or
they're not going to pry too much into your private life.
BECKY: When I first thought about becoming a surrogate
-- I'm Becky, by the way. Before I contacted the lawyers and
Nina, I was very interested to find out, first of all, how my
husband felt about it. Once I had his support, my siblings, my
parents, my personal support group, the minister of my church -people who I really care about, who are going to be in direct
contact with me for the length of this whole experience -- I have
found a lot of support.
It has been helpful to me to be part of Nina's group
because I'm then able to say, "Well, this is how I'm encountering
my job situation" or "My children have this particular question
that I've answered this way. Do you have any more information I
can give to them?"
The screening process we went through was just to ask
whether I was I going to be an adequate surrogate or acceptable.
Not only that, but I met my adopting couple, and we were able to
discuss all the important issues, including what happens if there
is a defect in the child -- birth defect or problems. Before
contracts were signed or anything, this was worked out. How
would they feel about taking the child if there was a Down's
syndrome situation, or how would they feel about having the
option to say, "We'd like you to abort"? All that was agreed
upon when we met and talked, because •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
agreed upon in theory?

Was it agreed upon contractually or

BECKY:
It's in the contract, and also they needed to
know what my feelings were about having an abortion, whether I
would feel comfortable about carrying a child who was having a
problem and delivering that child, and how they would respond to
accepting that child.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

SUE:
I'm Sue, and I just wanted to state that the
support group is really necessary.
It's really important to know
that you've got people behind you because I find that there is
pressure from society.
When I tell people that I'm going to be a surrogate, the
first question they say to me is "Oh, my God, can you really give
the baby away?" There's a lot of pressure ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Why do you tell them? Do you go
out of your way to tell them, or does it come up in the daily
conversation? How does it happen that it's anybody else's
business other than your close friends?
-32-

SUE: Because I'm really proud of what I'm doing, and I
think a lot
people need to know aoout
because this is the
way of the future and I'm real active in this program.
I bel
in telling
about
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I'm not suggesting that it's
something you should not be proud of, but is it a program? Is it
developing into something that is being promoted and people are
being enlisted to join the program? Is that what's happening?
SUE: No, that's just me.
It's just something that I
believe in promoting because that's my belief.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
then you're doing it yourself.

But if that brings on pressures,
Are you not?

SUE: Right, but that's why it's important to have a
support group, you see.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: One more question. Do you have
the advantage of legal counsel? Someone referred to attorneys.
SUE:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
you receive from counsel?
SUE:

We do.

Who pays for those services that

The surrogate pays for her own attorney.

ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING:
When you negotiate the fee with
the adopting parents and their attorney, then part of what you
have to consider is that you're going to have attorneys' fees to
pay also, right? Is that how it happens?

DR. KELLOGG:
It is how it happens, but I think it's the
only way it could because if anyone else were paying their
attorneys' fees then you'd have collusion •..
done.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I just was wondering how it was

Yes, next witness.

NANCY:
I'm Nancy. The way I feel about the
psychological aspects of it is that sometimes you just need
someone to talk to who's involved in the program-- not another
surrogate, but someone who can help you shuffle your feelings and
find out exactly how you feel about what you're doing, and -- the
pressures don't bother me because I don't care what anybody says.
I'm proud of what I'm doing.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. ~\Thy are you
doing it? Why are any of you doing it? My wife doesn't want to
be pregnant.
(Laughter)
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NANCY: I've had four kids, and,
lly, I don't
think there's anything more beautiful in the whole
than to
wake up in the morning and see that baby
giving me
"evil eye" out of his
I
has
the right to go through that and to have
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So your basic reason is that you
that those persons who aren't able to have children should be
able to have one and you're willing to lend you body to that
effort.
NANCY:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

Do you all have the same

reason?
SUE: Yes.
I firmly believe in the statement that she
made, and that's the reason that I'm doing it, though I do not
have children of my own.
I made that choice.
I firmly believe
in creating a child for an infertile couple because they
desperately want one and I can provide it for them.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So, basically, you're all
missionaries, and your purpose is strictly to do good things.
may sound like a hard question, but I really want to know.

It

BECKY: Four years ago, when I started thinking about
this, one of my sisters was having an infertility problem. At
that time, I was working for a group of obstetricians who were
weekly hearing from couples who were not able to have children of
their own.
The unfairness of it seemed very strong to me, and the
fact was that I was able to have children so easily and carry
them, and
didn't interfere with the rest of my life.
I worked
to the day before I delivered.
It seemed to me that, since I
lt complete with my own family and did not want any more
ldren and was able to do this so easily,
would be my way of
giving a gift.
It's hard to put into words because it's an
emotional response and a state of mind.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How much does the fee play in your
willingness to undertake this pregnancy?
BECKY:
It's very nice, in this day and age with
lation and the struggling of raising three
ldren of our
own.
It will come in handy ••.
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
Would you say the
ultimate deciding factor in terms of your will
Obviously, you're not doing this just for the
at all insinuating that, but I'm trying to get
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I'm not

Also, what kind of minimum
in order to convince you
's
hassle and soc
1 pressure?

is necessary
all the

BECKY:
It's my
is
five to ten thousand dollars.
approximately
a year's worth of involvement in this who
with the
inseminations, then the carrying of the child, delivery, and
recovery.
It's nice.
I am providing a
for somebody, if
you're going to look at it -- you know, there are many ways to
look at it. Money is not the factor
's controll
this
mostly, though.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I understand.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But when you talked about -- and
please don't misunderstand -- I'm not playing with you here
but it is a basic issue. When you're talking about the
unfairness of a couple not being able to have a child, what about
the unfairness of a couple not being able to have a child but who
cannot afford the fee? How do you deal with that issue as it
relates to your saying that the money is not the basic factor?
Suppose some poorer couple asked you, and they just couldn't pay
a certain fee.
How would the fairness of that feel to you?
DR. KELLOGG:
I think that can be addressed in another
way.
If you have a limited number of babies available, if those
who have the funds would choose to use a surrogate as their
process of acquiring a child, then you would have a smaller
number competing for those babies that are available through
other methods.
Now, in my interviewing of surrogates -- and I guess
I've interviewed between 30 and 50 surrogat.es -- I find that for
almost all of them, there has been a duality of motivation.
It
would be ridiculous to say that the money was not a motivator.
But, I have found none ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

There's nothing wrong with

that .••
DR. KELLOGG:
... that did not have the other motivation
as well and did not see themselves as doing a very magnificent
thing -- "being part of a miracle" is the way I put it.
But,
I ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me rush this along because I don't
think you can answer Mr. Stirling's question, but I would just
like to make the point that I think Mr. S
ing's question is
very valid.
I think that, if you look at the logical extension of
what we've heard, there's a constitutional right for a man to
have a child and for a woman to have a child.
If you look at
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abortion as
one situation that has developed and become
widespread
at one time, abortion was in the closet and done in
back rooms
alley ways.
It became increasingly accepted as a
legitimate r
of a woman. Now we've gotten to
point where
public policy,
luding constitutional law, dictates that a
woman has a right to an abortion, whether or not she can pay for
it. It's been consistently upheld by the courts, and that's one
of the real biting conflicts between the Legislature and the
courts because the Legislature constantly refines and limits
abortion rights but the courts constantly expand them.
I'm
thinking that we need to address this as it pertains to
surrogates at some point. Perhaps you can't address it, but I
think it's a legitimate question.
DR. KELLOGG:

I think it is.

There is one way I -- something slipped into my act, and
I've kept it
because there are two sides. There is the AID,
the donor insemination if the man is infertile. There is the
surrogate on the other side of the coin if the woman is
infertile. However, what I've found is that on one side it takes
minutes.
On the other side, it takes nine months.
By the way, the donor who gives his sperm to the sperm
bank is paid.
I don't know whether you know that. He is paid
less, but then it takes less of his time.
ASSEMBLY~~N

isn't

?

STIRLING:

That's just a biological

(Laughter)
DR. KELLOGG:
UNKNOWN :

That's right.
But he can make a lot of depos

(Laughter
DR. KELLOGG: Yes, you can make a
of depos s in
nine
very seriously, you see,
we so-called
"borrow" the egg, we must borrow with it the incubator. That, of
course, is the difference in the whole thing.
It's an enormously
involving thing on their part.
I don't know what is the right amount of money. When we
set up the program, we didn't know what was the right amount of
f
s were already out
in the field.
How do
you pay somebody -- what amount is a fair amount for ten or
eleven or twe
or fourteen month's involvement on someone's
time? If you break it down that way, it doesn't sound quite as
big as when
it in a lump sum, I think.
The
lives are terribly interrupted. They spend a lot
of time in and out of the doctor's offices.
Insemination doesn't
seem to go
easily.
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you.

I don't
Someone

what
got to come

amount
a

I

one.

answer on

I know
agency
determine the factors -- the
adoptive parents and match them
mother. Does that happen at all
DR. KELLOGG: Yes.
It certain
does, as
possible. It's funny. One time we were accused of
racist,
and I just did a double take because, in a
real sense, we
were probably the least racist -- the
anything -- because
we are sort of making children to order. Right now, in case you
know a Chinese surrogate, I'm looking
one; I just want you to
know that I'm looking ...
look.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
(Laughter)

Wait just a

1

11

a

DR. KELLOGG: The thing that is kind
marve
this system is that the people can have some say about how
child will look. For instance, if the wife of the couple is
feet one inch, we're not going to get a six-foot tall surrogate
for her, or if she's very fair, we're not going to get someone
with an olive complexion. There is much more than that, but
sometimes with the private adoption, if the couple has been
looking for a year or a year-and-a-half, they hardly find a young
lady who matches their wants and say, "Just a minute, I'm going
to put you on hold and find five others and see which one's best
looking." They usually say, "Eureka, I have found my baby!"
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
consideration in this area.

But there is some of that

DR. KELLOGG: Also, some
we can
are
very exciting. We can establish, to a
extent, whether
we're talking about a bright woman. We can discover whether
we're talking about someone who is psychologically pretty sound.
We can talk about whether she's going to take
sically good
care of herself through the pregnancy, how she's going to eat,
what sort of drugs and stuff. From
le's
of
,
there is some reassurance that this child of
irs that will be
coming is going to be born by a woman
cares
how she is
bearing their child. They find this very significant and very
helpful.
Another role that I serve is that I
Although my surrogates meet once
ir
delivery -- and most of the surrogates have
into the delivery room -- the coup
can call
say, "Hey, Dr. Kellogg, is she still
properly? Is she going to give us our
place -- a year is a very long time
have
hanging out there and waiting.
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can

CHAIRMAN HARRI :

One final que

ASSEMBLYMAN
the
been
,
combinations or
upon something
learned years later -- hearing defect,
therefore, you were the person who put
happens in other areas?
DR. KELLOGG:

Rave
the case
-- and,
? I mean

Well, I hear what you're saying.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I'm just wondering.
foreseeable? Is that a possibility?

Is that

DR. KELLOGG:
I think it's a possibility, and our
numbers are not significant.
I don't know whether you're
married, and I don't know whether you have children.
I think all
of us who are biological parents or any other kind of parents
take a chance when we have a child. You don't have a guarantee
the way your baby is coming out.
ASSEr.mLYMAN STIRLING:

Oh, I appreciate that.

DR. KELLOGG: My sense of most of these couples -- as
long as we're totally as straight as we possibly can be with them
-- is that we're not going to run into that. They want to be
parents, but they're willing to be realistic parents.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I think that may be a little naive
because I think people develop expectations, particularly if you
go back to your earlier comment about being able to pick and
choose and say, "Well, you know, I want the baby to kind of look
like this, and so on and so forth." People develop those
expectations.
It's a contract, and they've pa
for it, as
opposed to just taking their chances with a natural circumstance.
They have a s
where they want everything exactly like
expected
to be, and if not ...
MS. BERGER: Mr. Stirling, may I answer something from
an adoptive
s point of view?
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Be as
f as
can.
I've
kind of led us off in a different direction than the Chairman may
want to go, so I
ize, but ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

No, that's fine.

An
older son was a
was a Poli
attempt
The
rth
Jewess.
was a lot of mixture on the birth father's side.
, my older
A great deal of American Indian is included;
son has very almond
s. He's a gorgeous child. He has dark
hair.
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My baby
average height.
the Anaheim Rams as a 1

was
him on
years.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
(Laughter)
then!

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(Laughter)

How

Ra

s?

They'll be back in Oakland way before

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You have to understand that
Chairman is from Oakland.
(Laughter)
MS. BERGER:

•

In other words, I think ..•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Don't waste money buying season
tickets for next year.
(Laughter)
MS. BERGER: Our idea of average and her idea of average
must have been about a foot apart. Hey, we got two gorgeous
sons!
It doesn't matter. They're our kids.
DR. KELLOGG: But, the interesting thing -- and I've
been watching them both since birth -- you know what people do?
People look for the similarities, rather than see her very
dark-haired son and her very blond-haired son -- they are
different in coloring -- the thing that people say is "My,
have such two large babies." So people will reach
that
is comfortable. People don't want freaks; they really want
acceptable people. That's what they go for.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, ladies, I want to thank all of
you for the insightful testimony that
've given. Certainly
that which comes from personal experiences is most helpful. We
can get all the technical data we want, but it's hard getting
some particular insights from people who are actually
experiencing the difficulties of dealing with this.
I apprec
your willingness to come forward and share your experiences.
Thank you.
DR. KELLOGG:
when you need us.

Thank you very much.

We are available

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. All right. May I have
Karen Lane, David Leavitt, Theodore Eckerman, and Francis
Pizzulli?
MR. PETER JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, Assemblyman Stirling,
I'm Peter Jensen with the State Bar of Californ
I want to
just briefly introduce our witnesses, if I could, and give you a
little background.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Sure.
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MR. JENSEN: We asked two committees to take a look at
the issue
re addressing today, our
Committee
and our Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee is still seeking
to investigate
some of the issues
s area, and
we will have some
for you at
time
We do have today, though, a witness from our Adoptions
Committee, Karen Lane, and the chairman of that committee, John
sner, who will answer specific questions for you. Happily, we
are only focusing on those particular legal questions.
The Adoptions Committee, Mr. Chairman, has been involved
this issue
several years and has investigated all of the
literature -- general and legal literature -- in this area.
It
has specifically analyzed the legislation before you and can give
you some specific feedback on the particular provisions therein.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'd like to mention one point. Ms.
Young indicated to me an article, "Surrogate Mother's Motivation:
Initial Findings" by Dr. Phillip Parker.
[Exhibit I]
It was
sented in New Orleans in May of 1981 and is included among our
hearing exhibits today. It gives some insight as to the
motivation of the woman who would in fact be willing to carry a
child to term for an adopting couple.
In just reading it briefly
whi
the witnesses were testifying, I found that it does give
some interesting perspectives on that issue.
If anyone wants to
enlarge
own understanding of this, then I would certainly
recommend the article.
Now,
me ask one question before your witnesses
testify. Have you looked at this issue in light of this
specific bill? If so, I would like your comments to include
that.
If not, then let us know that they are general comments
that don't neces
ly pertain specifically to the bill that is
at hand.
MS. KAREN LANE:
I'm Karen Lane, repre
the State
Bar Committee on Adoptions, and our comments are both general and
specific. We have responded almost part by part to Assemblyman
Roos' bill. Many of the modifications in the bill have been at
our direction, and we will continue to comment here.
The Committee on Adoptions does support legislation
which would approve surrogate parenting. We feel that the direct
benefit is that it would permit parties to get the protections by
virtue of that law and also get out from under
prohibitions
that exist, as has been pointed out earlier this morning.
f
and really,
I would like to
begin -- has to do with the fact that all morning long, we have
really heard a very interesting direction
the testimony.
Everything that has been pointed out so
has been from the
standpoint of one program: one surrogate foundation.
I will
that without knowing more about it, I will defer that the
-40-

expertise and the
reputable and
not just
izing
s
is not going to be a one-program Cali
we have to be extremely careful to
bill goes into effect that allows any
with much less expertise, to be involved.
adoption in general -- there are very few
expertise in adoption as a part of the
handles an adoption here and there;
ramifications in doing so.

of answers
California,
s
to
California who have
ld. Every attorney
would know the

With that as a beginning, I would 1
to point out some
of the problems that may occur in expanding
s to anyone who
will be involved. One of the indirect bene
s that doesn't have
to be addressed by the act itself is that, in keeping with what I
just said, by having an act like this, many attorneys may feel
more comfortable getting involved. This should bring down the
excessive fees; there would be more "competition." I'm not
talking about advertising. We'll get to that-- either I or Mr.
Leavitt will talk about that.
I think that excessive attorneys'
fees should come into play because of more involvement by people.
One of the important things that I note in the bill
itself, and the committee would like to point out, is that much
of the bill is treated in a contract environment. We would very
much, and have recommended this before, like to see the bill
treated from an adoption procedure standpoint. One of the most
important things that we just will not go along with is who and
where. We feel that jurisdiction should only be assumed over
California petitioners, just like it is in any other adoption
situation.
I do not believe that we are intending to open up
California to anyone in this whole country,
luding Michigan,
to have those people come here, sign a contract, make a baby,
then turn around and go home. Who oversees
? We strongly feel
that ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How do we 1
understand.
I know what you're saying.

that?

I don't

MS. LANE: By saying that the j
sdiction is assumed by
where the petitioners reside.
If they are California res
,
fine; they can file here.
Every adoption petition in this state
can only be filed in the jurisdiction
the petitioners
reside. We cannot file if a couple from Kentucky wants to adopt
a California baby. They do not file the
petition in
California. It's not a California court that oversees the whole
process; it's a Kentucky court, and they have to comply with
Kentucky laws.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I'm not sure this is that simple, but
I'm listening to you. Go ahead.
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s

1

waiver, but I don't think that there should be a waiver. Again
you are not dealing all the time, or can project that you are
dealing, with a program or group that has
se. As
young ladies pointed out, they may or may not have retained
separate counsel. At the
, the attorneys who are probably
approaching them are the adopting parents'.
I think it is
adversary in that they really have much more of an interest. How
can one contract be objectively handling the situation for both
parties?
Even more particularly, there are a couple parts of the
bill that just have no clarity and absolutely need it. The issue
of insurance. How much insurance, for ~vhom and why? Monetary
compensation -- how open-ended are we going to be? Does that
mean if I have $100,000 -- and want to spend it -- I can go find
someone for $80,000. When I say "competition within the legal
field," I am not implying that this should be advertised as the
highest bidder.
I really do not believe that there should even
be a prohibition waived as to advertising for this, any more than
we can solicit in California and advertise for a mother already
pregnant.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me make sure I understand.
saying there should or should not be any •.•

You're

MS. LANE:
I think there should not be advertising any
more along those lines ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I'm talking about a limitation on
fees; I want to make sure I understand that.
MS. LANE:
I feel that there should at least be a
ceiling.
I think that it certainly stands to reason that you can
have a surrogate who doesn't want a lot of money, and that's who
you're really looking for. Many times, what I'm sure will happen
in the future, is a couple will come and say, "We found a mother
who wants to be our surrogate." It's not going to be vli thin a
program, where you build your surrogate mothers, you build your
clients, and you match them together.
It's going to be very much
like an adoption opportunity.
"We found a pregnant woman, and
she's like us." Now what happens? The prospective surrogate
comes to the attorney. That's where it may start.
Actually, as far as the nine-month screening process -yes, it may be wonderful, but she's relinquishing before she's
even inseminated. All her rights have to be established before
the psychological screening, because she already-- it's too
late. That's an issue there.
I do feel that at last separate
counsel will insure some protections.
Again, as to monetary compensations -- perhaps a
ceiling, or at least to set up more particularly what we are
looking at, so that we don't start playing a real money game
here, which I don't think it was intended to be. Again, this
could direct that it is.
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There
been
been -out
the most
was in
rebuttable
s
the father.
But
that the husband should at least,
we're
compromise
sign that he is aware of the situation because no matter what
happens, it could still fall that the re
il
s back to
What if she comes out here and the husband is
in
Louisiana and doesn't even know what she's do
You're dealing
with family relationships, and I think, at least,
should be
mutual awareness, even if he is not going to
to consent to
she does so we don't have legal actions later, where he
comes in and says, "But, I'm the father; I know it and want to
prove it." That would be helpful. Aga ,
wouldn't
happen with this foundation; but, you know, the
lems that
occur in all kinds of law are not from the
what they're
ing anyway. That's an unfortunate
We're trying to protect us all.
We are trying to have some kind of overs
social service. We changed an order in the bill
is filed with the court, it should be
be some social service or even court process,
conciliation court, which oversees the kind of unique
would be
lved here.

study

We are again depending on what
sure about the need
what would take place
1

soc 1 workers
motivation and

m

many of our
to
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

MR. JOHN R. BEISNER:
John Beisner,

Yes.

Before we go to Mr.
of the State Bar

'm
on

One

icular point that I would
to
of the comments that have
indicated a contract to
I don't think we conceive of
ld.
conceive
s as a contract
The
would become the respons
regardless of the health of the child.
The
it indicates

point indicated is
a contract approved
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itself,
shall

include.
So,
inference, if nothing else, is that
contract as presented to
court is approved at that first
court hearing. We're basical
suggesting that that
to be fi
so that the court does not get into the approval
process of the contract at the initial presentation of the
petition to the court -- the initial review
The court would then become involved. The court wou
retain j
sdiction of the interpretation of the contract through
the initial petition up to the finalization of the adoption.

•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. There is,
obviously, an analogy between a so-called traditional adoption
and a surrogate adoption.
It doesn't necessary follow complete
down -- in fact, it doesn't follow completely down the line. We
have very detailed rules for normal adoptions. Do you think this
legislation should be general or should it be even more detailed
than the bill that's before us?
MS. LANE:
I believe that the committee feels that it
should be as detailed as possible. If we don't have the answers
to as many of the problems that could arise, then it would be
worse to have a bill that doesn't deal with that.
One of the things that we would, again, like to avoid is
a dual kind of jurisdiction. We feel that the family court -the adoption court -- should be the one to oversee it all and not
take this as a separate contract action.
"Well, heck, we lost
the family senseJ let's go over to contracts and just sue on
breach of contract."
I think it's important to set out who has jurisdict
and what procedure should be followed.
MR. BEISNER: We have realized that, basically, there's
no way that we're going to put a bill together to cover all the
problems. There can't be a bill put together to cover all the
problems because, as you have indicated, you ask a question which
leads to additional questions, as opposed to a determination of
answers. As more things get added, obviously, more questions are
going to be asked. The point, we feel, is that, in general, we
realize that surrogate parenting is a fact and is going to go on.
We do believe that there should be legislation. We believe that
the legislation should be so that the courts are involved in the
control of the system and as early as possible, preferably prior
to insemination.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
or premature?
MR. BEISNER:

Do you think the legislation is timely

Timely.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Leavitt.
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MR

DAVID

Thank

. Cha

State Bar
but I am not
I
been a member of that
ten
years, and I was
when this
I have
been struggl
, as I am sure everyone on
, with
this contradiction between a deep feel
are an appropriate method of curing some
of
infertility, and there really is no reason
't
,
a nagging
that we are opening up a
Pandora's box of problems that are just horrifying.
I have been
trying, as I am sure you have, to reconcile these two
considerations in my own mind.

I've
to a number of seminars.
I
've heard
everybody talk who's ever talked on the
ect, and we have had
hearings and meetings
the State Bar committee and all the
rest. My feeling is that it is premature to draft legislation.
As chairman of a maior committee, I am sure
vou are
of
how difficult it is-to draft good legislation in ;ny field, and,
in this field, consequences of the proposed legis
ion just
cannot be divined.
I
with the State Bar Committee on Adoptions that,
than
s
a contract s
we are
1
a quasi-adoption situation. There are one or two
iples of
the adoption law that I think are applicable
I think one
of the reasons that there is the
of the notion of a
surrogate
fear of the
that in
adoption f
we recognize it as proper,
even
and moral and ight, for a woman who is ace
lly pregnant to
place her
with a suitable
cannot have
so that that couple can adopt the
ld, give it a
and
ace
1
can
together
But underlying the adoption
Penal Code, which says that, whi
you can
expenses of the girl who places her child for adoption, you can't
buy the baby.
I think that we are struggl
with the
notion of buying the baby, on the one hand, and giving a gift of
life, on the other.

from
svil
Now, we have had
sses
Dr.
addressed you about
We had this very lovely surrogate mother
motivation. She had three children; she
s having babies;
s looking at
thinks everybody should have the j
of
them out of
Dr. Levin, who was one of the pioneers
us many
ago
of
s
is a woman who
ls the ideal
babies, who
ls at
who likes
feels
st when
is
,
making a
of something precious
she is
s is
filling herself
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similar to an adoption, that is to say, where an expectant mother
feels that she cannot properly
her baby home and wishes to
make it a gift to another
and at the same time take the
benefits of going home
the responsibilitv.
In the surrogate parent situation, we are running into
the problem of paying a fee for a service akin to a baby.
It is
clearly against the law to pay a fee for a baby, and I think the
hang-up here is paying the fee for the service.
I find that
"over the line." I see no objection to defraying the reasonable
expenses of the mother.
I'm not saying, necessarily, that I
disagree with the payment of the fee, I just -- that's where I
get hit in the gut, the idea of the fee being paid for the
service of making a baby.
This leads me to one of the major objections to the
bill.
I think that something must be built into any legislation
that is going to set up certain qualifications for surrogate
mothers.
I think, for example, they absolutely must be over a
certain age, which is a mature age.
I believe they ought to be
required to have another child first.
I don't think that's an
unconstitutional requirement because it is rationally and
reasonably related to a proper public purpose, and that is that a
woman not get herself into something she maybe doesn't
understand.
I think that the experience of giving birth is such
a unique experience in the life of a woman that it may safely be
said that a woman who has never given birth before cannot
intelligently and knowingly enter into a contract to do it and
know what she is doing.
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
If we do not in fact eliminate the
legality of a fee in these contractual relationships, then would
you agree that you ought to put limits on it? Is that a prospect
that would logically follow in terms of your ...

MR. LEAVITT:
years, and my thinking
unquestionably you can
you might replace lost

My thinking isn't clear.
I have devoted
is still not clear.
I think
pay legitimate expenses.
Unquestionably,
income. A modest -- I don't know.

You see it's the line between something you are
purchasing, a marriage and an assignation.
I mean I don't want
to characterize it that way because it is something different
from that.
One of the things that bothers me, as Mrs. Lane has
said, is that you are going to have Surrogate Mother magazine,
which is a compendium of pictures, of cuties who, for a price,
will get pregnant.
I don't think we want in California, or
anywhere else, to make a life's career for some women of having a
baby for nine months and three months vacation and then another
baby.
They can spend a lifetime having babies, $25,000 a year.
I am not sure that that's a proper occupation for us to license
or regulate or permit in California.
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I can
example, again with Surrogate Mother
magazine
se thea
1 agents -- are we going to
license
parent agents? Fellows who
11 go out with a
string of women and negotiate
for them? The commercial
aspects
s just scare me to death, and
act
self is
utterly silent as to who can be a surrogate. The idea of
psychological screening -- that is kind of a pat phrase which is
in the statutes -- but what in the world is psychological
screening? I don't have to tell you in litigation we find
psychiatrists on fifteen sides of every issue.
You can prove
anything if you get the right psychological counselor, and it
sn't help here.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt and ask all three of
you who have test1fied thus far whether or not you feel there is
any constitutional problem.
I was asking about married women in
terms of their ability to serve as surrogate mothers and whether
or not there were any legal limitations, i.e., the husband or
whatever. Do you think it's clear?
MR. LEAVITT:
Stanley v Illnois [405 U.S. 645 (1972)]
says that the father of a child has certain constitutional
rights.
The non-father of the child, I don't think has
constitutional rights to that right.
Of course, we talk in
California of "presumed" fathers in Section 7004 of the Civil
Code. Presumed fathers are usually actual fathers.
You can
rebut the presumption if he is her husband but not the father.
don't think that is a right of constitutional dignity.

I

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Beyond that though, you would not see
any rights that the husband of the surrogate mother would have as
to this whole transaction?
MR. LEAVITT:
I don't see that the Constitution would
prevent the Legislature from dealing him out.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
You don't think he would have legal
rights for
consortium or anything?
MR. LEAVITT:
I think the Legislature could deal him
out. The Legislature has dealt out alienation of affections and
a few of those old torts, you know, and I think they can deal
that one out also.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, that answers my question.

MR. LEAVITT:

One thing that Mr. Handel presented to the
describing
s contract absolutely disturbs
I can imagine. Mr. Handel said, "Well, we
have a contract that says if the surrogate changes her mind, we
are going to sue her for damages, punitive damages, emotional
distress." How in the world can any lawyer in the entire state
of California permit an unpregnant woman to sign a contract that
might set her down in that courthouse for five years, jury
trials,
s,
s' fees, agony and distress?
Committee
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I mean, until you have been a party in a lawsuit, you
could never know how horrible it is. Justice Cardozo, I think,
once said that, next to his own funeral, he would
a
party in a lawsuit. How in the
can we have some young
woman, who is trying to do something noble, at risk that if her
circumstances change, if something comes out of left field that
she didn't anticipate and she can't go through with it, she is
going to be tied up in the courts forever and God knows where she
can get the money to pay the damages or the attorneys' fees.
I
think that's wrong.
The State Bar Committee on Adoptions has opposed, and I
agree, the idea of specific performance -- that babies should be
dragged from their mothers' custody kicking and screaming, no
matter what kind of a contract they signed. We have had a law in
this state for years that the grown-ups cannot bind the child on
a waiver of support, for example. The child himself has an
independent right to have his support and custody and welfare
considered by the court.
Another thing that really bothers me here also is
this doesn't talk about the paramount interest of the child.
Fundamental to all our child custody laws is the paramount
consideration of the welfare and best interests of the child.
This thing just ignores it completely.
For example, suppose the husband gets the surrogate
pregnant and his wife dies.
Suppose he's sent off to prison.
Under this bill, if the surrogate wants to keep the child, she is
liable for damages to the husband whose wife died and who doesn't
have a mother for the baby. No court can really interfere.
I'm
not really sure that we should have a bill that utterly ignores
the interests of the baby, and yet that's what
does.
So, I think it is premature. We're making babies. What
this bill says, in effect, is that we are going to make babies
that weren't there before.
Intentionally, we're going to make
new people and they are going to have entire lives to live,
either as burdens on society, benefits to their parents. They
are going to have to mature, be educated, be supported. Somebody
once said it costs a hundred and some odd thousand dollars to
raise every single child. And, we are going to make one, and I
don't think we dare make one unless some very serious questions
have been answered.
I haven't even heard approaches to the
answers this morning.
CHAIR¥~N

testimony.

HARRIS:
Thank you.

MR. LEAVITT:

Yes, sir.

I appreciate your

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Eckerman, please.
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's a field that is
1 the time.
You are getting more and more insight, and genet
engineering is
expanding at a very rapid rate.
I have heard no reference to the
situation
I understand, and I'm assured by gynecologists
that
is coming along the line) wherein a woman makes an
election to have a child, where she perhaps may have some
birth-bearing impediment but the physicians extract
egg from
her ovary.
is fertilized, perhaps by her husband, and in
turn is placed in a surrogate. That is going to be one of the
next steps in
s legislation. Of course, it
s not
into
The

irman raised the question of
s,
surrogate's spouse have. Our committee has
certa ly obtaining his consent,
's
his
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to the
determin
to of
but I

financial profile of a given
court at the time of the
paternity is submitted to
much direction as to
think accountability
Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I was ask
myself what would happen
if the adopting parents were killed
an automobi
accident
prior to the birth or the delivery of the baby? I was just
wondering about estate matters and other kinds of things. This
is really getting complicated.

•

I appreciate the testimony, sir .
Mr. Pizzulli and Ms. Bernhard.
MR. FRANCIS C. PIZZULLI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
giving the Bioethics Committee an opportunity to present their
views today.
I might first specify that these are the views
the Bioethics Committee solely and not those, at this time, of
the Los Angeles County Bar Association.
I want to preface several things here. First, we do
have a report today, and we would request that that be made
of today's hearing record.
[Appendix A]
CHAIR}~N HARRIS:
Before you te
fy, would you
introduce yourself again, even though I did it, just for the
record?

Sure. Francis Pizzulli and Linda
is
Bernhard,
me,
the
cs Committee. This
an inter-disc linary committee composed not only of lawyers but
physicians, philosophers, and soc 1 scientists.
There are
questions, I think, that you, Mr.
Chairperson, have raised today that we would like to put our
comments in context and those primarily being:
Is this
legislation premature? Are there constitutional problems? What
are we to have in terms of remedies?
As we understand this bill, two primary facets of it
involve authorizing remedies for enforcement of the surrogate
contract, either through specific performance or for damages,
and, in cases of custody dispute, that instead of Section 4600,
which applies in all custody disputes outside of this -- which
looks to the best interests of the child to determine who should
get that child -- the provisions of this contract would govern.
I might qualify that the interests of the child are not to be
considered absent extraordinary circumstances, wh
are not
specified in the bill. We believe
, without these
provisions, the bill as currently constituted really loses all
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controvers
and the ones
therefore our
is

11.

the issues of
Mr. Leavitt
spoke
this, and I
, even with
the provis
b 11, that we are
many courts
wrest away a newborn child from a natural
give it to
someone so
on the
is of a contract.
ink the reason
that the best
sts of
child standard is excluded is
probably because in normal situations the child would be left
with the only human being that it is bonded to at that point in
time, absent a finding that the surrogate mother has suddenly
become a very unfit mother, which presumably would not have been
found ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Would the court require the return of

the fee?
MR. PIZZULLI: We believe, and I would like to point
out, there s an area which is appropriate for an analogy.
I
think Mr. Leavitt was suggesting it. There are existing statutes
which we think provide guidance in this area.
They are Civil
Code Sections 43.4 and 43.5. They say that there is no cause of
action for a breach of a promise to marry, and that applies not
only to breach of contract remedies.
For example, in the mid
'50s, the California Supreme Court said, "Well, if someone really
jilted someone and fraudulently promised to marry them, we may
consider a tort remedy for fraud."
I suppose the proponents of
this bill are saying intentional infliction of emotional distress
in punitive damages. Now,
1959,
Legislature stepped in
immediate
to correct that and enacted Section 33.4, which said
, even if
fraudulent promise to marry or promise
to cohabit,
11 is no cause of
that may lie.
se to marry,
Of course, the logical extension of a
part for
a promise to cohabit, which is a euphemism in a
sexual relat
, is a promise to bear a child.
I think one of
low breach
questions
should be asked is, if we don't
ld in this
contract
area, why we
even
area.
In answer to
Sections 43.4 and 43.5 do
received as a re
of a
, if
an expensive
And, I would assume that if an analogy
fees
s were given to the
the baby, that perhaps there is a rest
"resti
" meaning non-enforcement of

the cases under
property
For
it
, if
decided to

We
that, because of these
with the
remedies and also the constitutional problems (and I guess
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has

been perceived earl
),
do not suggest that
there is a requirement
abort, or
a
court can actually
scovers that
the child, for example,
hand
we have to ask ourse
s
to have
money damages as penalties
Is it constitutional to now require
her to keep the child if that is something
't bargain for
originally? Probably, I would suspect,
those are still
forms of penalties for the exercise of
to
, and
therefore we have const
ional problems
One thing I would like to stress, because I th
as
Assemblyman Roos prefaced this bill, he referred to existing
alternative lifestyles. What we perceive is a
fference between
a laissez-faire situation, in which we permit people to make
promises to marry, which they can then breach -- to have
surrogate parenting contracts, which they can then breach. That
is one thing.
It is another thing for the State to step in,
affirmatively promote and authorize a program, and regulate it
because, once it does that,
is state action and that's when
you start raising constitutional issues.
One, for example, raised earlier by the Chairperson and
other people, is what if we have a single person who wants to
avail themselves of this way of having a baby. Reference was
made to feminists who go to sperm banks. We believe that there
are serious constitutional issues in this bill restricting or
precluding single people from having access to that technology.
Under cases such as Eisenstadt v Baird (405 U.S. 438 (1972)] and
other ones, the developments of the concept are that first
married peop
have the right to contraceptives and then single
people have the right to contraceptives, and in intimate
decisions regarding whether to bear or beget a child, the Supreme
Court has not found a great distinction between married people
and single people up to this point in time. So that, while under
existing pol
single people may do
s, once this
slation
comes in,
ch only allows infertile couples to have
, we see
a constitutional problem there.
Therefore, among other reasons, we think it advisable to
perhaps consider a Michigan approach, which is, to the extent
that people do perceive a criminal prohibition on this sort of
thing, maybe the thing to do is to erase criminal sanctions but
perhaps reconsider whether the State, at this
, ought to
involve itself in such detail or such abnormal remedies in a
field, which even, I think, Dr. Kellogg said that they still need
time to study what these surrogate mothers -- psychological
attributes. We need long-term studies. She said, "We need to be
able to
it to find out the information." I
that.
However, perhaps, the legislation should wait
information and sociological study is uncovered.
paper.

There are several other minor points
sented in our
I believe, again going to the constitutional ssue, the
-53-

test of whether someone is
test. One is
that a doctor finds medical
is
le.
the
can use b
control for a
ss
I
are other considerations, for example, whether homosexual couples
would quali
as an infertile couple
that standard.
It
ses a
of issues there.
I bel
the other points we have to raise have
covered
were discussed somewhat by
s
idential
of records, separate counsel, the matter of fees,
whether it should be handled by the Department of Social
Services, and whether in fact there should be a relation in
connection
the fees as to how much the middle
le,
lawyers or
, get as opposed to the surrogate.

There is one final question.
It is not clear to
Bioethics Committee at this time whether in fact it is all that
easy to just make an exception under the baby-selling statutes
s practice. That would obviously be the eas st solution
to permit
to go on whi
we gather more information,
I
think the enforcement stance is now that no one is being
prosecuted. Probably it is not a very abusive situation.
Surrogate Parent Foundation has seemed to have acted in a
non-abusive way. But, I do believe that Mr. Leavitt's comments
are very cogent, and that is Section 273 of the Penal Code is
concerned about economic coercion -- going to court, women
are desperately in need of financial resources and have something
to give; that is, a child.
I am not sure that the pol
s
behind there can so easily be accommodated by allowing surrogate
where
is a substantial fee paid
the services.
to our original presumption, and
problem with the approach of
We do not see this as a
for
s.
s is motherhood, and those are
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Ms. Bernhard, would you 1

all of

MS. LINDA BERNHARD: No, I think he's
bases I would have mentioned.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
{Laughter)

to add

You are the best witness today!

Let me thank you all very much for
more witnesses in
at this point is to break
five
s.
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te
groups, and what I
lunch

(Lunch
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We
11
afternoon session of
the hearing.
now go to our
of witnesses.
Those witnesses are
ssor Herbert
Monsignor
William Levada. Would you come forward, gentlemen?
I also want to introduce my colleague, Assemblyman
Alister McAlister, from my county as well as Santa Clara County.
He has joined us for the afternoon session.
PROFESSOR HERBERT T. KRIMMEL:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm Herbert Krirr~el.
I'm a professor of law at Southwestern
University School of Law, where I teach jurisprudence and
bioethics.
I'd like to thank the Committee for inviting me to
appear and testify before it, and in deference to the limited
time which the Committee has to hear oral testimony, I prepared a
written statement on Assembly BilJ 3771 which I now wish to offer
for the record.
[Appendix B]
Consequently, I will confine my
oral remarks to a brief outline of just two of the major points
raised in my written statement.
I will first address what I
believe to be the primary ethical problem with surrogate
parenting, and second, I will identify what I believe to be the
negative social effects of legalizing such arrangements.
The primary ethical question with the use of the
surrogate mothering arrangement is:
Is it ethical for someone to
create a life with the intention of giving it up? This is the
essence of the surrogate mothering arrangement since the
surrogate mother provides her ovum to be fertilized and enters
into the agreement only with the understanding that she is to
avoid responsibility for the life she creates.
It is a
separation of the decision to create a child from the decision to
parent that I think poses the major ethical barrier to surrogate
parenting; that is, the child is conceived in order to be given
away.
The child is not conceived because he's wanted by the
surrogate mother, but because he can be useful to someone else.
In other words, fundamentally, surrogate mothering agreements
involve a change in the motive for creating children, from a
desire to have them for their own sake to a desire to have them
because they can provide some other benefit to the surrogate
mother, normally a monetary one.
Now, why is
so terrible if the surrogate mother does
not desire the child for its own sake when under Assembly Bill
3771 there will be an infertile couple eagerly desiring to have a
child and to be its parents? The problem is that this may not be
an entirely accurate statement. Most of these surrogate
mothering arrangements may work out just fine.
The child will be
born normal, and the infertile couple will want
But what
happens when unforeseeably the child is born deformed? Although
Assembly Bill 3771 mandates that the infertile couple take the
-55-

whatever
couple
I
at
con
last year, I was
by the atti
surrogate
mothers and the
le couples to these very problems. Both
groups were
troubled with the issue of what to do with the
deformed
The infertile coup s voiced the concern -- "Do
we have to
that?" The surrogate mother said
re
"Well, we don't want to be stuck with it." It was quite c
that both groups were anxious not to be responsible for the
undesirable child if at all possible.
It is just human nature
that, when one pays money, one expects value. Things that one
pays for have a way of becoming viewed as commodities.
Unavoidable in surrogate mothering arrangements are questions
such as "Did I get a good one?" Indeed, we see s
lar behavior
manifest itself with the adoption of children.
Surrogate parenting agreements are concerned with more
than just the desire to have a child. They are concerned with a
desire to have a certain type of child. But aren't these the
same concerns voiced by parents anyway in the normal course of
having children? I think not. No one doubts or minimizes the
pain and disappointment parents feel when they learn that their
child is to be born with a birth defect. Why is it different in
a surrogate mother situation? The reason is that, in the
surrogate mother situation, it is possible that neither party may
feel responsible and both sides may feel they have a legitimate
excuse not to accept responsibility for the child. The surrogate
mother might blame the biological father for having defective
sperm, as might the infertile couple blame the surrogate mother
a defective ovum or for improper care of the fetus during
pregnancy. The fact that the matter is settled by legislation
doesn't prevent there being disputes in court about whether the
contract has
complied
th.
point is
the infertile
le des
a normal child -- not this child in any condition
-- and the surrogate mother doesn't want it in any event, so both
sides will feel threatened by the birth of an undesirable child.
bruised fruit in the produce bin of a supermarket, this
child is more likely to become an object of avoidance than one of
desire.
In
ion to this moral problem,
are several
social problems which I think surrogate mothering will cause.
Among them are the pressures that it will p
on the family
structure. For example, when the child is given up to the
infertile coup , there are more
ies af
than mere
and
le coup
ld is also
removed from
surrogate mother's
have
Do not
ld have
st to be
an interest
fact that the
"given"
?
woman, the
for artif
l
semination,
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eloquently when
asked, "I wonder how many grandchildren I
have that I've never seen or been abie to hold or cuddle."
Another area
agreements will pose
problems are
11 result from the
asymmetry
a relationship
couple will have
toward the child. The wife has no biological relationship to the
child, whereas the husband is also the
's biological father.
Won't this unequal biological claim on the child be used as a
wedge in child rearing arguments? Can't we imagine the husband
being liab
to say, "Well, he's my son not yours?n What if the
couple eventually is divorced? Should custody in a subsequent
divorce between the adopting mother and the biological father be
treated equally and simply as a normal child custody dispute, or
shauld the biological relationship which the father has be given
greater weight? Assembly Bill Section 3771 does not answer these
questions.
Finally, another social problem which could arise from
the legalization of surrogate mothering arrangements is the undue
pressure put upon poor women to use their bodies in this method
to support themselves and their families. Analogous
exploitations of the poor have arisen in the past with the use of
paid blood donors, and occasionally the press reports someone
desperate enough to offer to sell an eye or some other organ.
I
believe that there are certain things which should be viewed as
too important to be sold as commodities. Hopefully, we've
advanced from the time where parents raise children from
profitable labor or found themselves forced to sell them.
In conclusion, I urge the California Legislature refrain
from legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements by the passage
of this or any other bill, primarily because it violates
important ethical and moral pr
iples but also because of the
social problems that it will cause. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: First of all, if it's happening
anyway, then why shouldn't we look at that reality and attempt to
at least make sure that there's a rational process, that there
are some safeguards, that it doesn't happen helter skelter with
no logic or no provisions for it?
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Mr. Chairman, the two objections I
made -- one is to the soc1al ramification -- I think certainly
careful legislation can help alleviate these problems.
Concerning the ethical problem, that of divorcing the desire to
have children from the decision to have them I think is something
which cannot be remedied by proper legislation.
In response to
your question-- "but it's happening anyway" .•.
CHAI~1AN HARRIS:
That's one of the real constant
entreaties that we've had, that ...

PROFESSOR KRI~illEL:
I guess the best analogy I can draw
to that as an answer is that the fact that we accept an
-57-

unfortunate consequence of the
1 sale of alcohol 26,000
deaths on the highways every year due to drunk dr
s is not
imperative that we
ize other intoxicants. The
that
's happen
sn't mean that
to be
authorized.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Although that is one of the arguments
that's made on behalf of legalizing other intoxicants.
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL:

Yes, it certainly is.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just reject that.
I understand.
I just want to make sure that's what you're saying.
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
questions?

That is what I'm saying.
Mr. McAlister, do you have any

ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER McALISTER: You and I obviously
share generally a sort of a common approach to cultural and moral
questions, but, to pursue the Chairman's remarks just a little,
we know that surrogate motherhood is a reality. There is a
certain amount of it going on. That may trouble you and me, but
it is going on. When thes~ children are born, there are then a
variety of legal questions that arise as to their fate and who's
responsible
them and who's not. From what the proponents of
this legis
, at least, tell us, they apparently see a kind
of legal jungle there -- a lot of unanswered legal questions -and they would like to resolve some of those things. At least,
that's my understanding of their viewpoint.
If we don't pass
legislation, I guess we're going to have a development of a
certain common law surrogate parenthood, aren't we? Because once
the child is
, then the courts are going to have to decide
who has what
igations to it.
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL:
I dare say the proponents to the
11 are somewhat concerned about that since the one case on
point, Doe v Kelley, came up clearly against surrogate mothering
arrangements as contrary to sound social policy.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I don't know if we can say that it
clearly came out against it.
I'm not sure that we are in common
agreement in terms of that being the conclusion.
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: Well, the judge seemed to consider
to be baby-selling in the most classic sense. That's only one
court, obvious
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
I wouldn't want to do anything
to encourage
society faces a real quandary in
this, as
a
things though when there are
ices that occur. How
we cope then with that reality?
Are we better off to say
's illegal -- "We'll have as little to
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people to do t
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to say
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's also a host of legal
slat
I'm aware of

s

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. McAlister, there's something I'd
like to add too that an individual mentioned earlier this morning
during the course of testimony.
It was the situation where you
have an infertile couple where you take both
sperm and the
egg from that couple and implant it in the surrogate mother so
that she is simply carrying the child physically but in fact the
child is the product of the adopting parents or the natural
parents and you run into those same arguments in that case.
PROFESSOR KRI~·rnEL:
I think the ethics of that are
somewhat different. That's somewhat more like artificial
insemination by the father.
The fact that •..
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But you do run into a lot of the same
legal arguments from the standpoint of who actually is .••
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL: You certainly do.
I think that you
face somewhat different ethical problems though.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Obviously, if a child has more
than two parents, they have a complex life ahead of them.
PROFESSOR KRIMMEL:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Indeed.
Monsignor.

MONSIGNOR WILLIAM J. LEVADA: My name is William Levada.
I'm the director of the California Catholic Conference, which is
an office mainta
by the Cathol
bishops of California to
conduct liaison with the agencies of the state government.
I've given written testimony, which I will not read
entire , to the members of the Committee, and I submit it for
the record.
(Appendix C]
I have other copies if it's useful to
you.
My purpose is to address the question that is posed in
Ms. Young's document prepared for the Assembly Judiciary
Committee -- "should the California Legislature give its approval
to surrogate
ing arrangements as a matter of public
policy?" In fact, the bill in the third paragraph states that
the Legis
f
and declares that surrogate contracts are
in accord with sound social policy. In developing this
rationale,
seemed, as I understand from the testimony you've
heard this morning, many of the people, or most of the people,
address themselves to the technical issues involved.
I will not
do that. The question of sound social policy, however, as it is
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status or penalty to them -- or to
In
this testimony, I want to dissoc
any
suggestion that I'm offering a rationale for making surrogate
contracts illegal.
I do not believe that every moral issue in
society need be codified into law so I just want to make that
sclaimer at the beginning.
It seems to me that the sound social pol
ought to
and give legislative emphasis to support the basic and
fundamental
of society, the family, which is constituted by
marriage contract entered into by husband and
fe,
committing themselves to undertake a role which is both
individual and social and provides for the generation and
nurturing of
ldren by which the continuance and development of
s society are ensured. In our view, the surrogate mother
concept, the altruistic motive of providing children for
le couples notwithstanding, contains elements which tend
rather than strengthen the institutions of marriage and
society and therefore should be judged contrary to
upon moral and ethical grounds. It is my
s fundamental attitude towards marriage and
s is
on a reasoned view of human nature, a view
s consistent
and
by
Judeo-Chri
br f re
s
from
book
Genesis
and generative, or
It would seem that, to
, we
see the
contract
as violating both the
tive and the
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The unitive
me, is harmed in
draws into
-- a third
not a

into
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Committee
analysis
11
staff shows,
s relationship
is no intrinsic reason why
should not
extended to single persons unless one adopts a
losophical
and family
the signi
of
for society and
The generative or procreative purpose of marriage seems
to be violated with regard to the child who
issue from this
surrogate procedure.
It's difficult to see how children produced
this way could avoid being labeled a commodity, a product
whose natural mother surrendered them for economic
considerations.
Present adoption laws have cons stently and
correctly sought to diminish and even exclude the mercenary
aspect of adoption procedures which would treat children as a
commodity or product. This rationale which is based on our
primary ethical or moral consideration regarding marriage and
family is one which we also support.
I will raise four other issues that have moral
implications not connected essentially with this rationale. They
are the concern for the child, adoption, the potential impact on
young surrogate mothers, and other economic considerations.
In
commenting on a concern for the child, we note that in this
process the likelihood of a psychological separation of
responsibility, both on the part of the father whose child is
being borne by a woman who is not a part of his marriage and
fami
relationship and on the part of the mother who does not
to keep this child as a part of her family unit, the
1 relationship and responsibility for the children
are weakened. We believe that this, together with the desire to
a child without any possible de
-- a child who is as
as one can arrange
-- opens the door to a variety of
testing procedures and contractual statements which will further
the push toward aborting undesirable infants.
It is not
neces
for me to restate, I don't think, the position of the
Catholic Church on the sacredness of every life and its
oppos
to abortion, but it would certainly be a concern with
regard to the present legislation that this legislation would
contain e
that would encourage the extension of abortion
in our soc

primary
for chi
provide
primary

seems to us that, while
to adoption,
ldren for
traditionally been the source of
desire
fill
s and enables them to
responsibilities of a family, the State's
legalized adoption is the provision of homes
to
are unwanted or whose parents are unab
the
It is not the State's
rearing and education.
les who are infertile
concern to provide children
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whose

the impact on young
would permit this practice could prove tempting
difficult economic circumstances to become
even though the potent
emotional and
s cannot be measured or even e
of the age limit for surrogate mothers from
the proposed legislation shows
sensitivity to this social concern, we believe that this
practice inherently tends to place women in a role of being
exploited by hiring them to bear a product child and in this way
lves become part of a potential chain of
sons who
ly contribute to the possible exploitation of
ldren as
well.
F
lly, economic considerations -- I've already alluded
to the mercenary aspects of the surrogate mother contracts as
would view the children in question possib
as a commodity
favoring an impersonal context with this most personal
activities -- marriage and family.
The economic aspects
se serious questions about the wisdom of the proposed
lation s
surrogate contracts would be available only to
ly well-to-do. Figures c
s morning
I've read range
the area of $25,000 for
contract procedure.
It may
whether the
of contracts benefitting such a small element of
not
to involve
j
se contracts and attendant legal
which would seem to many to be a bias against the needy
allocation of
ted state financial resources.
Thank you

much for al

me to

s

I'd
slation,
that's
is whether
should
to be made
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your
answer.
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MONSIGNOR LEVADA:
any
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to enact legislation
lems.

It seems to me
want to restate
my primary
ss that one line
are a
of techn
1 or
be addressed,
believe that
Legislature to find and declare that
accord with sound social policy."
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You view
sanction, as opposed to simply a matter
recognize that these things are happening.
I appreciate your testimony.
It was very helpful.
I'd like to now call forward John

a

Susan

The American Civil Liberties Union
its representative is not going to be present
be submitting written testimony for the record.
Mr. Davies.
MR. JOHN DAVIES: Chairman Harris and Assemblyman
McAlister, John Davies for the Judie
Counsel.
outl
here

We've transmitted to the author of
our concerns and that is
le
[Appendix D]
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Let me say, first of all, that there is a fundamental
policy issue here of whether or not surrogate parenting contracts
should be
zed
the state of California as lawful
contracts.
a substantive question of law; the Judicial
Council takes no position on that one way or the other. However,
AB 3771 goes far beyond that, specifying certain procedures for
the court to follow in terms of proceeding with surrogate
contracts and approval of the petitions that are supposed to be
filed with the court.
First, a technical matter, the bill specifies that
superior court jurisdiction exists and that it is within the
family law department of the superior court. The Judicial
Council opposes any legislation that specifies a particular
department having jurisdiction over a matter, and we think that,
if it is to be in the superior court, it should simply state that
alone. The bill further provides that it would have
jurisdiction ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why is that? Is it because you don't
want us to deny you the flexibility of assignment?
MR. DAVIES:

Yes, and I think the example that I have

here ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What about adoptions? There was an
analogy made earlier that adoptions go to family law court. Why
shouldn't these?
MR. DAVIES: Well, there are certain counties that have
one-judge courts, and they have no departments.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Couldn't we, obviously, amend the bill
to make an exception for those counties where there is only one
judge in the court.
MR. DAVIES: We certainly could. The bill, however,
provides that all proceedings and actions pursuant to the act
shall be in the family law department. That could include, since
the bill also specifies that the contract must provide for legal
and equitable remedies, that actions for monetary damages for
breach of contract will be in the family law department and that
injunctive relief to order someone to have an abortion would be
in-the family law department. We think that the law and motion
calendars and the regular civil calendars are appropriate places
for some of those actions.
We also have a fundamental question regarding whether or
not there is a case or controversy in existence under the
provisions of this act. We have a contract of sorts provided for
in the act that has no force or effect until approved by the
court -- until the court has taken some action on the petition.
At that point, there is no accrued legal, enforceable right.
There is no other type of contract in which the court becomes
-64-

or
s

legal
ect to court
fundamental
11, as drafted,
a petition.

The proponents cited two examples.
conservatorships are similar. I don't
Conservatorships of the person or of the estate invo
existing person. They involve an existing estate
question is whether or not that person has lost
to
deal with his own legal affairs. Clearly, in that case someone
is coming forward, contesting the right of an exi
individual
to take care of his own person or financial estate. That's
clearly distinguishable from this case, where there is no
existing enforceable right.
Secondly, they talk about the adoption procedures that
now exist in the court. Existing adoptions, obviously, deal with
existing human beings. They also deal with existing parental
rights, and it is those rights that are an issue
those cases.
Under this proposed act, those rights would only be future
and none
stence at the time that they came before the
court.
The analyst has pointed out that there is a
question also of what re
ship
mother,
and the right to control her
trimester and
or
cmcu~cS

since
breach
contract
the statute would reauire that the contract provide for
equitab
s and legal remedies,
would
conceivable
that a
upon learning that the mother was
to
an abortion, could go into court and
inj
relief
a hospital or a physician from
1
These are issues that the Legislature
of and
ss in any legis
F
, two other technical
11
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calendar pr
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priority, you also create another class
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as contemplated by the act, since the approval
this is
would be enacted, is, even be
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for
have

don't think there is any urgency associated with giving a
calendar priority. I would also like to point out that, if you
remove it from the court process until you actually have a child
in existence, at birth, you get rid of this problem and there is
no need for calendar priority.
We think there are a number of reasons for having a
process that we have proposed as amendments to the author in a
general fashion, that would simply provide for establishing the
medical standards that were referred to this morning and legal
standards for lawyers to follow.
Leave it with the lawyers and
the physicians to ensure that the statutory standards are being
complied with in the formation of the contract and its
implementation, and then provide that upon the birth of the child
you go into the appropriate court for adoption proceedings.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Your opposition then,
basically, is not to the subject matter but rather to the content
of the bill at hand.
Is that it?
MR. DAVIES: That's correct. As to the fundamental
policy issue, the Judicial Council views that as a substantive
law matter and takes no position.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Davies.

Yes.
MS. SUSAN NASH: Mr. Chairman, my name is Susan Nash.
am here on behalf of the Women Lawyers' Association of Los
Angeles, and I would like to address some of the fundamental
substantive issues.
I have a written statement, which I will submit for the
record, and let me just say at the very beginning that we
strongly oppose this bill and we don't pretend to have answers
for all of the questions that have been raised.
[Appendix E]
What I would like to do today is just point out a couple of the
things that we think are the major problems ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
or the content?

Are you opposed to the subject matter

MS. NASH: We are opposed to the idea that these
contracts be enforced in the way that the bill provides. We
recognize that there should be some legislation.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay
bill rather than the subject.
MS. NASH:

So then you are opposed to this

Right.

The first problem that we have with the bill is its
focus on only two of the four people involved. We have heard a
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I

and
But, in
these
the
bill overlooks
surrogate mother
the
ld.
The
specific enforcement of a mother's
se
child, and thereby it encourages and endorses contracts which are
based on an unequal relationship.
bill aids men and those
women who are able to afford to pay
s of
surrogate mother.
It proclaims that these contracts are
enforceable without regard for the surrogate mother and the
economic reasons which may have motivated
decision to enter
into this contract in the first place.
I think some of the problems of lops
have already been pointed out this morning.
no
uncertain terms that the mother may be forced to give up her
ld, but it is very doubtful that things would be turned around
such a way that the couple would be forced to take the child.
Certainly, we are not advocating that, but I think that
considering this sort of legislation you've got to cons
legislation which provides for a more equal allocation of
s.
The other lopsided aspect of this bill is the manner in
which it ignores the interests of the child. By providing that
the contract shall prevail over the provisions of Civil Code
4600, which states that custody of a chi
must be
according to the child's best interests, the bill
the person who is most direct
affected by the contract
s
most helpless. While we recognize that the freedom to
contract is very important, we believe that contractual rights
can never
il over the needs of an innocent third party.
11,
major problem that we
, is
statement
I
contracts are in accord with
beginning that way, the bill comes across as a
mother contracts.
If we are going to
, I
think about what
is we re saying.
To
us, that means
Legislature is approving both the
of
women rent
ir wombs as well as the imposition
a
This framework, we feel,
regulatory framework on womens' bodies.
no right to impose.
the State
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Are you opposed to both of those

?

MS

NASH:

CHAI~AN

We are
HARRIS:

to the
I understand.
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of the

slature

MS. NASH:
strongly ••.

Let me try and clarify that.

We believe very

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I guess, usually, I have an
expectation that the idea of women renting their bodies is also
considered the idea of women controlling their bodies and doing
with them what they want basically. That's why I was asking
about that.
I understand the second point, but I just wanted to
make sure I was clear on your first.
MS. NASH: Well, let me just address that briefly. We
believe, very strongly, that women should be able to use their
bodies the way they want to, and we've gone on record stating
that position with regard to prostitution. But, it's one thing
to say that women have the right to use their bodies any way they
want to, and it is another thing to encourage and endorse another
method for women to use their bodies to make money.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

MS. NASH: We can't deny that women have historically
used their bodies to make money, but we can certainly say that
the Legislature has never taken the step of endorsing this
ancient profession.
I don't think we need this sort of
endorsement here. Furthermore, we believe that, once the
Legislature involves itself in deciding which uses of womens'
bodies are and are not sound social policy, women will lose the
right to make voluntary choices of this and other types.
The third problem that we have with the bill is the idea
that the court should be involved in monitoring these kinds of
contracts, not only from the point of view which was just
presented by the Judicial Council, but also from the point of
view that once we get the courts involved at a very early stage,
we have the possibility that the courts will be issuing interim
orders as to how a woman ought to manage her pregnancy. As with
the Legislature, we feel that the courtrooms are not a place for
governing this type of decision.
The last problem that we have with the bill is the whole
idea of specific performance.
I think that it may very well have
been intended that the specific performance provisions only apply
to an order by the court that the woman give up her child after
its born.
It's certainly not clear from the bill that that's
what "specific performance" means.
I don't think that it's clear
from Roe v Wade that specific performance could not be directed
at decisions that would be made by a woman during the time that
she is carrying the child.
It is very possible, or at least one
could make the argument, that a woman, by entering into this
contract, is waiving her constitutional rights under Roe v Wade.
We think that, as long as there's any possibility that specific
performance is applying to that sort of decision, we would be
unwilling to accept a bill of this nature.
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no further in telling you what
to have.

to do is, if you are interested -- we
, and we would be willing to
al
and he
you in

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
testimony.

I apprec

your

witnesses are Vikki Schummer,
Suzanne
leman.

Ms.

, if you

would 1
name is
repre
Reuben Pannor,
called out of

, was go

I

am
Mr.
was

What I have to
is
of an
of the issue
of surrogate parenting and not necessarily issues with specific
things in the bill. The Los
County Adoption Council is
opposed to this
of legis
and to surrogate parenting.
We think
Los
les County
s in Los
organizations,
zations, the
guardian ad litem,
, most important, the original
table, permanent families for
would be a legal and
famil s for children
We
1 that
everything sound and ethically
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right in adoption practice. Surrogate parenting c
establishes and condones mercenary considerations
of parent/child relationships, ignoring the social
implications that I think go along with it.
In about the
legislation making it
anything of value for
prevent commercialism from affecting
her relinquishment. We feel
definitely enters into it.
One thing that we feel very strong about is
psychological and moral implications and ramif
surrogate parenting. Part of that is coming from,
surrogate mother's other children. What could enter
Could her other children see their sibling relinquished
essence, perhaps sold? What do they tell their
s?
they tell their families?
I think the emotional reactions of the
have to be looked into. How are they going to feel a
the road, five, ten, twenty years down the road? Are
to feel loss? Are they going to feel mourning? Are
to feel the guilt? Would they feel guilty because
less willingly entered into this and conceived and bore a
for the pure purpose of relinquishing?
I have heard a lot of testimony today, and
testimony did not take issue with one aspect of
perhaps, I believe, is a most important aspect. That
product of this, and that is the child. How would the
surrogate parenting feel?
I don't think the issues are much dif
normal adoption." One of the hardest things for
trying to understand why they were relinquished.
I think, for an adoptee, there are problems.
I
at the issues in adoption and have something to go
ramifications and the implications of surrogate
going to be down the road.
I think that's the moral a
it. How are the products of this engineering
to
fifteen, twenty, twenty-five years down the road?
going to feel, knowing that they were conceived
they were contracted to be sold, that somebody sold
somebody bought them.
I think that that's a real issue.
think ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
If we remove the fee,
care of that problem for you?

r1s. SCHUMMER:

No.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Why not?
-70-

s

1

a

with it
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SCHUMMER: Sure
remove the fee,
the impl
s
11
mother conceived with the
expressed interest
re
, and I think the
psychological a
of that are most profound.
CHAIRMAN
be worse
gave him

You
that would
accidentally and

se
SCHUMMER:
you are a

Is that

parenting would be worse?
me?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
impact is worse on
purpose to
accidental

the psychological
conceive you on
to
she conceived you
't understand.
I would
rather than to do it by
II

MS. SCHUMMER:

No, I

,
themse
Today, soc
this is no longer accurate.
affects the whole family.
I
way; it is a life
ss.

there.
adult.

It
It is a

pace.
twenty-f
child, coming
have heard a
\·lith the
speak to

No, I do disagree

are much the same as
we have to consider, everybody
of this contract. It is
bought and sold.

I

what
should cons
a human 1

In

so.

s or so, even
take the
take care of
ssionals realize that
is a life-long process. It
have to look at it that
the contract is signed, and
it
sn't stop
and becomes an
had to change and keep
adoption practice was twenty,
ic premise is that the
has got to be considered.
I
, of course, that has to do
cannot speak to that, but I can
the moral implications.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you very much.

Next witness.

HS. SUZANNE RUBIN: My name is Suzanne Rubin.
I am the
branch coordinator for Concerned United Birthparents here in Los
Angeles, which is a national organization representing
birthparents.
I also am a member of the Los Angeles County
Adoption Council.
I am soon to be a representative of Concerned
United Birthparents on the California Association of Adoption
Agencies.
I am a birthparent who searched, found and has been
reunited with my daughter.
I am also, and I learned this about a
year and a half ago, the product of artificial insemination by an
unknown donor.
I am in the process of searching for my
sperm-donor father.
I am also the first person in the world to
start litigation in regard to AID from the child's standpoint,
myself being the child, although I am now thirty-three years old.
Professionally, I'm an accountant.
Many of the issues that Concerned United Birthparents
takes with the surrogate contracts and the surrogate legislation
have been echoed by many of the people who have been up here,
particularly Mr. Pizzulli, Mr. Krimmel, Monsignor, Ms. Schurnmer.
Our major concerns have to do with the child. They
to do with the birthparent. They have to do with adoption and
what adoption means to a family unit, what it can mean. For
those of us who are involved in adoptions, we see the
repercussions, twenty, twenty-five, thirty years down the line.
Adoption is not a simple procedure.
I also echo the
point that adoption was a way to find homes for homeless
children. Adoption was never meant to be a way to supply
infertile couples with children. We are very, very aware of
those couples. Those of us who work in the community can't help
but be aware of the issues and can't help but be aware of the
pain and the anguish of not being able to have a child and to
want a child.
However, we would like to state that we don't
think that the decisions in terms of who is to have a child are
entirely mortal decisions. Some of those decisions are out of
our hands, and part of living each of our lives is to come to
terms with what is and what our limits are as human beings. We
do not see parenthood as an absolute right. We see it as a gift.
We see any child as a gift.
It's not something that every person
deserves because they want it. Whether you are a natural parent
or an adoptive parent, you have been given a great gi
and a
precious gift.
Some of our other concerns have to do with unresolved
infertility issues, which are also major issues in the adoption
community. We see adoptive parents, who have been parenting for
fifteen, twenty, thirty years and have still not come to terms
with their infertility. These issues have a tendency to warp and
to cause great difficulty to the child of such a union. They
affect parenting abilities and in very subtle types of ways.
These kinds of issues, if they aren't unresolved, will affect the
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adoptee's feelings about where they came from, their origins,
their place in life, and their reason for being.
In terms of infertility issues and adoption, these are
concepts which have been gone over and over, and they're
published in thirty years of adoption research. The idea that we
don't know what happens when a child feels that they were
unwanted by the birthparent is ludicrous. We do know. We do
have statistics. We know what happens to adoptees. We see the
results statistically. Traditionally, they are not good. We see
adoptees struggle with the issues of identity, the issues of
feeling that they were abandoned by their birthparents, the
issues of "Why me?" and the issues of "Do I really fit in my
adoptive family?" These are all continuing issues, and they are
lifetime issues for the person who is adopted. They don't have
easy answers, and some of these issues are tremendously
difficult, and this is even when the birthparents had a loving
relationship, wanted the child, loved the child, lost control of
the situation, where the decision was taken out of their hands.
In most cases, birthparents do not wish to surrender children.
They fight very hard to keep them.
Even with these considerations, adoptees carry lifelong
feelings that they were rejected, that they were abandoned.
These are dreadful things to feel.
Having a happy,
well-balanced, terrific, nourishing, loving adoptive home does
not completely take away those feelings. We see adoptees who are
in wonderful family situations, who are very devoted and
tremendously bonded to their adoptive families, but that doesn't
take away the pain that we hear and that we see. For those of us
who are involved with adoptees and birthparents and adoptive
parents on a daily basis, we hear the same kind of pain over and
over and over again. This is not something that's new. This is
something that is documented, and it's part of adoption.
It's
part of the package.
Now, the problem with surrogate parenting is that we're
further complicating that package. What we're doing -- we have a
birth mother who willfully conceives -- essentially contracts out
to bear a child which she does not want. The question is how
that child feels about his or her origin -- about his or her
conception, knowing that his or her own flesh and blood mother
never wanted them to begin with.
She was short of cash. Now, I
would ask anyone in this room ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I don't know if that's an assumption
you can make, and I certainly don't want you reaching that
conclusion for anybody other than yourself.
MS. RUBIN:
I'm saying that that is a very big
consideration in surrogate parenting.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We
was a factor but it was not
MS. RUBIN:
I agree. It s just 1
overriding factor of their birthparents was not
their children, but it still
happen and
assuaged by knowing it was just a
there, and anyone with common sense
real deep, involved issues.
told that their birthparent was
and for handing them over to an
take a great deal of skill to
factor in the pregnancy.
Now, the question is how
person. One of my main concerns has
with artificial insemination by
has been talked about numerous t
that this is an acceptable
this is a moral procedure. It's
truly not. For people like myse
million who are walking around
[artificial insemination by
one half of their identity) -- for us, it
I have to deal with the exact same
parenting would have to deal
father who contracted out
and he was paid relative
for
of that ...
rather
MS. RUBIN:

It's a moot

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. RUBIN:
circumstances.
s

Do
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I
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I
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deal of
which I consider to be adulterous
deceit, involved breaking the
of me.
I have
diff
something that was totally out
entrance of a third party into
Judaism, it is adultery.
In terms of
adultery. Now, maybe it doesn't
that chi
desperately enough,
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It
to you. Let s not
make this a universal statement for all children.
MS. RUBIN:
I don't
Any child that isn't concerned
origins, first of all, I don't
dealing with adoptees ...

I am.
I'm
doesn't care
exists.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: To care about your
thing. To have the same conclusions that you
be stretching things a great deal.

is one
, may

MS. RUBIN: Well, the conclusions I had s
conclusions having to do with
ism and Cathol ism.
CHAIR}ffiN HARRIS:
MS. RUBIN:

to

Well, I'm neither Jewi

are

nor

Well, I am.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm not trying to argue with you.
Just let me say this -- I want you to state your
I just
don't want you to make that a universal view
all of us
MS. RUBIN: What I'm saying is that, to
is produced, it matters.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Fine,

I

rson who

accept that.

MS. RUBIN: One of our other concerns
s to
feminist issue. We're concerned, and we are aware, that
the feminist communities is some support for AID and
parenting. I am a feminist, and I believe very
of the issues. The concerns that we have are concerns also
were echoed by other people, having to do with a woman
put
in a position where it's economic for her to
contract
out to have a child and to sell
child to an adopt
We think it's sad that some women
1 that that's
of value that they have to offer and perhaps the most
thing they have to offer is their ability to bear a child. We
think that's a sad statement about women.
I think that cone
s
my testimony.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Ms. Rubin, I'm sorry
we clashed on occasion, but I
and I reserve the
do that. Don't be offended by
I do it all
t
Mr. Fields.
MR. HOWARD FIELDS: My name is Howard F lds.
I'm
adoptee myself, and I'm here because of my professional
in AB 3771 because I am an attorney and I'm also an
the ALMA Society, known as the Adoptees' Liberty Movement
Association. AL~ffi is the country's largest organization of
adoptees, birthparents, and other individuals, all of whom
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legislation would do this by requiring the infertile wife to
adopt the child of the surrogate parent. Adoption proceedings
will take place as they have for many years. However, because an
amended birth certificate will issue, adoptees on reaching the
age of 18 will still be denied the truth of their origins. We
therefore have to strenuously oppose this legislation which
further restricts the rights of residents of the state to know
their hereditary background.
Studies have shown that adoptees have a higher rate of
psychological problems than the population in general. This is
manifested by the percentage of adoptees who've undergone some
form of counseling or other therapy -- a percentage greater than
the population as a whole.
Some authors have attributed this
fact to the denial of essential information concerning the
adoptee's background.
It's not uncommon for the receipt of the
knowledge of the background to have a cathartic effect vastly
changing the adoptee's life.
One of the major problems, as I see it, with AB 3771 is
that the system of encouraging lies is continued. As long as
sealed records remain a reality, the Legislature's concern for
"the best interests of the child" is a hoax.
If the Legislature
is in fact concerned with the best interests of a child, then
it's time to take an appropriate stand and include in this very
novel legislation a guarantee of the right of a child to know who
he is and upon age 18 to have the right to a copy of the original
birth certificate as well as the contract. Other than that, I
find it a courageous piece of legislation. These are my personal
views, and I still think that the child has to be taken into
consideration and he has the right to know who he came from.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me say, first of all, that I agree
with you as to the right of the child to know. Assemblyman Bruce
Young carried legislation on this issue that passed through the
Assembly but failed in the Senate, about the right of an adoptee
to know who his natural parent or parents were.
I think that's a
correct piece of legislation and it's certainly one that we need
to consider.
By the same token, I'm sure that being adopted does pose
special problems, and I certainly want to be the first to admit
that that's the case, but also there are a number of children
with their natural parents who are subject to child abuse and who
wish they could be adopted.
I think psychological abuse and
psychological problems in a universal sense always have to be
looked at with a concern about children, their welfare, and the
quality of life that they endure. However, I just don't want to
have a universal statement that all children who are adopted or
children who are born of surrogate mothers are so psychologically
burdened that they can't function properly or that they are
unhappy.
I just don't want anyone to reach that conclusion.
MR. FIELDS:

I didn't even state that •..
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I didn't say that you did; that was my
statement beyond what you said.
I said I agreed with you as to
the need for a child to know who his parents were, and that's all
I was saying in agreement.
MR. FIELDS: The only thing the child of a surrogate
parent contract is going to know is that he was sold, and I think
he, or she, has the right to know a lot more than that because
there's a lot more to a person than just being born.
It's where
you came from, and I think that the adoptee has the right to know
that.
I'd love to see this legislation have some amendment, to
try and slip in the right to knowledge of your heritage. We're
going this far; we can go a bit farther.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There're probably some ethical
implications that would suggest that, certainly, as it relates to
health and other kinds of concerns. For an individual to know
something in his biological background may in fact be vital to
his continued health.
Mr. McAlister.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
Is it possible to say whether
adoptees who are not aware of the fact that they are adoptees
have these psychological problems that you've mentioned?
MR. FIELDS:
I'd like to mention something about
personal background.
I didn't know I was adopted until I was 26.
I'm 31 now, and it did affect me.
It affected me only because my
parents by not telling the truth -- it does affect the entire
relationship.
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
I'm talking about those adoptees
that don't know that they're adopted.
MR. FIELDS:

What about them?

ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER:
problems that you've mentioned?
MR. FIELDS:
tell you the truth.

Do they have the psychological

I don't think I'm qualified to state, to

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
In other words, you weren't bothered
until you knew.
Is that right?
MR. FIELDS: Oh, you know.
If an adoptive father and
mother don't tell the truth, the truth of how they got you,
there's no way that they can maintain that lie for many years
without the child thinking that something's not right there.
It's too big of a lie to hold on to.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just didn't force the issue until
you were 26.
Is that what you're saying?
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MR. FIELDS:
I'm saying is .••

Oh no, I forced the issue.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
you were 26.

They 1

All

You told me you didn't find out unt

MR. FIELDS: That's correct. Finally, at age 26,
confronted them for the umpteenth time .••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
were 26 then?

I

You forced the issue by the

MR. FIELDS: Yes. Up to that time, they said, "No."
But what I'm saying to Assemblyman McAlister is that, even if the
parent doesn't tell, it's very difficult to maintain that secret
for all those years without the child thinking that something's
amiss there.
CHAIID1AN HARRIS: Would any of you like to add anything
else or react to what's been said? I want to give everybody a
chance to react to some of my remarks.
MS. RUBIN:
I would like to reiterate what Mr.
s
said in terms of not knowing. I did not know until I was over 3
that I was not aware that my birth father was not in fact
man
I would also like to say that in my case
l
I grew up with.
has also warped the relationship. There are very few children
who are deceived about things like that.
I would also 1
to
say that the vast majority of adoptees are told. The adoptees
who are growing up now are told very early. They are aware
they are adopted. They grow up with the knowledge, and
issues of not telling -- I know I've got two adoptees si
here, both of whom learned at relatively much older ages than is
recommended that they were adopted.
I suspect they've both
strong suspicions all along.
MR. FIELDS: I'll say that the knowledge of the
worked wonders on the relationship.
MS. SCHUMMER:
I also am an adoptee and I found out
later -- not quite as late. When I was 18, I found out.
In
answer to the question, I always knew.
I just recently reun
a family of five siblings, the youngest being 49 years
He
was never told he was adopted, but he always knew. He
something was amiss.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
testimony.

Thank you.

I appreciate all of

We're going to conclude this hearing at this po
anyone who has any additional testimony which he's like to
in writing, we'll leave the record open ten days.
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For
t

I want to tell you that, regardless of whatever
disagreement that I might have had on this issue in terms of the
testimony of individual witnesses, all of the testimony has been
helpful and all of it will be reviewed very careful
at this legislation either for purposes of amendment,
whatever because this is a serious subject -- one that we
not have had the hearing on if we were not concerned with getting
as much information and diversity of viewpoint as we could get.
The Committee, obviously, is going to be
ann we'll have additional members on it. One of the
representatives of the State Bar informed me that,
,
are going to be only 15 lawyers in the Assembly so
terms of
the final makeup of this Committee, the issue is not
to be
looked at simply from the standpoint of legal issues
also
from the standpoint of other concerns. I'm sure that the
Committee will review this record carefully and
aware of
1
the concerns that have been raised here today.
Again, I'd like to thank all of you for
participation. This will conclude the hearing.

# # # # # #
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contract as to the custody of the child shall prevail over the
provisions of §4600 -- "the best interests of the child" standard
absent "extraordinary circumstances."
Parts I-II.
These
objections to tNO integral enforcement provisions of the bill -provisions Nhich motivate various other provisions regarding the
content of the contract and the procedure for its execution and
approval -- leave us unable to suggest any simple modifications
of the bill.
We believe that it may prove helpful to compare
existing statutes (Cal. Civ. Code §§43.4 - .5) Nhich preclude all
breach of contract and tort remedies (~, fraud) for breach of
promises to marry or to cohabit, (though permitting restitution),
and §273, Cal. Penal Code, Nhich expresses a policy against
economic coercion in "black market baby sales".
Additional
ramifications regarding the surrogate's constitutional right to
decide to bear a child or to abort should also be revieNed in the
context of §7511.
The Bioethics Con®ittee also has criticisms on other
specific provisions of the bill. Part III. In sum, the
bill does not strike an adequate balance betNeen the rights of
the infertile couple and the rights of the surrogate, and the
interest of the child not sufficiently addressed. This imbalance
of protection in the sensitive area of family rights and custody,
exacerbates the inherent situation of unequal bargaining poNer,
particularly Nhere the surrogate is a person participating solely
for needed finances.
I.

THE REMEDIES PROVISION OF §7511 IS AGAINST EXISTING
SOCIAL POLICY AND IS CONSTITUTIONAI;LY-SUSPECT:---

-----------------------------·-

The thrust of leading proponents of the bill is fairly
clear.
Specific performance, or the threat of such equitable
relief coupled Nith suits for large damages for breach of
contract and for infliction of emotional distress, are sought to
give -the infertile couple a superior legal position.
They
contend that this is not a question of sale of children, but
simply a commercial transaction regarding the rental of a NOmb.
The statement of these proponents' philosophy is revealing as
Nell as problematic:
motherhood simply is not a mercantile
exchange.
A critical problem area is in the case of a surrogate
mother NhO Nants to keep her neNborn child. Excluding cases of
in vitro fertilization Nith the adoptive mother's egg, the
surrogate mother is both the natural and genetic mother of the
child.
The bill NOUld empoNer the court to Nrest a Nay her
child, not because it NOUld be in the best interests of the
child, but simply because of the provisions of a consensual
agreement outside of the bonds and covenants of marriage.
Indeed, in the absence of neNly discovered evidence of unfitness,
at the earliest stages of birth the bonding betNeen a natural
mother and her child militates toNards her retaining custody of
the child for the best interests of the child.
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In the converse situation, .vhere the infertile couple no
longer .vants the child -- .vhether on grounds of a genetic or
birth defect, that the surrogate's pregnancy .vas unhealthy, that
the baby looks less like the adoptive father than the surrogate's
sexual partner, or for other reasons -- specific performance to
require them to take the child is unavailable as an impermissible
enforcement of a personal services contract.
Thus, unless the
surrogate mother changes her original intention of giving up the
child, the child is in a situation .vhere neither natural father
nor mother desire custody.
This .vould impose a cost burden on
the state, as .vell as a burden on the child.
The problem of judicial enforcement is heightened by
use of contractual provisions requiring the surrogate mother to
regulate her health care (~, smoking or alcohol consumption)
during the pregnancy.
These provisions of a contract invite
judicial supervision over personal matters that courts are
neither .vell-equipped nor desirous of engaging in.
In contrast,
in the typical family situation, judicial intervention is sought
only at the extreme situation .vhen a parent is deemed unfit to
raise a child based upon affirmative acts of abandonment and
sanctionable neglect in supervision.
Enforcement of contractual
provisions contemplated by the proponents of the bill, ho.vever,
.vould involve courts in revie.ving personal matters that .vould
cover a far .vider spectrum of human activity, .vhich on its face
may be neither good, harmful nor value neutral.
In a third context, involving the decision to abort, the
contractual remedies of both damages as .vell as specif
performance create constitutional problems as .vell as social
policy problems.
These problems .vould arise principally .vhen
either (1) the surrogate mother .vants to abort the child or, (2)
the infertile couple
.vants the surrogate mother to abort for,
say, fear of a genetically disadvantaged child as discovered by
amniocentesis testing.
Enforcement of the infertile couple
contract rights in each situation .vould directly conflict .vi th
the surrogate mother's Roe v. Wade rights to decide .vhether to
abort her fetus.
While
the
bill does
not
make
specific
performance
mandatory, the threat of it is a po.verful club to .vield upon the
surrogate mother, .vho is presumed to be the party in the inferior
bargaining position.
For the proponents of the bill clearly
intend to raise the specter of damage suits as a means of
enforcing the contracts.
The threat to a surrogate mother of
la.vsuits brought by la.vyers for the infertile couple -- .vho might
be the same middlemen .vho originally solicited the surrogate -may be a more effective means of obtaining specific performance
of the contracts then seeking such relief directly from the
courts.
The situation is fraught .vith unequal bargaining po.ver
and dual agency issues.
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In addition to arguments based on natural
laN and
tradition, the Constitution, and considerations of judicial
supervision and enforcement, Ne believe another relevant source
of policy is contained in Civil Code §§43. 4
. 5.
Section
43.5 (d) states:
"No cause of action arises for:
(d)
Breach of promise of marriage." We believe that there are some
parallel considerations regarding the scope of remedies for
breach of promises to bear a child and to marry, both matters
going to the heart of the institution of the private and
autonomous nuclear family.
Moreover, it appears that the Legislature has acted tNice
in the related area of promises to marry. The apparent dilution
of the policy of §43.5(d) in Langley v. S~huma£ker, 46 Cal. 2d
601 (1956) authorizing tort, as opposed to breach of contract,
remedied for fraudulent promises to marry,
NaS
decisively
remedies by the 1959 enactment of §43.4:
A fraudulent promise to marry or to cohabit
after marriage does not give rise to a cause
of action for damages.
Property transferred as a result of a fraudulent marriage promise
can be restored, hoNever, on the theory of preventing unjust
enrichment, Nithout the necessity of enforcing the promise.
See
generally Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 374 n.2 (1964)
Of course, peopJe still have the freedom to promise
marriage to other people and to later decide to go through or not
go through Nith the promise.
Absent, perhaps, an extraordinary
abuse of the anti-babyselling statute policy (Cal. Penal Code
§273), infertile couples and surrogate mothers are similarly free
to enter into surrogate parent contracts. One question might be
Nhether contracts to bear a child, Nhich are from at least one
perspective a deeper extension into the family sphere, ought to
be treated similarly to promises to marry, or Nhether Civil Code
§§43. 4 and 43.5 (d) should be repealed and for surrogate parent
contracts to be made similarly enforceable.
On the other hand,
the differences betNeen promises to marry and to bear a child may
be sufficient to justify different remedies for their respective
breaches.
Similarly, Ne beJieve that Cal. Penal Code §273 Nill also
profit from comparison.
To the extent that §273
ibits
adoptions Nhere the primary motivating factor encouraging an
actual parent to relinquish parental rights is financial gain,
(See Comment, Contracts to BearaChild, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 611, 613
(1978)) 1 and tO regulate blaCk- Irla-rket baby SaleS 1 it appearS that
a specific exemption as provided for in §7515 of the bill for
surrogate parent contracts might be inconsistent Nith the central
policy of §273.
This may depend on Nhether §273 is intended to
apply to natural parents.
If, for example, §273 does not
prohibit a divorced Nife from obtaining custody of a child of her
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ex-husband's, Nhere she had no prior custody rights, by means of
offering him, say, $5,000,000 in order to save his car dealership
teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, then §273 may Nell not
apply to surrogate parent contracts.*
If that is the case, a
laissez faire approach to surrogate parenting might Nell enable
the Legislature to obtain additional evidence and long term
studies on the effects of surrogate parenting before considering
giving its imprimatur to this practice.
II.

SECTION 7518 IS UNSOUND BECAUSE THE ESTABLISHED
STANDARD OF "BEST-INTEREST-OF-THECHILD1'-SHOULD
PREVAIL ALSO nfASURROGATEPARENTING SITUATION.

Proposed Section 7518
Nhich NOUld dispense Nith the
provisions of section 4600 requiring the use of the standard of
"best interest of the child" in custody disputes absent undefined
"extraordinary circumstances," underscores our concerns Nith the
imbalance of the bill Ni th respect to surrogate mothers and
children vis-a-vis infertile couples.
Section 4600 is clear in its intent to use the interests of
the child as the focus of a custody dispute. The bill, hoNever,
endoNS the donor-father Nith greater rights vis-a-vis the natural
mother than NOUld exist in a dissolution of marriage situation,
solely by virtue of the surrogate parenting contract. We are not
persuaded that public policy supports this distinction.
III.

COMMENTS ON VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE BILL.
A.

Section 7502 (a).

"Infertile couple" is defined, in part, as one Nhich has
been unable to conceive for one year prior to the date of the
execution of the contract. This appears to be a standard Nhich
is not tailored to the specific purpose of alloNing infertile
<:;:ouples to become parents.
It is not too difficult for a couple
to go a year, through the use of artificial birth control or
other efforts, Nithout becoming pregnant.
It is instead a
Naiting period to apply for the bill, rather than a medical
standard for determining infertility.
As such, it appears to
invite abuse.
We NOUld recommend that only the standard of
determination of infertility by a licensed physician be used.
This NOUld, hoNever, not necessarily resolve the issue for
homosexual couples.

*

We believe~-1t-unlikely that Cal. Penal Code §181 regarding
involuntary servitude and sales of persons is applicable to the
surrogate parenting context as it appears to apply to forced
labor Nhich is not Nhat is contemplated for the child.
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The affirmatively stated restriction of the bill to
infertile couples, as opposed to fertile couples and infertile
individuals (i.e., infertile single #Omen) raises constitutional
equal protection issues not present in a laissez faire context.
The notion of the nuclear family unit does not appear to be at
the core of the bill, #hich seeks to enforce a procreative
relationship that goes beyond such a unit.
Similarly, the bill,
#hich authorizes but does not mandate specific performance of the
surrogate parenting contract, Nithout requiring surrogate mothers
to be married #omen,
impliedly contemplates that in some
situations a single surrogate mother #ill retain custody of the
child.
If such is the policy, may a single infertile #Oman be
precluded, say, from using sperm from a sperm bank to inseminate
a surrogate mother so that she may obtain a child through
germinal choice?

c.

Section 702(b)

There is no requirement that the surrogate be either a
married #oman or a #Oman #ho has previously had children.
We
believe that a study of psychological attributes of #Ould-be
surrogate mothers might benefit any comprehensive legislation in
this field.
D.

Section 7504

We agree that the surrogate mother should be represented by
separate counsel. We presume that the surrogate may often be an
individual Ni th limited financial resources.
The question of
state subsidized counsel should be examined.
E.

Section 7505(b)-(cl

The deletion of these provisions regarding confidentiality
of records and the identities of the surrogate and the infertile
couple should be examined in light of analogous adoption la#s.
F.

Section 7 50 6 (}?.}_

This section provides for medical evaluation of the
surrogate mother and the husband of the infertile couple, but for
psychological screening only for the surrogate.
It is unclear
#hether the suitability of the adoptive home #ill be examined as
in traditional adoptions.
With respect to psychological screening of the surrogate,
#e believe, as indicated above, it might be useful to study
potential surrogates to analyze #hat are acceptable motivations

-86-

for being a surrogate, and thereby determining Nhat
psychological health the screening is to test for.
G.

Section 7506(e)

We agree that a reasonable monetary
required to be paid to the surrogate mother.
ho#ever, are given, particularly in relation to
attorneys and other middlemen or brokers #ill rece
H.

•

Section 7509

The reasons for the deletions in the Legis
Digest
and
in
Section
7509
of
the
phrase
insemination"
and its substitution
#ith "
unclear. One apparent reason for this change might
the scope of the surrogate arrangement to include
artificial insemination but also insemination by more
methods.
This leaves the bill open to needless cr
some quarters as condoning adultery.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Bioethics Committee thanks the Judie
giving it the opportunity to express its vie#s on
No. 3771.
If the Judiciary Committee seeks an
procreation policies, or to legislate a different
issue, the Bioethics Committee #ould look
#ard
#hatever helpful resources it has the capacity to
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APPENDIX B
J..

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR HERBERT T. KRIMMEL"
REGARDING THE PROPOSED "SURROGATE PARENT ACT"
ASSEMBLY BILL 3771
(CALIFORNIA

In

its

LEGISLATURE

letter

**

1981-1982

REGULAR

to pro spec ti ve witnesses,

SESSION)

the Assembly

Judiciary Committee outlined several questions that it hoped
might be answered by the testimony before the committee. 1
This

statement

shall primarily address two of those ques-

tions:
"1.
Should the California Legislature give
its approval to surrogate parenting arrangements as a matter of public policy?
and
2.
What long-range impact will surrogate
parenting
contracts have on children conceived by such an arrangement and on parties
who have entered into the contract?"
My statement will deal with what I
ethical

and

social

problems

believe to be the

of surrogate parenting.

And,

since I believe that these problems are ones which no bill,
however

carefully drafted,

could

remedy, my comments will

primarily be concerned with the general problems raised by
surrogate parenting arrangement,

as

opposed to the parti-

cular problems raised by this bill.

I will leave for others

the

provisions within

bill.

task of objecting to
In summary,

specific

this

this statement will outline the ethical

and social policy reasons against allowing surrogate parenting arrangements, and my conclusion will be that the people
of the State of California should not sanction or legalize
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such arrangements by the passage of Assembly Bill #3771 in
this or in any other form.
My remarks will be divided into two sections:

First, I

will address what I believe to be the primary ethical problem
with

surrogate parenting arrangements,

and second,

I will

identify what I believe to be the negative social effects of
sanctioning or legalizing such arrangements.

I.

The Primary Ethical Problem of Surrogate Parenting
Arrangements
The primary ethical problem with the use of surrogate

mothering arrangements lies not with the family that wants
the child begotten by such means, but rather with the surrogate

mother

herself:

whether

the

surrogate

mother,

who

serves as ovum donor, may donate germinal material and avo
parental

responsibilities

for

the

life

she

creates. 2

In

other words, is it ethical for someone to create a life wi
the intention of giving it up.

This seems to be the essence

of both surrogate mothering arrangements and of artificial
insemination by donor
situations

that

the

(AID),

because

person who

is

it

is clear in both

providing

the germinal

material does so only upon the assurance that someone else
will

assume

full

responsibility

for

the

child

they he

create. 3
To

understand

this

primary ethical

problem posed by

surrogate mothering arrangements, it is helpful to begin by
inspecting

the

roles

that

the
2
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surrogate mother performs.

First, she acts as a procreator in providing one of
to be fertilized.

Second, after her ovum

ized by the sperm of the man who wishes to
she acts as host to the developing fetus,
and protection while the newly conceived
ops.

In this second role as host I

see no

moral objections to the function that the
performs.

I think that her actions are
These act

a foster mother or of a wet-nurse.

morally objectionable when then natural mother c
form these roles any more than it is wrong
employ the use of others to help them in educat
or otherwise parenting a child.
extreme cases,

Of course,

the abdication of parental re

for a child does raise serious moral issues
limiting

surrogate

mothering

arrangements

to

couples as Assembly Bill 1F3771 does, 4 this
the essence of that moral principle.
Contrariwise,

I

believe

the

first

role,

above, which the surrogate mother performs, that of p
germinal material
problem.

to be fertilized,

poses a

The surrogate mother provides her ovum

into a surrogate mothering arrangement, only
standing that she is to avoid responsibili
she

creates.

It

is

this

separation

of

create a child from the decision to parent it
poses

the

major

ethical

barrier

3
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to

surrogat

That is, the child is conceived in order to be
The

child

is

procreator,

conceived

not

because

he

s

is wan

but because he can be useful to someone

In other words,

at its very fundament, surrogate mo

arrangements involve a change in motive for creating
from a desire to have them for their own sake, to

ren:
desire

to

have

they can provide some o
benefit, normally a monetary one. 5 The surrogate mo
provides

the

abdicate

the

them because

ovum

creates

parental

responsibilities

generation of children.
answer is no.
present an
mothering

a child with

the

intent

attached

to

to

Can we view this as ethic

?

In order to elucidate this point I

analysis of the contexts under which
arrangements

might

occur,

carefully

inspect

possible analogous situations and our attitudes toward
One context in which surrogate mothering
might be used is that of the single parent.

It is cl

that both AID and surrogate mothering arrangements
used by unmarried individuals as a means of having chil
Although Assembly Bill 1f3771 presently

limits

the

use

surrogate mothering arrangements to infertile couples,
is

no

being

technological barrier to prevent the te
used

by

single parents.

In other words,

a

woman might use AID, or a single man might use a
mothering arrangement, if they

wan~

to be burdened with a spouse. 6

The use of surrogate mo

ing

by

arrangements,

or

of AID,

4
-91-

a child but do not

the

single parent

intentionally deprive

the

child of a

mo

or

This, I assert, is fundamentally unfair to the
In response, however, one might point to e
or to the death of a parent, as situations
is deprived of one parent and must rely sol
upon a single parent.
site.
child

Unlike
may

divorce

find

o

The comparison, however
or

himself

the
with

i

death of a
a

single

unfortunate, unintended, and undesired results of li
surrogate mothering arrangements in the single
text, intentionally creating children knowing
be deprived of a parent, is the intended and

s

It is a far different question to ask what one
make the best of a bad sitaution when it is

t

than to ask whether one may intentionally p
the same result. 7
It may be objected by some that since a
pregnant if she wishes whether or not she is
since there is little that society can do to
from creating children with the intention to
a

father,

using

why

should we be

surrogate

mothering

so

concerned wi

arrangements

might want a child and not a spouse?

s

aus

But on

to say that women can intentionally plan to
is not to say that it is moral.

Also, we note

will hold the father liable in a paternity ac
identify and find him, which evidences some soci

5
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that people should not be able to abdicate
ties that they incur in the generation of

c

why do we condemn the reckless male

bial sailor with a pregnant girl in every port?
Society does not view as moral and up
who creates a child and then abdicates the re
to that child which we attach to, and associ
creation.

But,

it may be objected,

this

the context which surrogate mothering arrangemen s
pate.

What is proposed by Assembly Bill 1F3771 is

will
of,

be

a transference of responsibility

the child from the surrogate mother to

father and a stepmother, the wife of the b
who will adopt the child.
Consequently, let us now discuss the e
mothering arrangements
taken

into

father.

a

in

the

family where

Again,

surrogate

context of

there

is

both a mo

mothering

pose parallel ethical questions to this extent:
gate mother transfers her parental responsibilitie
wife of the biological father, while with
relinquishes his interest in the child to
biological mother.

In both cases we have

a child in contemplation of transferring the re
,.for

that

child

to

a

new parent.

The surrogate

situation is more dramatic since the trans
the child is born, while in the AID situat

6
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oc

not

yet

even

Nevertheless,
discussing,

in
in

being
the

at

the

time

context of

the

of

ins

the

ethical point we

that of creating children

for

the

transferring them, they raise the same ethical issue.
question remains,
create

a

child

8

is it ethical for a surrogate mo

for

the purpose of transferring it to

wife of the biological father.
At first blush this looks to be little dif
the typical adoption,

for what is an adopton other

transfer of responsibility from one set of parents to a
set of parents?
The

analogy,

however,

is misleading for two reasons.

First, it is difficult to imagine anyone conceiving
for the purpose of putting them up for adoption.
such a bizarre event were to occur, I doubt if we
upon

such

behavior

with

moral

Most

approval.

arise from entirely different contexts:

adopt

either that o

undesired conception that is brought to term, or where
parents desired to have the child,

but find that

unable to provide for the child because of some un
circumstances developing after conception. 9
The

second

objection

is

even if

surrogate mo

arrangements were to be classified as a type of adop
this still would not answer the question of the morali
surrogate mothering arrangements, because not all of
of children for adoption are necessarily moral.

For

would it be moral for one to offer one's three-year o

7
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adoption because one was bored with it?
for a couple to offer for adoption their newborn
because what they wanted was a boy?
Therefore, even though surrogate mothering
may

in

some

superficial ways

be

likened to

must still frankly address the issue of whether it
to separate the decision to create children
to have them.

I would answer no.

The reason

should be intentionally created is that it is
procreator for its own sake, not as a means to
of some other end.

Even though one of the

altruistically as trying to bring happiness to an
couple; nevertheless,
surrogate.

the child is still

She creates it not because she desire

.
. 10
b ecause s h e d es1res
to get somet h.1ng f rom 1t.

But why,

it might be asked,

is it so

surrogate mother does not desire the child
when

under

the

proposed

surrogate

i

mothering

there will be a couple eagerly desiring to
and to be its parents?

The problem with this

that it may not be entirely accurate.

This

illustrated in the following section dealing
consequences of surrogate mothering arrangements;
ally, the reply to the above argument is that
ethical

principle

unless one desires

that

one

ought

not

to

ola

create

that child, causes a fundament

in how we look at children --

8
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instead of viewing

gifts

from God,

to be desired in their own right, we

come to view them as commodities.
best

illustrated

by

examining

This thesis, I

what

surrogate mothering arrangement,

might

go

and most

important

viewing how the various parties to the contract may react
the

disappointment

of

their

expectations.

This

s

purpose of the next section of this statement.

II.

Social Problems of Surrogate Mothering Arrangements
One of the best ways

to appreciate the importance

the ethical problem identified in the first section of
statement is to view the social consequences which may
because of surrogate mothering arrangements.

As was

out in the first section of this statement, surrogate mo
ing arrangements are designed to separate in the
surrogate mother

the decision

to

create

decision to have and raise that child.

a child
The cause of

disassociation is some other benefit she will rece
often money. 11

In other words, her desire to create a

is born of some other motive than the desire to be a
What are the potential social results of this disassoc
of creation from parenting?
First and foremost I fear that because of this
ciation the child will come to be viewed as a
manufactured
think

that

thing.
this

The

probably

following will
will

come

illustrate

about.

percent of the surrogate mothering arrangements may

9
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just fine; the child will be born normal, and the
.
But, wh at h appens wh en un
parents 12 w1'11 want 1t.
the child is born deformed?

There are many de

t

cannot be discovered prenatally by amniocentesis or
means, and therefore, it is just a matter of time be
situation arises.

Similarly,

the death of the b

father before the birth of the child, or mul tip
triplets, etc., pose similar inevitable situations
adopting parents may be unhappy with the prospect of
Although Assembly Bill #3771

the child or children.
that

the

whatever

s

adopting parents take the child or chi
condition

come, 13

they

provided

the

mother has abided by all the surrogate mothering
ment's contractual provisions, the important point
discussion is not that the matter has been settled l
tively or contractually, 14 but rather with the atti
both the surrogate mother or the adopting parent migh
toward the deformed child.
When

I

participated at the Surrogate Parent
tion's conference last year, 15 I was struck by the atti
of both the surrogate mothers and of the adopting
these very problems.

t

Both groups were very troubl

this issue of what to do with a deformed child.

The

parents voiced the concern "Do we have to take that? n
the surrogate mothers said in response, !!Well, we don't
to be stuck with it." 16
were

anxious

not

to

It was quite clear that bo

be

responsible

10
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for the "undesi

of the surrogate mothering

!!

s

What does this portend for
s just
ts

nature that

value.

Things

viewed as
mo

that

commodi

one

pays

arrangements are questions
one?"

as:

Indeed, we see similar behavior
adoption

is no
re

l

Unavo

es.

of

ldren.

shortage of Black, Mexican

or older children seeking homes;
attractive,

intelligent-looking

parenting

arrangements

are

cone

just the desire to have a child.
desire to have a certain type of
it may be objec
parents

Aren't

anyway

the normal

I think not exactly.

No one

and disappointment parents

bi

ir

ld is born with some gene

feet.

Why, it might be asked, is

s

mother situation?
mo
l

situat
re

it is

le,

and both s

a legitimate excuse to not as
ld.
cal

father

The surrogate mother
for having

11

defective

s blame the surrogate mo

11
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l
as
!!

ovum" or for improper care of the fetus
The

point

is

that

the

adopting parents
sire
18 an d
. any con d.1t1on,
.
c h 1'ld , no t t h.1s c h 1'ld 1n

mother doesn 1 t want it in any event.
feel

threatened by

the

birth of

So, both s

an "undesi

le

Like bruised fruit in the produce bin of a supermarke
child is more likely to become an object of avo
one of desire.
I certainly don't question the fact that parents
natural course of having children might doubt whe
would want a child if the father died before its bi
who was born defective, or where there were mult
but nevertheless, I think that parents in the
are more likely to accept these contingencies as a
fate.

I

don 1 t

think that this is the case with

mothering arrangements.

After all, in the surroga

ing arrangement there is someone outside the mari
tionship for the adopting parents to blame.
is the surrogate mother who has been hosting this
along,

and it is she who is delivering it.

It ce

looks far more like a commodity than the child
in the natural course within the family unit.
A second social problem, which I believe arise
the first, is the fear that surrogate mothering
will fall prey to eugenic concerns. 19 As I s
surrogate mothering arrangements deal with more
desire to have a child, they also fundamentally

12
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desire to have a certain type of child.

This is evidenced

by surrogate mothering contracts which typically have clauses
requiring genetic tests of the fetus and require the surrogate mother to have an abortion (or keep the child herself)
if the child does not meet these test. 20
In the last decade we have witnessed a renaissance of
interest in eugenics.
advances

This renewed interest, coupled with

in biomedical

technology,

abuses and new moral problems.
seling

clinics

now

face

a

has

created a

host

of

For example, genetic coun-

dilemma:

The

same procedure,

amniocentesis, which identifies whether a fetus suffers from
certain genetic defects, also discloses the sex of a fetus.
Genetic counseling clinics have reported that even when the
fetus

is

reported

as

normal,

a

vastly

disproportionate

number of mothers abort the child because it is female over
those who abort a normal male child. 21
and

abortion of,

normal

fetuses

Genetic testing for,

based upon the desire to

have a child of a certain sex is one example of the results
of viewing the child as an item of manufacture, a commodity.
Again, while this and similar evils may occur whether or not
surrogate mothering arrangements are allowed by law, to the
extent that they are part of the milieu which promote the
view of children as commodities, it certainly will enhance
these

problems.

I

am not

saying

that

there

is

anything

wrong with striving for betterment, as long as it does not
22
result in intolerance to that which is not perfect,
and it
is the latter attitude which I

13
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fear will become prevalent.

A third group of
result

from

social

sanctioning

problems which I

surrogate

mothering

involves the pressures that it will place
structure.

First,

technically

to

as was noted earlier,

prevent

the

use

of

there

surrogate

mo

single males desiring to become parents and,
females

can already do

this with AID or even

Even accepting that Assembly Bill 1F3771 limits
surrogate

mothering

arrangements

to

infertile

nevertheless it still imposes other pressures on
structure in our society.
trudes
not

Most obviously,

in

another person into the marital communi

think

that

society

is

ready

to

accept

ei

parenting, nor quasi-adulterous arrangements, as
course.
Another

stress

on

the

family structure arise

the family of the surrogate mother.

When the chi

up to the adopting parents in the surrogate mo
rangement,

there

are more

parties in teres ted

than merely the surrogate mother and the adopting
The child is removed not only from the surrogate mo
also from the family of the surrogate mother.
interests

to be

considered.

Do not

the s

l

child have an interest in the fact that their li
24
brother has been "given" away?
One woman, the mo
man who had often donated sperm for artificial ins
expressed

these

emotions

quite

14
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eloquently:

she

c

wonder how many grandchildren I have that I have never seen
and never been able to hold or cuddle." 25
Another area in which surrogate mothering arrangements
will pose problems are the intrafamily tensions that will
result from the asymmetry of relationships which the adopting parents will have toward the child.
has no biological relationship
adopting

father

is

also

the

The adopting mother

to the child,
child's

whereas the

biological

father.

Won't this unequal biological claim on the child be used as
a wedge in child-rearing arguments?

Can't we imagine the

father being liable to say, "Well, he is my son, not yours,"
etc.

What if the couple eventually is divorced?

Should

custody in a subsequent divorce between the adopting mother
and the biological father be treated equally and simply as a
normal child custody dispute in any other divorce, or again,
should the biological relationship which the father has to
the child be given greater

weight~

It should be noted that

these questions do not arise in typical adoption situations
since both parents are equally unrelated biologically to the
child.

Indeed, in adoption there is symmetry.

The surro-

gate mother situation is more analogous to second marriages,
where one party has children by a prior marriage which are
adopted by the new spouse.

Certainly, since we have prob-

lems with asymmetry in second marriage situations, we can
then

anticipate

similar problems of asymmetry arising in

surrogate mothering arrangements.

15
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The

fourth

social

problem

I

mothering arrangements is

t

deprived of a certain amount
age.

see

f

This problem is analogous to

have, and that children conceived by arti
by a donor have, where they are l
their biological parents which could
medically.

Another less popularly

danger of half-sibling marriages,

26

where

surrogate mother unbeknownst to himself
half sister.

The only way to avoid

s

pense with the confidentiality of these
as in both the case of adopteds, and
con~eived

through AID, this may give unwan

child to the natural parent.
A

fifth

social

problem

ch

legalization of surrogate mothering
undue pressure put upon poor women to
this

method

to

support

themse

s

Analogous problems have arisen in the
paid blood donors. 28
And occas
l
someone desperate
other

organ. 29

enough
I

to

o

believe

which should be viewed as too
modi ties.
parents

rtant

Hopefully we have advanced
raised

children

for

themselves forced to sell their

16
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profit
i

le

3

While many of the social problems I have outlined in
this second section of my statement have analogies to other
present-day occurrences,
every addition is hurtful. 31
Legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements will make these
problems more frequent occurrences.

And, due to its more

dramatic nature, is more likely to cause stress on our society's shared moral values. 32

III. Conclusion
Does the marginal increase in joy that an infertile
couple might have

in raising

a

child with a

biological

relationship to the husband, when. compared with the joy that
they would experience in raising a "less desirable" adopted
child

who

has

no

biological

relationship

to

either

the

husband or the wife, outweigh the potential pain that they,
the child, or others might suffer and the social costs and
problems that the legalization of the surrogate mothering
technique might well engender?

I honestly do not know.

I

don't even know on what hypothetical scale such interests
could be weighed and balanced.

But even if we could.

And

even if they did.

I still would not be able to say that we
could justify those ends, by these means; 33 that ethically
it would be permissible for a person to create a child, not
because she desired it, but because it could be useful to
her.
Edmond Cahn has termed this ignoring of means in the
attainment of ends as the "Pompey syndrome":

17
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I have taken the name
Pompey, who appears in Shake
and Cleopatra in an incident
from Plutarch.
Pompey, whose
control of the seas aroung I
negotiate peace with the
Mark Antony, Octavius Caesar,
and they meet in a roistering
Pompey's ship.
As they carouse
Pompey's lieutenants draws him
whispers that he can become lord
world if he will only grant
leave to cut first the moo
then the throats of the
pauses, then replies in these
Ah, this thou shouldst have
And not have spoke on't! In me 1 t
villainy;
In thee't had been good se
Thou must know tis not my
that does lead mine honour·
Mine honour, it. Repent
tongue
Hath so betrayed thine act;
unknown
I should have found it a
done,
But must condemn it now. Desis
and drink.
Here we have the most
moral syndromes, the one most
of so-called respectable men
society.
To possess the end
responsible for the means, to
fruit while disavowing the tree,
being told the cost until someone
paid irrevocably; this is the
and the chief hypocrisy of our time.
I

urge

that

the

California Legislature

legalizing surrogate mothering arrangements
of this,

or any other bill,

primarily

important ethical and moral principles,
the social problems it will cause.
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FOOTNOTES
School
Professor of Law, Southwestern Universi
675 South Westmoreland Avenue, Los Ange es, Cali
90005.

**

As amended:

1

Hearings before the California Assembly Committee on
Judiciary, Los Angeles, November 19, 1982.

2

The ethical objection to surrogate mothering
arrangements which is made in this first section of
statement is identical to one of the e
c
object
to the use of artificial inseminatin by a donor (
The common ethical objection to both techniques is
it is wrong for someone to provide germinal material
with a design to create a life, and then seek to avo
responsibility for the life thus created. In this
respect, the distinction between AID and surrogate
mothering arrangements is only one of degree and not
one of kind, in that the AID father's abandonment of
interest in the child takes place far earlier than
surrogate mother's transfer of possession of the
While the latter appears to be more dramatic, the core
ethical issue remains identical to both.
Consequently, it might be objected that since AID
arrangements are now legal in the State of California,
why ought not surrogate mothering arrangements also
made legal? First, this objection does not address nor
answer the question of whether either are ethical.
ethics of these techniques must be inspected independently of whether they are presently legally autho
or not, and that is the task of the
rst section o
this statement.
Second, if AID and surrogate mo
are not ethical, in that they anticipate
of parental responsibilities for the life created,
argument as to the legali
of AID is still no justi
cation for making surrogate mothering
s
legal, except in the
terests of some
symmetry. For example, the fact that
unfortunate consequence of the misuse o
of alcohol, 26,000 deaths on the
to drunk drivers, is no imperative to
of other intoxicants. Therefore, even if one cone
that AID and surrogate mothering arrangements pose
certain identical ethical issues, and even given the
fact that AID is legal, this is not per se a reason
legalize surrogate mothering arrangements. As will
pointed out later in this statement, surrogate mothering arrangements and AID also raise soci
problems
which are not always identical in impact or nature,
it will be argued that surrogate mothering arrangement

5/18/82, 6/17/82, and 8/2/82.
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because of their more dramatic nature
produce more severe social problems
3

To this extent, re
es
surrogate mothering arrangements o
such as Genesis 16, which deal with
children by his handmaid, Hagar,
which deals with the duty of a man to
to his dead brother by his sister-in-1
It is quite clear that when Abram cone
Hagar, he had done so only after his
given Hagar to him as a second wife
Similarly, Deuteronomy 25:5-6
so
tion where the woman becomes a wi
so-called surrogate mo
is not a
but an extension (albeit polygamous)
unit.
In the biblical tradition,
s
way relinquishes control or responsibil
child they create; and therefore,
such biblical passages and presentmothering arrangements are incorrect.
Moreover, if the proponents of
arrangements wish to take biblic
au
analogies, they should well look to
story of Hagar and Ishmael: how they
Sarah after Sarah gave birth to Isaac
The family animosity of thousands of
with us today as the sons os Ishmael
the sons of Isaac (the Jews) still
ties getting along. The problem of
which might be created by presentarrangements is dealt with more
Section II of this statement.

4

§7505(b); AB377l, p. 3

5

That the lure of financial gain is
reason that women are willing to be
is evident from the reported accounts
See, ~' Womb for Rent, Los ~ngeles
Sept 21, l9~A~Col. 1; Lew1s,
Surrogate Mothers Pose Issues
Los Angeles Daily
,
Moral and Legal Problems of
Times, Nov. 10, 1981, V,
,
.
Who Have Babies For Other Women,
gg-(April 1981); See
so Doe v Kell
of Wayne County Michigan (1980)
on Human Reproduction and Law I

6

See,

~'

11. 16,29.

C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J.

E2I (1977); Why She Went to 'Nobel
Child, Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
Col. 4; Womb For Rent, Los Angeles
Sept. 21~8~A~ol. 2.
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7

The morality of identical results (e.
are often distinguished based upon whe
is invited by, or involuntarily thrust
Legal distrinctions following and based
ethical distinction are abundant. The
defense provides a notable example. Se
Reproductive Technologies: Ethical Issues
pedia of Bioethics 1454, 1459 (W. Reich,
Snowden and G. Mitchell, The Artificial
(1981).

8

See, note 2, supra.

9

The story of Moses in the bullrushe
2:1-10) provides a dramatic example.
s
to give him up in order to save him from
Pharoah's army. According to the Bible,
however, did not abandon him, but found a
his wet nurse after the baby was found
by Pharoah's daughter.

10

To sanction the use and treatment o
as means to the achievement of other goal
as ends in themselves is to accept an e
horribly tragic past, and to establish
an incredibly dangerous future. Already
reported the decision of one couple to cone
for the purpose of using it as a bone marrow
its sibling. (L.A. Times, April 17, 1979,
Col. 1). And the bioethics literature con
seriously considering whether we should c
beings to serve as an inventory of spare
organ transplants (L. Tribe, Channeling
Through Law, Part IV (Biomedical Technology
Reproduction) (1973); Note, The Brave
World:
the Law Bring Order Within Tradi
Precess?, 4 Suffolk L. Rev.~8~9~4-,~9~0~1--~02
The New Biolog~ and the Future of Man, 1
.. ,
Rev.-z73, 302 (19b&); Castel, Legar-lmplications __
Biomedical Science and Technology in the Twenty-First
Century, 51 Canadian B. Rev. 119, IL7-rl973)), and
articles which foresee the use of comatose
in Karen Ann Quinlan-type situations as
blood banks and manufacturing plants
(Nelson, Maintaining Dead to Serve as ~B~~-~-~~·~~
Proposed: Logical, Sociological Says,
Feb. 26, 1974, §II, at 1, Col 2; Jonas,
Stream: Comments on the Definition and ~-~~~
Death, in Philosophical Essays: From
Technological Man, 132-140 (1974)).
is willing to proceed down this road is
it is clear that the first step to all
is the acceptance of the same principle
attempted to use to justify their medic
21
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at
Nuremberg War Crimes
s: that human beings
may be used as means to the achievement of other worthy
goals, and
not
so
as ends
themselves. (L. Alexander,
Science Under
ctator
~' 241 No. 2 The New
of Medicine 39
(1949); United States v. Brandt, Tri
of the Major War
Criminals, International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg,
14 November 1945-1 October 1946.
11

See, note 5, sulra. That the motive of monetary
can quite readi y cause this disassociation in some
people is illustrated by the reported case of the
couple who attempted to trade their 14 month old son
for a three year old black and silver Corvette valued
at $8,800. Will, ~ Baby as ~Trade-in on ~ Car: Parental Love May Be ~ Lemon, L.A. Times, Sep . 1~1980,
II, p.J Co1-:l. The so called 11 baby bartering statute"
Cal. Penal Code §273 -- which AB 3771 makes inapplicable
to qualifying surrogate mother contracts (§7515; AB
3771 p.6 11.31-35) -- evidences a concern that this
phenomenon is not all that uncommon.

12

Assembly Bill 3771 uses the terminology "infertile
couple 11 (§7502(a), AB 3771, p. 2, 11.17-22) to refer to
the biological father of the child and his infertile
wife who will, pursuant to the surrogate contract, gain
custody of the child from the surrogate mother. Because
the technique of surrogate mothering could be used in
the future by single parents, and also by fertile couples,
I have employed the use of a more general term, adopting
parent(s), in discussing the social problems engendered
by surrogate mothering arrangements.

13

§7506(h); AB 3771, p. 4, 1. 38- p. 5 l. 1. Assuming
one were to allow surrogate mothering arrangements, it
is not clear to me why Assembly Bill 3771 mandates that
the adopting parents must bear all of these risks instead
of allowing the parties to contract for themselves who
should bear them. Not all adopting parents are risktakers, and not all surrogate mothers are risk-averse.
One might well imagine the situation where the surrogate mother would prefer to take these risks for a
higher
-- a sort of warranty, if you will.

14

This assumes, of course,
judicially enforced.

15

"The 1981 Inaugural Symposium on Surrogate Parenting 11
e Parent Foundation, Inc., Los Angeles,
a, November 7, 1981.

16

so, Womb for Rent, Los Angeles Herald Examiner,

' r91IT,AJ".--
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t such provisions would be
,

17
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scussion:
,
and E
cs of A.I, .
(Comments of Himmelweit)
Spece, Bioe
cs and Law

Issues,

60 (1973)

Shapiro and
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te
new

baby
be given
ied: 11
good. If it's a gi
an
it and give Jef
[her 2 year old half brother} away.'' Womb
Rent.
Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sept. 21,

•

25

From an interview with the mother of a medical student.

26

Regarding how this has posed an accelerating problem
for children conceived through AID, see, ~' CurieCohen et al., Current Practice of
cial Insemination ~--Donor in the United States, 300 New Eng. J.
Med. 585-89 (1979).

27

The former provisions of Assembly Bill 3771 which
provided for such confidentiality have since been
deleted by amendment. (AB 3771, p. 3, 11.4-12).

28

See, ~' R. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From
Human Blood to Social Policy (1971).

29

See,~' (UPI), ~an Desperate for Funds: Eye for Sale
at $35,000, L.A. T1mes, Feb. 1, 1975, §II, at 1, co~.;
TAP), 100 Answer Man's Ad for New Kidney, L.A. Times,
Sept. ~ 1974, §I, at ~ col.~

30

See generally, Slavery, Serfdom and Forced Labor, 16
The New Encyclopedia Britannica E51, esp. 854, 858, 865
(15th ed 1974).

31

See, note 2

32

Concerning this phenomena see generally, Calabresi,
Reflections on Medical Ex}erimentation in Humans,
98 Daedalus 1R7-393 (1969 ; Shapiro and Spece, On
Being "Unprincipled on Principle": __ Limits Of
Decisionmaking "On the Merits 11 , in Bioehtics anaLaw
67-71 (1981).
- --

33

See, note 10, supra.

34

Cahn, Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience, Drugs
in Our society 255, 258=1bl-rP. Talalay ed, 1964).

(last~),
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APPENDIX C

California Catholic Conference
926 J Street- Suite 1100, Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 443-4851

ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE'S INTERIM HEARING ON
SURROGATE PARENTING
November 19, 1982
I want to thank the committee for providing the opportunity to
testify on a question which, while having only a limited application
in terms of the number of people who may be directly affected, has
broad implications for the good of society as a whole. The proposed
legislation states, "The Legislature finds and declares that surrogate
contracts are in accord with sound social policy." Speaking for the
California Catholic Conference, representing the Catholic Bishops of the
State of California, I want to suggest that legislation to regulate contracts providing for surrogate mothers to supply children for infertile
couples is not sound social policy, because it offends against the support that such policy should give to the basic institutions of marriage
and family in our society. Sound social policy should protect and give
legislative emphasis to support the basic and fundamental unit of society,
the family, which is constituted by the marriage · contract entered into
by husband and wife committing themselves to undertake a role which is
both individual and social and provides for the generation and nurturing
of children, by which the continuance and development of this society
are ensured. In our view, the surrogate mother concept--the altruistic
motive of providing children for infertile couples notwithstanding-contains elements which tend to weaken rather than strengthen the institution of marriage and family in our society and therefore must be
judged contrary to sound social policy on moral and ethical grounds.
By means of the marriage contract, husband and wife make a commitment to each other which creates a moral obligation to nurture the new
family unit which they have established; by it they gain the recognition
of society to guarantee to them certain rights and responsibilities
toward each other and toward the children who may result from their
union of love. Such a fundamental attitude toward marriage and family
is based upon a reasoned view of human nature, a view which· is consistent with and supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition, which has so
powerfully shaped the Western democratic aivilization of which we are
the inheritors .
The Judeo-Christian tradition has explicitated the moral and ethical
aspects of the human values involved in this fundamental societal institution of marriage and family, and permits us to assess in ethical
terms what fosters or weakens this institution, and hence what should be
judged sound social policy. This tradition has classically pointed out
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the twofold aspect of the marriage relationship: it is both unitive
(see the passage in the book of Genesis 2:23 in which Adam says,
"'This one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh, this one
shall be called "woman" for out of "her man" this one has been taken.'
That is why a man leaves his father and mother clings to his wife and
the two of them become one body.") and generative or !?recreative (see
Genesis 1:27, "God created man in His image; in the d1vine image He
created him; male and female He created them. God blessed them, saying
'Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it ~ '") .
The Judea-Christian tradition has held the family in highest
esteem from ancient times. Some 2500 years ago Isaiah likened
the relationship between God and the Jews to that of a mother
and child: "As a mother comforts her son, so will I myself comf0rt you, and you shall find comfort in Jerusalem" (Isaiah 66:13).
In the Christian dispensation, the mystery of God is revealed in
terms of filial relationship, Father to Son. The deep spiritual
significance of the family stands forth when Scriptures liken the
relationship of husband and wife to Christ and His Church. This
view of marriage has deep meaning in today's society. The American Bishops, speakinft in their pastoral letter "Human Life in
Our Day," hold that 'For the believer, the family is the place
where God's image is reproduced in His creation. The family is
the community within which the person is realized, the place
where all our hopes for the future of the person are nourished."
The Second Vatican Council, too, spoke of the family mission and
ministry: "The family has received from God its mission to be the
first and vital cell of society." (National Conference of Catholic
Charities "Policy Statement on Family"; 1977)
In our opinion the surrogate mother arrangement adversely affects
the place of marriage and the family in today's society, because it
violates the Unitive and generative or procreative dimensions of marriage and hence modifies the essential meaning of the marital, familial
relationship.
The unitive aspect of the marriage relationship is violated by the
introduction of a third party into the relationship in which the couple
(even if infertile) has committed themselves to each other. While it
is true that the presence of this third party may not be a physical
presence to the couple, it is certainly a psychological presence for
the nine months .in which the surrogate mother is bearing the child of
the husband insubstitution for the wife to whom that husband has committed himself to create a bond of love and become "one flesh" for the
purpose of creating that family for which their mutual love may provide.
Through artificial insemination the husband has, in fact, drawn into
the circle of that bond an outside party. The violation is perhaps more
significant in the case of the surrogate mother herself, who has introduced into her relationship with her husband a child which comes from
a party outside their union of maritial love. Because of this violation
of the unitive aspect of the maritial bond, we judge the use of artificial insemination by donor, in this as in other areas,. to be morally
wrong.
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Secondly, the surrogate mother arrangement separates the generative
or procreative aspect of the marriage relationship from the unitive,
insofar as the child to be conceived and borne is not the fruit of
the mutual love of husband and wife. It further has implications for
the generative aspect of the marriage/family relationship by preventing the natural bonding between mother and child during pregnancy and
infancy, a bond of such great importance for the future of the child.
Of course it goes without saying that,.were the surrogate mother
procedure to involve single persons on either side, that is on the
side of the biological father as sperm donor, or on the side of the
surrogate mother, the violation of family and marriage values would be
even more clear. But in fact, as the study of the proposed legislation
by the staff of the committee allows us to infer, there are no inherent reasons why the surrogate mother contracts should be limited to
married persons unless one has a philosophical and moral commitment to
society's right and responsibility to foster the institutions of marriage and family.
It seems to us that the generative or procreative purpose of marriage
is further violated with regard to the child who would issue from this
surrogate procedure. It would be difficult to see how children produced through this procedure could avoid being labeled as a commodity
or product whose natural mother surrendered them for economic considerations; present adoption laws have consistently and correctly sought
to diminish and even exclude the mercenary aspects of adoption procedures which would treat children as a commodity or product.
For the above reasons we believe that it would not be appropriate
for the legislature of the State of California to adopt legislation
codifying and regulating surrogate mother contracts, because such
codification into law could not do otherwise than weaken that protection
and guarantee that it is society's right and duty to provide for the
institutions of marriage and family. In a word, such law would in our
view be the opposite of sound public policy.
The California Catholic Conference believes that surrogate mother
legislation would also be unwise because of its potential impact on
other areas which have ethical implications for our society. These
areas are~
(1) concern for the child, (2) adoption, (3) impact on
young surrogate mothers, and (4) economic considerations.
(1)

Concern for the Child
The impersonal nature of the surrogate mother arrangement
increases the chances that the child's own best interest may
be ignored in any conflict that arises. The father is related to the developing infant through technologically-conducted
artificial insemination rather than through the exchange of
human love, and further has no lasting relationship with--and
in most cases may not even know--the mother of his child.
Changes in his circumstances (business reverses, impending
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(2)

1
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te

the children in question as a commodity, by
ing an
impersonal context for
most personal of human activities:
marriage and family. The economic aspects considered from
another point of view also raise serious questions about
the wisdom of the proposed legislation: since the surrogate
contracts would be available only to those who are relatively
well-to-do (the popular literature suggests $25,000 as a
normal estimated cost to the couple requesting the procedure),
it may be questioned whether the regulation of contracts
benefiting such a small element of society would not prove
to involve expenditures for judicial review of these contracts-not to mention the attendant legal and medical costs--which
would seem to many a bias against the needy in the allocation
of limited state financial resources.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our view that the proposed
legislation is not sound social policy; furthermore, it would seem
a more reasonable procedure to await judicial determination of the
questions posed by surrogate parenting before attempting to decide
whether and what kind of statutes may be necessary to regulate certain
technical legal aspects of the practice in such a way as to exclude
favoring the practice as sound social policy.
Reverend Monsignor William J. Levada, S.T.D.
Executive Director
California Catholic Conference
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November 15, 1982

Honorable.Michael Roos
Member of the Assembly
3160 State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
Re: AB 3771 - Surrogate Parent Act
Dear Assemblyman Roos:
This is in regard to your bill AB 3771, as amended in
Assembly August 2, 1982, and the interim hearing of the
Assembly Judiciary Committee set for November 19, 1982, in Los
Angeles.
This office previously expressed concern with certain
provisions of AB 3771, as amended, in correspondence to your
office and at the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committee
hearings on the subject. Testimony has been requested by the
judiciary committee staff for the upcoming Los Angeles hearing.
The issue of whether to sanction surrogate parenting
is a fundamental public policy issue and a substantive law
matter. Accordingly, the Judicial Council takes no position on
that aspect of the proposal.
The present version of the bill does present several
issues of direct concern to the Administrative Office of the
Courts, however.
A.

Superior Court Jurisdiction

Proposed Section 7503 (p. 2, ls. 32 to 36, inclusive)
specifies that the "department of the superior court to which
proceedings under the Family Law Act . . . ordinarily are
assigned shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings and
actions" pursuant to the act.
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The Judicial Council opposes specifying in statute
that any cause of action be within the jurisdiction of a
specified ''department" of the superior court. Under your bill,
the potential types of cases which could arise would vary from
adoption of the surrogate's child to a breach of contract
action for money damages.
Effective court management is best served by providing
that jurisdiction over actions under the act lies in the
superior court generally. No further specification is
necessary or desirable from a court management perspective. A
breach of contract suit for monetary damages should not be in
the family law court, as I am sure you recognize.
B.

No Case or Controversy

There is no existing type of contract, other than
settlements of existing actual pending legal disputes, in which
the courts become involved in the approval or implementation of
contract terms.
Contracts are entered into by the respective parties,
subject to statutory substantive law restrictions, e.g.,
certain contracts must be in writing, must provide a period for
revocation, or disclose certain information, such as interest
rates.
It is not until a dispute arises that a cause of
action exists. Dispute resolution of an actual case or
controversy is the function of the courts.
Oversight of contract drafting and
not a case or controversy but rather is the
matter for attorneys in assuring compliance
drafting and implementing contracts between

implementation is
proper subject
with the law in
parties.

This long established principle of courts addressing
only cases that have an accrued enforceable legal right is
contradicted by provisions of the bill for court oversight of
surrogate parenting contracts. Specifically, proposed Section
7505 provides in part that, "the court shall determine . . .
whether the requirements of this part have been satisfied" in
the contract agreement. This in essence is precedent to an
enforceable right accruing, and not within the definition of
court jurisdiction.
"Jurisdiction over a particular case is the
power to hear and determine that case . . . "
16 Cal.Jur.III Section 43, p.76, citing
Central P.R. Co. v. Board of Education 43 C.365;
Spencer Creek Water Co. v. Vallejo 48 C.70
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"A 'case' is a question before a court of
justice or in an action or suit at law or in
equity.
. • In this, its generic sense,
the word includes all cases, special or
otherwise."
1 Cal.Jur.III, Actions, Section 4, p 434
"An action cannot be maintained until the
cause of action accrues.
Adams v. Albany 80 F.Supp.876.
"The term 'accrues' as applied to a cause of
action means to arise, to become or present
an enforceable demand.
1 Cal.Jur.III, Actions, Section 4, p.434, fn. 48.
Section 7505, subdivision (c) lists requirements
which, if met, require court approval of the petition, which
includes the executed contract (7505 (b) (1)). Prior to this
"approval" there is no present and enforceable demand of a
legal right. Therefore, no case is presently before the court
to be heard and determined.
Also, Section 7506 specifies that a contract "approved
pursuant to this part" shall include, "but not be limited to" a
specified list of items including: relinquishment of all
parental rights by the surrogate natural mother; custody at
birth to the adopting parents of any child born to the
surrogate under the contract; consent to adoption by the
adopting mother; medical evaluations; financial arrangements;
and "that legal and equitable remedies be available in the
event of brea h". (Section 7506, subdivisions (a) to (h)).
C.

Res Judicata and Specific Performance or Recission of
Contract

Two serious and fundamental legal issues are raised by
this proposed scheme. First, prior approval of the contract by
the court is presumably a judgment. If not, it is without
legal significance. If it is, then it is a binding
adjudication of all the terms contained in the agreement.
A prior judgment is controlling as to all subsequent
adjudications of those same contract clauses. Consequently, a
future challenge to a provision of the contract could not be
readjudicated; the prior judgment controls. This is the
principle of res judicata.
A contract provision calling for aborting a fetus
shown to be genetically defective or, conceivably, aborting a
fetus if tests show it to be of a particular sex, therefore
would be enforceable (subject to constitutional standards).
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More generally, providing for "e itable remedies"
connotes the availability of the specific performance remedy
e.g., enforcement of the waiver of "parental rights" by the
surrogate natural mother, on the one hand, and forced
acceptance of custody of the child at birth by the surrogate
parents, on the other hand. These could be specifically
enforced, even if a party changes his or her mind subsequent to
entering the agreement.
This could mean placement of a child with parents who
do not want the child, or aborting a child wanted by the
natural mother.
Similarly, if fraud existed in the formation of the
contract, such as the wife's infertility being falsified,
presumably the contract could be rescinded, eventhough the
impregnation had been completed.
Constitutional Question of Privacy
A constitutional question is also raised with respect
to the surrogate mother's constitutional right to privacy.
This right includes the right to elect to abort or continue a
pregnancy during the first trimester.
Presumably, exercise of this right would constitute a
breach of the contract for which monetary damages would be the
remedy. The bill, however, provides for a contract permitting
an equitable remedy, raising the prospect of a writ of
prohibition against a physician or hospital from performing an
abortion or child birth services in various situations.
Calendar Priority and Preference
The Judicial Council opposes imposition by statute of
restraints on internal court calendar management procedures.
This approval process contemplated by the act precedes
impregnation. Therefore no compelling urgency exists to
granting surrogate parenting cases calenaar priority (Section
7505 (d)) and Section 7508, subdivision (a)).
Statutory Remedy
These issues can be resolved by appropriate amendments
to AB 3771. This office would be pleased to assist you and
your staff in making AB 3771 unobjectionable.
Generally, this would entail deleting the prior court
review process, thereby reserving court action to adoption
procedures after the child is born. Substantive law
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requirements to preserve the medical and other standards for
surrogate contracts drawn by attorneys and followed by
hospitals and physicians would govern the contract terms and
implementation of the act.
Also, the availability of specific performance or
recission versus money damages as available remedies should be
addressed.
Please call if this office can be of assistance in
this matter.
Very truly yours,
Ralph J. Gampell
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Mr. John Donough, Consultant
Senate Judiciary Committee
Mr. Jim Prosser, Minority Consultant
Assembly Judiciary Committee
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APPENDIX E

(Zf3) 4~0'12"34
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF
THE WOMEN LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
IN OPPOSITION TO
THE SURROGATE PARENT ACT, AB 3771

I am here on behalf of the Women Lawyers'
Association of Los Angeles to express our strong opposition to the proposed Surrogate Parent Act.

In our view

the major defect of this bill is its focus on only two
of the four people involved.

The circumstances of the

childless couple seeking to avoid lengthy adoption
procedures and to have a child by at least one parent
are both sympathetic and understandable.

However, in

attempting to facilitate these couples' resolution of
their problem, the bill grossly overlooks the interests
of both the surrogate mother and the child.

By providing

for specific enforcement of a surrogate mother's promise
to relinquish her child upon birth, the bill encourages
and endorses contracts based on an unequal relationship.
The bill aids men and those women who are able to afford
to pay for the services of a surrogate mother.

It

proclaims that these contracts are enforceable without
regard for the surrogate mother and the economic reasons
which may have motivated her decision to enter into such
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a contract.

The bill states in no uncertain terms

that a mother may be forced to give up her child, even
though it is extremely doubtful that a court could or
would specifically enforce a couple's promise to take
a child.

Obviously, such an order would not be in

the interest of anyone involved; the point is simply
that the circumstances of the surrogate mother and
the possible hardships she will face if the couple
reneges on its end of the deal--for example, lack of
child support--are not considered.
The complete neglect of the interest of the
child is another facet of the bill's lopsided nature.
By providing that the contract shall prevail over the
provisions of Civil Code § 4600, which states that the
custody of the child shall be awarded according to the
child's best interests, the bill ignores the interests
of the person who is most directly affected by these
contracts and yet is the most helpless.

The freedom

to contract, though an important one, must surely give
way to the needs of an innocent third party.
The second major problem with this bill is
the legislative declaration that ''surrogate contracts
are in accord with sound social policy."

In our view,

the Legislature is thereby approving both the idea

-2-
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of women renting their wombs and the imposition
of a regulatory framework on womens' bodies, a framework which the state has no right to impose.

As

women lawyers we firmly believe that every woman
should have the right to use her body in the manner
in which she chooses.

However, it is one thing to

recognize a woman's right to use her body in such a
way; it is another to encourage women to adopt yet
another method of making money off their bodies.
Although women have historically made money through
such use, the Legislature has never before taken the
step of actually endorsing this ancient profession.
Moreover, we believe that once the legislature
involves itself in deciding which uses of womens'
bodies are or are not "sound social policy," women
will lose the right to make voluntary choices of
this and other types.
Along the same line, and with regard to the
third major problem with the proposed bill, we cannot
condone the idea that the courts should be involved
in monitoring these kinds of contracts.

The provisions

for court supervision of the contract are unnecessary;
when and if an action is brought to enforce such a
contract, the courts can provide whatever protection
is proper at that time.

As with the legislature, the
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courtrooms are not a place for governing a woman's
voluntary choice to do as she pleases with her body.
The last major problem with the bill--and I
say major because time does not permit me to point out
the many smaller but still important defects in the
bill--are the numerous questions which arise as a
result of the bill's provisions for court-ordered
specific performance.

Though it may be intended that

this provision only apply to an order requiring the
surrogate mother to relinquish her child, the bill
certainly does not impose any such limitations.
Consequently, the possibilities are endless.

We cannot

accept any type of bill which would allow a court to
issue directives and orders concerning a woman's
decision as to whether and how to carry a fetus to
term.

Even if this provision was or could be limited

to the court's order after the birth of the child,
we cannot accept the notion that a newborn child
can be taken from its natural mother pursuant to
a court order in much the same way as a tractor
or truck is taken from a delinquent debtor.
Having said all of this, we as women lawyers
also recognize that surrogating parenting is a reality,
for better or for worse.

In order to ensure that a
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woman's right to control her body is respected, we
would support a bill which would remove the
uncertainty regarding the applicability of various
penal code sections.

At this point, we can go no

further in saying what other provisions such a bill
should include, mainly because the whole question of
surrogate parenting gives rise to so many hypothetical
situations and so many policy issues that at this
stage there is simply not enough information to cover
all the uncertainties.

We can say, however, that any

bill should take care to respect not only the right of
a woman to control her body and to make decisions
regarding childbirth, but also the rights of the child-the person whose interest seems to have been most
ignored.

To this end, the Women Lawyers Association

would like to offer the services of its legislative
drafting committee in coming up with an alternative
bill, and we are willing to work with the bill's
sponsors in any way we can to ensure that the needs
of all of the parties to the contract are considered.
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November 16, 1982

TO:

:tvlembers of the Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

Lettie Young

RE:

Hearing on Surrogate Parenting Contracts

On Friday, November 19, 1982, the Assembly Judiciary Committee
will hold a hearing on the topic of surrogate parenting
contracts. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. in the
Auditorium of the Whittier College School of Law, 5353 West Third
Street in Los Angeles.
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with background
information for the hearing.
Related materials have also been
included in the hearing booklet.
AB 3771 (Roos) , which would legitimize contracts for surrogate
parenting, was presented to the Committee earlier this year,
whereupon it was assigned to interim study.
Please refer to the enclosed analysis of AB 3771 for information
on surrogate parenting and a discussion of that proposal.
This memo discusses two additional issues:
case law and proposed
legislation in other states and the surrogace's waiver of the
constitutional right to privacy.
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Case Law and Proposed Legislation in Other States
Although California has established no legal precedent on
surrogate parenting ~rrangements, some authority has developed in
other jurisdictions.
Such case law has generally dealt with the
issue of payment to the surrogate.
In Michigan, an action for declaratory iudgment was brought to
determine the constitutionalitY of state statutes prohihitinq an
adoption 2 based upon the exchange of money in the surrogate mother
context.
The court held that those laws are not void for
vagueness and that the right to adopt a child for payment is not
within the constitutional protection of the right of privacv. It
also held that the state has a compellinq interest to regulate
adoptions in order to prevent babv-selling:
"Mercenary
considerations used to create a parent-child relationship and its
rsic] impact upon the family unit strikes [sic] at the verv
foundation of human society ~nd is [sic] patentlv and necessarily
injurious to the community."
Since the Michigan Supreme Court
denied a hearinq in the case, the plaintiffs have filed an appeal
with the United States Supreme Court.
Another Michigan case holds that the Michigan Paternity Act may
not be used as a pro~edural device to validate a contract for
surrogate parenting.
According to the court, that law was not
intended for determining the paternity of a child conceived in a
surrogate parenting arrangement. The case is currently on
appeal.
In both Michigan cases, the court deferred to the
legislature to address the matter.

1

rn the one known California case, the surrogate mother
refused to relinquish parental rights to the child. She had
received neither a fee for her services nor medical expenses.
The contract couple, who were New York residents, requested
custody of the child. Pursuant to an out-of-court settlement,
the surrogate kept the child, and the husband (the child's
biological father) was acknowledged on the birth certificate as
the natural father.
Thereupon, the case was dismissed without
prejudice. The settlement, however, left the question of future
custody and visitation rights unresolved.
Hearings in the case
were closed, and the case file has been sealed.

2 Doe v Kelley, 6 FLR 3011 (BNA), 106 Mich. App. 169, appeal
denie~No. 67308.
3

rd. at 3013.

4 svrkowski v Appleyard, 8 FLR 2139 (BNA).
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-3In Kentucky, the state attorney general issued an advi
opinion declar~ng surrogate parenting contracts to be il
unenforceable.
Citing Kentucky law which prohib s
for adoption, the opinion states that "the strongest
against surrogate parenting in Kentucky is found in
6
policy against the buying and selling of children.
also relies on state statutes which prohibit a parent
consenting to adoption and voluntarily terminating
rights until five days after the birth of the child.
attorney general has also filed a civil action
of illegality and an injunction against
Associates, Inc., a Lou~sville firm that
couples and surrogates.
A ruling in that cas

anc

ling

In addition to California, a few other states
con idered
proposals to recognize contracts for surrogate paren
Those
states are Michigan, Alaska, and South Carol
(Copi s of the
bills are included in the hearing booklet.)
To date, none of the
proposals has been reported from committee, and passage
s vear
appears unlikely.
Waiver of a Constitutional Right
Among the many issues raised in surrogate parenting arrangements
is whether the surrogate's right to have an abortion may be
waived by contract.
For example, the surrogate, for whatever
reason, may breach the contract by aborting the fetus, or the
couple, rather than accepting a child with a physiological or
genetic defect, may require the surrogate to undergo an abortion.
It is unclear whether a surrogate who desires an abortion within
prescribed constitutional limits can be legally prevented from
obtaining one.
In Roe v Wade, the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to privacy, as protected by the Ninth
Amendment, encompasses a woman's decision uhether or not to
8
terminate her pregnancy.
The court held, moreover, that the

5 7 FLR 2246 (BNA).
6

rd. at 2247.

7 cornmonwealth v Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., No.
81-CI-0429 (Franklin County Cir. Ct., Div. 1, filed January 27,
1981).
8 410

u.s. 113 (1973). [See also other decisions in vlhich the
court has upheld the right of privacy to decide whether to
procreate and rear children.
Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 u.s. 438
(1972); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); Skinner v
Oklahoma, 316 QS. 535 (1942)]

-129-

-4right can 0 be regulated only pursuant to a compelling state
interest.J Subsequently, the court also ruled that a woman may
decide to have an abortion irrespective of the consent of her
husband ~O' in the case of an unmarried minor, the consent of her
parents.
It is therefore uncertain whether parties who are
merely in a contractual relationship with the surrogate may
override her decision to obtain an abortion.
Under the doctrine of waiver, some coTititutional rights may be
relinquished prior to their exercise.
However, it remains
unclear as to wheth~~ all constitutional rights can be
irrevocably waived.
There has been, as yet, no specific
determination on whether a woman can irrevocably waive her right
to have an abortion even if she does so in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary manner.
To facilitate the discussion at the hearing, witnesses have been
asked to address the following questions:

9

In Roe, three stages of pregnancy were outlined with respect
to determining the state 1 s interest in abortion. During the
first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman
and her physician.
In the second trimester, the state, in
promoting the health of the mother, may regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
After the stage in which the fetus becomes viable, the state, in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
10

52

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 U.S.
(1976).
11

. h t to a Jury
.
. l may b e wa1ve
.
d 1n
.
For examp 1 e, t h e r1g
tr1a
both civil and criminal cases.
Criminal defendants may also
waive other procedural protections, including the right to
counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to appeal.
Parties in a civil action may be found to have waived their right
to an adjudication, either before or after the dispute arises,
e.g., through a confession of judgment or an arbitration
agreement.
12

For example, the freedom of religion may be waived, but the
waiver is not irrevocable.
Thomas v Indiana Employment
Security Division, 101 S. Ct. 1425, (1981); Sherbert v Verner,
374 u.s. 398 (1963).
In these and other cases, conctitions and
qualifications upon governmental privileges and benefits have
been invalidated because of their tendency to inhibit
constitutionallv protected activity.
Contracts between private
individuals which impose unconstitutional conditions, in
comparison, may be void as against public policy.
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-5Should the California Legislature give its approval to
surrogate parenting arrangements as a matter of public
policy?
What statutory protections, if any, should be provided
for persons entering into a surrogate parenting
contract?
What statistical information is currently availab
regarding surrogate parenting?
Should the established standard of "best interests f
the child" prevail when there is a dispute between
biological mother and the contract couple over a child
conceived pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract?
What long-range impact will surrogate parenting
contracts have on children conceived by such an
arrangement and on parties who have entered into the
contract?
What impact will surrogate parenting contracts have on
the adoption program in California?
What other considerations should be discussed before
enacting legislation on surrogate parenting?
If you would like more information regarding the hearing, please
contact me at (916) 445-4560.
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EXHIBIT B

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 2, 1982
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 17, 1982
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 18, 1982
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION

ASSEMBLY BILL

No. 3771

Introduced by Assemblyman Roos

April 6, 1982

An act to add Part 9 (commencing with Section 7500) to
Division 4 of the Civil Code, relating to surrogate parenthood,
and declaring the urgency thereof, to take effect
immediately.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 3771, as amended, Roos. Surrogate Parent Act.
Existing law does not provide a procedure for the approval
of a petition incorporating a contract in which a woman
agrees to be aFtifieially inseminated by the sperm of a man
whose wife is unable to bear a child and to relinquish all legal
rights to any child resulting from that insemination to the
husband and wife, upon its birth, and for enforcement of such
a contract.
This bill would so provide, as specified.
It also would take effect immediately as an urgency statute.
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no.
State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of Cahfornia do enact as follows:
1
SECTION 1. Part 9 (commencing with Section 7500)
2 is added to Division 4 of the Civil Code, to read:
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

PART 9.

SURROGATE PARENT ACT

7500. This part shall be known and may be
as
Surrogate Parent Act of 1982.
7501. In enacting this part, it is the intention of
Legislature to facilitate the ability of infertile couples to
become parents through ffl:e use of a suFrogate
establishing a pwcedure f& ffl:e execution of a contract
determining ffl:e rights anEl obligations of ffl:e parties f.e an
agreement f& ffl:e services of ft surrogate. become
parents through the employment of the services of a
surrogate.
The Legislature finds and declares that contracts
executed in accordance w#h ffl:e provisions of ~ t*lfl:
surrogate contracts are in accord with sound social policy.
7502. As used in this act:
(a) "Infertile couple" means a husband who is capable
of producing viable sperm and his wife who has been
determined by a licensed physician to be incapable of
conceiving or carrying a child to term without significant
risk to her life or who has been unable to conceive for one
year prior to the date of the execution of the contract.
(b) "Surrogate" means a woman who consents to be
artificially inseminated by a man who is the husband of
a woman described in subdivision (a) and to carry any
child that she conceives by that man.
(c) "Surrogate contract" means an agreement
between the infertile couple and the surrogate which
determines the rights and obligations of each of the
parties to the agreement, consistent with the provisions
of this part.
7503. The department of the superior court to which
proceedings under the Family Law Act (Part 5
(commencing with Section 4000) of Division 4)
ordinarily are assigned shall have jurisdiction over all
proceedings and actions pursuant to this part.
7504. The infertile couple and the surrogate shall be
represented by separate counsel.
7505. (a) Upon the verified petition of an infertile
couple and the surrogate, the court shall determine,
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based on affidavits or other documentary evidence,
whether the requirements of this part have been
satisfied.
W Unless the infertile couple ~ the surrogat:e
asseRt ffi e: meeting & etfte.f. disclosure, the identity ef the
surrogate sfte:H fief ee disclosed fe the infertile couple,
e:nd f±le identity ef f±le infertile couple ~ fief ee
disclosed ffi .tfie surrogat:e.
fet A:H records pertaining ffi .tfie proceeding ~
remain ~ f±le eettff e:nd ~ ee inspected enty a,..
eettff personnel ~ sueft e#te¥ persons ftS ffiftJ' ee
designated ey eettff order.

-tat

(b) The petition shall include all of the following:
( 1) The original executed copy of the contract.
(2) Evidence of the wife's infertility.
(3) Evidence of the medical evaluation of the husband
and of the surrogate.
(4) Evidence that the infertile couple and the
surrogate have retained separate legal counsel and that
the opinion of counsel in each case is that his or her
client's entry into the contract is voluntary and that the
client understands the terms of the contract.
(5) Proof that the funds described in Section 7506 have
been deposited in an escrow account or attorney trust
account.
(6) Evidence that the surrogate is at least £H. 18 years
of age.
(7) Evidence of the marriage of the infertile couple.
30
(8) Evidence of the ability of the infertile couple to
31 care for the child.
32
-fet
33
(c) The court shall approve the petition if it finds that
34 the requirements of subdivision -f6t ftt:we Been HTet; e:nd
35 (b) have been met, a report recommending approval of
36 the petitionhas petition has been submitted by an agency
37 approved by the court to conduct a home study of the
38 infertile couple,
and the court has reviewed any
39 criminal record of either the husband or wlfe and found
40 that the offense committed by that person should not
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1 affect his or her ability to function as a
2
fft
3
(d)
petition pursuant to
part shall

given
4 calendar priority and shall be handled expeditiously~
5
7506~ A contract approved pursuant to this
6 include, but shall not be limited to, all of the
7 provisions:
fat ~ #te auuogate agrees ffi relinquish parental
8
9 rights ffi #te efti.kl. ffi #te infertile couple immediately
10 aft:eT #te child's ~
(a) That the surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental
11
12 rights to, and the custody of; any child conceived as a
13 result of the insemination to the infertile couple
14 immediately after his or her birth, and to consent to the
15 adoption of any such child by the wife.
16
(b) A requirement for medical evaluation of the
17 surrogate and of the husband (in the case of the surrogate
18 the medical evaluation shall include psychological
19 screening) .
(c) That responsibility for all medical expenses of the
20
21 surrogate during pregnancy and a six-week postpartum
22 period shall be paid in an agreed manner.
23
(d) The provision of term life and health insurance for
24 the surrogate and infertile couple for such term and in
25 such amounts as shall be determined by the parties to the
26 contract.
27
(e) That reasonable monetary compensation shall be
28 paid to the surrogate by the infertile couple in an agreed
29 amount.
30
(f) That the amount of payment shall be placed in an
31 escrow account or attorney trust account prior to the first
32 insemination of the surrogate; however, a portion of the
33 amount, as agreed by the parties, shall not be deposited
34 until the child's birth.
35
(g) That legal and equitable remedies shall be
36 available in the event of a breach of the surrogate
37 contract by any of the parties.
38
(h) That the infertile couple agree to accept custody
39 of; and parental responsibility for, any child conceived as
40 a result of the insemination immediately after his or he1~
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birth.
7507. As a part of its determination pursuant to
Section 7505, the court shall review all information
submitted by the parties to the proposed surrogate
contract and may order the submission of such additional
information as it deems necessary to insure the ability of
the parties to comply with the terms of the surrogate
contract.
7508. (a) Upon the court's approval of the petition, it
shall retain jurisdiction in the matter until the entry of
both a decree of adoption by the wife and a decree of the
paternity of the husband with regard to any child
conceived atJ a msult ef the aftificial insemination agfeed
f6 in: pursuant to the contract. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, such a decree shall be entered within 45
days of the birth of the child. The infertile couple shall
have the right to custody and control of the child prior to
the entry of such a decree.
The fee established by Section 10619 of the Health and
Safety Code shall be paid at the time of the entry of the
decree of adoption.
(b) The husband shall be presumed to be the father of
any ch11d born to a woman who agrees to act as a
surrogate pursuant to this part that was conceived during
that period oftime in which it was possible for her to have
conceived as a result of insemination pursuant to a
contract incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to
this part. This presumption shall be a presumption
affecting the burden of proof and may only be rebutted
as specified in Section 606 of the Evidence Code, by clear
and convincing evidence. A decree made pursuant to
Section 7010 establishing a father and child relationship
between the child and a man other than the husband
shall be considred a rebuttal of this presumption.
7509. A:ftifieal insemination 9fittl.l: no.f .ffilte plaee The
surrogate shall not be inseminated prior to approval of a
petition pursuant to this part.
7510. During the performance of the surrogate
contract, the court may require such additional
information from, testing of, and personal interviews
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with, the infertile couple and the surrogate as it deems
necessary to insure compliance with the terms of the
contract. All costs incurred in this connection shall
borne by the parties, as ordered by the court.
7511. Upon breach of a contract that is the
a petition approved pursuant to this part, the court
grant such legal and equitable relief as it
appropriate, including specific performance.
7512. At the discretion of the supervising judge of the
family law department, proceedings pursuant to this
part, except for the procedures referred to in Section
7511, may be heard before an official of the family law
department of the superior court designated by the court
for this purpose.
7513. Subject to the power of the court to transfer
actions and proceedings as provided in Title 4
(commencing with Section 392) of Part 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the county in which the contract is
executed is the proper county for the filing of a petition
pursuant to this part; and any proceeding in connection
with that petition or the contract incorporated in any
petition approved pursuant to this part.
7514. The presumption contained in Section 621 of
the Evidence Code, and the presumptions contained in
Sections 7004 and 700-X shall not be applicable to a child
conceived by a woman who agrees to act as a surrogate
pursuant to this part during that period of time in which
it was possible for her to have conceived as a result of
artificial insemination pursuant to a contract
incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to this part.
7515. Payments made to a surrogate pursuant to
subdivision (e) ofSection 7506 shall be for the purpose of
compensating her for her services and the making or the
acceptance of such a payment shall not constitute a
violation of Section 181 or 273 of the Penal Code.
7516. The court shall not approve the withdrawal ofa
consent to an adoption made in connection with a
contract incorporated in a petition approved pursuant to
this part unless it finds that extraordinary circumstances
require that approval in order to protect the best
-137-
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1 interests of the child.
2
7517. The provisions ofthis part shall control over any

3 other conflicting provision of law.
4
7518. In the event ol a dispute as to the custody of a
5 child conceived pursuant to a contract incorporated in a
6 petition approved pursuant to this part, between the
7 surrogate and the infertile couple, the provisions of the
8 contract as to the custody of the child shall prevail over
9 the provisions of Section 4600, unless the court finds that
10 extraordinary circumstances require that the provisions
11 of Section 4600 shall control.
12
SEC. 2. This act is an urgency statute necessary for
13 the immediate preservation of the public peace, health,
14 or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the
15 Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The facts
16 constituting the necessity are:
17
In order that the provisions of this act shall be
18 implemented to the maximum extent, it is necessary that
19 it take effect at the earliest possible date.

0
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As amended 08/02/82

SUBJECT
This bill would (1) specify the p.covisions that are to be
included in surrogate parenting contracts and (2) authorize a
court to approve and enforce such contracts.
DIGEST
This bill would establish the Surrogate Parent Act to
situations in which a married couple and a woman enter
contract for the woman to be artificially inseminated
husband's sperm and to carry any child conceived to term,
whereupon the child is to be given to the
e.
to a "surrogate contract" would be
"inferti
the "surrogate," as defined. Each party would
separate counsel.
Under the bill, a surrogate contract would have to
, but
would not be limited to, all of the following provisions:
1.

The surrogate's relinquishment of parental rights and
custody immediately after the child's birth, and
consent to the wife's adoption of the child.

2.

The infertile couple's acceptance of custody
immediately after the child's birth.

3.

Medical evaluation of the surrogate and the husband
and psychological screening of the surrogate.

4.

Responsibility for the surrogate's medical expenses
during pregnancy and a six-week postpartum period.

5.

Term life and health insurance for the parties.

6.

Reasonable monetary compensation in an agreed amount
to the surrogate, with placement of the money in an
escrow or attorney trust account prior to the first
insemination. However, a portion of the money would
not be deposited until the child's birth.

7. ·

That legal and equitable remedies would be available
in the event of a breach of the contract.

The bill would also require a court, upon the parties' petition,
to determine whether they have complied with the provisions of
the Act.
Supported by affidavits or other evidence, the

(CONTINUED)
Consultant L. Young
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petition would include, amcng c.Yi.:l":,:r
:o, ,__ ,; ldenc·e that the
wife is infertile, the:.::. the surrog,:t/::
2;t
•'a::;::. 1.8 years cf
age, and tha-c the couple is m<:u·;:·i
0.1"0 ab~,; tG care for the
child. A report recommending appcoval
t~e ~etit~on must be
submitted by an agency approved by th<2 conr t. t.o conduct. a home
study of the infert.ile couple. The c . Jurt
so review any
criminal records of the husband
wi.fe
to determine
whether a reported offense •,.,rould
fc::-ct
>:".L r ,":Jbi 1 i ty to
function as parents. At any time,
co~rt could order the
submission of more information as it deerr r,,.:cessa:r.-y.
Upon approval of the petition, the
jurisdiction in the matter until
by the wife and a decree of the
days of the birth of the child.
including specific performance, could
as it deems appropriate, in case of
The bill would
i~mediate ei~ect a3 an
would control over an1' other c-c)rtfl ~-ctir1g

e<Tee of adoption
, within 45
itable remedies,
'd
the court,
contract.
statute and
1

)\l

s

~.on

of law.

STAFF COMHENTS
1.

This bill states that the proposed Suc:,Y;
?u.r·2nt Act. is
intended to facilitate the ab:.11xy of i:lf•::>r:ciJ.e couples to
become parents through the emp oymcnt of the ;sc.cvices of a
surrogate.
It also states 2 l
islative finaing and
declaration that surrogate contracts are in accord with
sound social policy.
The source of the bill, the Surrogate Par~nt Foundation,
claims that the availability
in
s for
ion is
virtually nonexistent due to birth control, abortion, and
the choice of many unwed mothers to
their
ldren. As
a result, some infertile couples have t~
to, or want to
participate in, surrogate motherhood jn o_ er to have a
family.
The source argu~s
, oeG~us
e surrogate
arrangement has become a viable alternative method of human
reproduction, legislation is nDw needed to authorize it.
Concerned with charges of baby-s ling, coercion, inadequate
legal representation or
~ sc:ree;y;
,
ive
participants and their attor
fear tha- surrogate
contracts may be construed as ileg l sines no law
affirmatively permlts the ,;..:c:mE'nL,
Surrogate motherhood is controversi.:;.l, pr.·es,;nting many
legal, ethical, and public policy <pJ..c:st.ions. As a
reproductive procedure, it may b~
3r~6 to artificial
insemination by a donor, i tseH' o .. ce rrH.:stionable but now a
socially and legally acceptable
ice us~d to help women
with infertile husbands to c~
Surrogate contracts
attract couples who have giv(::n the mat: 1>2r a great deal of
thought and who are financially c~p
~ of entecing into the

(CONTINUED)
Consultant L. Young
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arrc.ngeme;nt.

adopt.

A

-~

The c

contr~ct

th2n to

adoption vJai~ing lists
biolog1.cal. nexus to t:he
cost, some Cal:~.fornia c
have
ready entered into

, nt
::..·.:..d.
zens

such

c~1(:

l2 or 0nwilling to
e delay of
~:am::: r:J.::J~e, to e:stablish a
te
e controversy and
v,;:.:r~,. srnal1 nwnber,
w1. t.h com p 1 et ed
~vc~d

births.
Opponent.s of this bill claLm t"chll .
r.::oezld .
.:;t c::cagic
impact on parti.es to a sur-roc:a·cc~ :;or:. ·<Ct, chi 1:1ren borne of
this arrangE:~mei'\t, anrl soci ~t.
l ctrfte ._
·Tr-,
cl aj.m that the
proposal
lishes
, .. (,
~-a.r:y consideration
in the creation of parentild relat
In addition,
the psychological and ethica:
surrogate
arrangements, opponents note, have
y~
received
sufficient study to justify codif c~t ou cf the surrogate
parent concept at this t
Th
concerns such as the
effect of surrogate parentinq ·)n thE: snrrogate' s other
children who know that a br.othL~r or sisb'!r was given away;
the surrogate's own lonq-t_err.1 dmotion 1
to the
experience; and the child's a lity to cope vlith being the
product of a surrogate parenting relatJ.on
Opponents
urge that serious study be given to SQr
dte parenting
before this bill is enacted.
Should legislation be enacted to 1egit:irnize surrogate
contracts and set forth guidelines for them?
If so, should
it be enacted now?

2.

This bill would expressly
e U:1at payments pursuant to
a surrogate cont
are compensa~
the surrogate's
services and do not constitute violation of baby-selling and
payment-for-adoption statu·tes (Penal Code Se:::tions 181 and
27 3).
Current law makes the legal stat.us of surroga:ce parenting
contracts uncertain.
In so~e arrangem~nts,
surrogate
receives no financial compensation.
Howe·Jer, where
compensation is given, the
fertile couple and the
surrogate may be subject to prosecu~ion under felony and
misdemeanor statutes.
Penal Code Sect
lHl makes it a
felony to sell or pay for th Cc'-l::> cc;dy ci. a human being.
Penal Code Section 273 makes i·t a r:n ::je.n~.:l:~nr to pay money
to a parent, other than mat
~ted 0r necessary
1 iv.:;,ng expenses, l l l return fo:r pl .~<.c .. ':-j ,~: cni
for
adoption.
Uhder the
iracy pcovJ.s~ons of Penal Code
Section 182, attorneys, physicians,
others participating
in surrogate arrangements might be
in violation of
Sections 181 and 273.
Moreover, sirce Civil Code Section
224p makes it a misdemeanor for someon2 other than a
1 icensed adoption agency to a.dvert.ise .for adoption,
attorneys who advertise in seeking surrogates may be
prosecuted.

(CONTINUED)
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While these statut:es ar<:: inu:.n.ded to pronocc: t.he public
interest in deterring baoy-sell
and black market
adoption, they may nonetheless cre2tt~ legal obstacles to
surrogate
renting.
To date, ~? casss ln the surrogate
context have been prosecuted by tne dttorney general or a
district attorney.
This bill wo~~d r6quire a surrogate
contract to provide for "reasonaDl•::: P1onetary compensation"
to the surrogate. The source, however,
lieves that
surrogate parenting is beyond the scope
any baby-selling
or payment-for-adoption st-at~lte be.cau~:>e
the
surrogate's services that are
by the couple and she
carries their child in her womb .::o.s a cn1stec~.
Should the bill also include an exc
Section 224p?
3.

ion to Civil Code

This bill would authorize contracts in which a surrogate
agrees to be artificially inseminated with the husband's
sperm, to carry the child conceived to term, and to
relinquish her parental rights and custody of the child to
the husband.
It assumes that the husband, as the biological
father, will establish paternity and the
fertile wife, as
a stepmother, will adopt the child.
(Civil Code Section
226.9 permits a stepparent to adopt a chi
where one
natural parent retains custody and control of the child.)
The bill would create a new presumption of paternity under
which the husband would be t_he presumeJ father of a child
born to a surrogate durin9 the t.ime
which it. was possible
for her to conceive as a result of the contract.
The
presumption would be. one which affects the burden of proof
and rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence. A decree
establishing paternity in another man would be a rebuttal of
the presumption.
As stated in proposed Section 7514 of the bill, existing
presumptions of paternity under Evidence Code Section 621
and Civil Code Sections 7004 and 7005 vJon d be inapplicable
in the surrogate parent context.
Under Evidence Code
Section 621, the child of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or steriler is conclusively
presumed to be a child of the marriage.
Recent amendments
to Section 621 permit either the wlfe {¥Iith the
acknowledgement of the child's biological father) or her
husband to contest the pres~Ttption through a motion for
blood tests, except in cases of artificial insemination
performed with the husband's consent.
Civil Code Section
70D4 sets forth a series of rebuttable presumptions of
paternity under the Uniform Parentage Act as adopted in
California (Civil Code Section 7000 et 5'~·)
Civil Code
Section 7005 expressly denies any parental rights to a man
whose semen has been used by a physician to artificially
inseminate any woman other than his wife.
The woman's
husband is treated as the child's natural father.
( CON'riNUED)
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To establish a parent and child relationship between a child
and his or her natural father, an action may be brought
under the Uniform Parentage Act.
Although this bill would
create a presumption of paternity for the surrogate parent
context, it fails to provide a mechanism whereby a contract
father would be able to acknowl
paternity.
Should the
bill be coordinated with
form Parentage Act in order
to give a contract father
ing therein to bring an
action to establi
4.

This bill would permit
court to grant legal and
equitable remed
, as it deems
, when any party
breaches the surrogate
usual legal
remedy
damages
lows specific
performance, i.e., the actual carrying out of the contract
in the manner agreed upon.
Courts
will compel and
coerce specific performance
a contract where money
damages would not adequately compensate for its
nonperformance. As a general rule, specific performance is
limited to certain types of contracts, such as those entered
into for the sale of land or unique property. Courts
typically will not order specific performance to enforce
contracts for personal services.
The most obvious concern regarding a surrogate contract is
its enforceability. This bill would require particular
provisions to be included in the contract, with any number
of other terms added to fit the parties' needs.
Among the
mandatory provisions would be the surrogate's agreement to
relinquish her pare~tal rights and custody of the child
immediately after the child's birth and to consent to
adoption by the wife.
In the one known case in which the
surrogate refused to give up the child, the couple dropped
the lawsuit before the court could rule on the matter.
Thus, a surrogate contract has not, as yet, been tested in
the courts.
The bill would specify that, in the event of a custody
dispute between the infertile couple and the surrogate, the
contract would prevail over Civil Code Section 4600 unless
"extraordinary circumstances" are found to require Section
4600 to control.
(Section 4600 provides that in family law
proceedings, as between a child's natural parents, custody
is to be granted to both parents jointly or to either
parent, according to the child's best interests.)
Likewise,
the surrogate's consent to adoption could not be withdrawn
unless the court fi.nds that "extraordinary circumstances"
require withdrawal to protect the child's best interests.
What types of situations would constitute "extraordinary
circumstances"?
If the surrogate decides to keep the child, would it be
sound public policy to compel her to give the child to the

(CONTINUED)
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couple, absent 11 extraorC.inary circumstances"? If not
considered paramount, should the natural mother's parental
rights to the child be seen as co-equal to the contract
father's rights? To what extent could the best interests of
the child be protected? Would the child have to be
represented by counsel?
Other complications involving breach of the surrogate
contract may be generated, depending on the terms of the
particular agreement. For example, would a couple be forced
to accept a deformed or retarded child? Would a surrogate
be compelled to undergo an abortion if testing indicated
Down's syndrome?
Problems of supervision often accompany the remedy of
specific performance. For example, if the surrogate
breaches an agreement not to smoke or take nonprescription
drugs during the pregnancy, could the court, as a practical
matter, supervise specific performance?
5.

This bill would enable the parties to a surrogate contract
to obtain court approval of the contract.
It would also
allow judicial oversight of the surrogate parent arrangement
from the time a contract is executed. The court may order
the parties to submit additional information upon filing of
the petition and during the performance of the contract to
ensure the parties' ability to comply with the contract
terms. Given the individuals who decide, and are
financially able, to enter into surrogate motherhood, does
this proposal represent excessive protection? Should the
court become involved in a surrogate arrangement only when
there is an alleged breach of the contract and when the wife
applies for a stepparent adoption? Would registration and
regulation of surrogate contracts, as a device for
preconception adoption, be better left to a social services
agency than to the courts?

6.

The bill would make approval of the petition contingent on
a favorable report submitted by an agency which the court
approves to conduct a home study of the infertile couple.
Should the agency procedure include psychological counseling
of the couple?

7.

The provisions of the proposed Surrogate Parent Act would
apply only to infertile married couples.
Should fertile
married couples and single persons be allowed to contract
for a surrogate's services?

8.

Under this bill, no provision would be made for maintaining
the confidentiality of court records.
Should the records
concerning a petition for approval of a surrogate contract
remain sealed?

(CONTINUED)
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9.

This bill would require a court, upon petition, to
determine whether the
sions of the proposed Surrogate
Parent Act have been satisfied.
Upon approval of the
petition, the court wou
retain j
sdiction until the
husband has established
the wife has adopted
the child. The bill does
the court to issue a
decree approving the
is procedure intended
to validate a surrogate contract so
the issue of
validity need not
n any subsequent action
based on breach
contract? If so, should it be
specified that
11 issue a decree declaring
approval of
es the surrogate
contract?

10. Under this bill,
e
fe would
iate a
stepparent adoption of
conceived by the
surrogate. The bill would
e
filing fee for
the petition for adoption would be pa
at the time the
decree of adoption is entered. However, existing Health and
Safety Code Section 10619
ires the filing fee to be paid
when the petition is filed.
Should this portion of the bill
conform to existing law?
11. The bill would require couns
for
to the
surrogate contract to state an opinion
his or her
client's entry into the contract is voluntary and that the
client understands the terms of the contract.
If the
attorney believes that the client is acting voluntarily and
understands the contract provisions but the client later
reneges on the contr~ct, would the attorney incur any
liability to the other party?
12. This bill would provide that the court, prior to approving
the petition, would review any criminal record of the
husband and wife for a finding on the ability of each to
function as a parent.
If the court finds that the criminal
record of either reflects unfitness as a parent, it would
withhold approval of the petition. Would the court consider
both convictions and arrests? Specifically, what offenses
would render a party unfit to be a parent?
13. Portions of this bill need technical revision.

a.

Proposed Section 7503 should be revised to read "The
superior court shall have jurisdiction over all
proceedings and actions pursuant to this part."

b.·

In proposed Section 7505, delete "documentary" from
"documentary evidence".

c.

Proposed Section 7507 should be revised to read "In
making a determination pursuant to Section 7505, the
court shall review all information submitted by the

(CONTINUED)
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petitioner and may order the submission of such
additional information as it deems necessary to insure
the ability of the ~arties to comply with the terms of
the surrogate contract."
d.

In proposed Section 7508(a), delete "such a decree,"
and insert "each decree".

e.

Proposed Section 7512 should be revised to read "At
the discretion of the court, proceedings pursuant to
this part, except for the procedures referred to in
Section 7511, may be heard before a commissioner or
referee."

14. AB 365 (Roos), which, except for the urgency clause, is
identical to this bill, was scheduled to be heard in the
Senate Judiciary Committee on August 3, 1982.
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SOURCE
Surrogate Parent Foundation
SUPPORT
The Committee on Adoptions of the State Bar of California
OPPOSITION
Los Angeles County Adoption Council
Quo Vadis Family Center
California Catholic Conference
California Conference of Catholic Charities
Concerned United Birthparents, Inc.
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EXHIBIT C

l

f

I

I

\!,Jo, vv::; didn't find you under o crJbba~;JC !eof, dear, ond the stork
di~h't bring ycu. Do you knov1 ¥/hat a surrogate mo·!her is'!•'

t--·----------·----------·

Renault, Sacramento Bee
Auqust 15, 1982

Fcruw, Paqe 2
Reprinted bv Permissio~
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Surrogate Parent F oundation 9 Inc"

EXHIBIT D

A CALIFORNIA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION

12301 WILSHIRE BLVD., SUITE 420
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025
·OFFICERS

{213) 820·4723
DIRECTORS

W•!liam C. Gentry

William G. Karow, M.D .. F.A.C.S.
John A. FitzRandolph, J.D.

William W. Handel

Prolf!!uor ot Uw

Nina F. Kellogg, Ph.D.

Bernard A. Sherwyn

June M. Remisch, Ph.D.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

The following terms are defined by the Surrogate Parent
Foundation to clarify the individuals and procedures relating
to the practice of Surrogate Parenting.
Infertility - The inability to conceive after being exposed to one's
mate for one year.
In instances where Surrogate Parenting is
being considered, it is the wife's infertility that constitutes
an "infertile couple".
Surrogate Parenting - An alternate method of childbearing for an infertile
couple when the wife is unable to bear a child.
In this procedure,
a woman known as .the surrogate agrees to be art if ically
inseminated with the husband's sperm and carry the baby for the
couple. The surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental rights.
The husband, being the natural father, assumes custody with his
wife who then legally adopts the child.
Infertile Couple - A married couple in which the wife is infertile (see
above definition) and the husband is fertile.
Artificial Insemination - Placing the sperm in the mouth of the womb
by means other than intercourse. In a surrogate arrangement, it
is the sperm of the husband of the infertile couple.
Surrogate - Fertile female over age 21 who agrees to be inseminated with
the sperm of the husband of the infertile couple and carry the
child for them.
She further agrees to relinquish any parental
rights at the time of the birth.
Natural Father - Husband of the infertile wife, and biological father
to the infant carried by the surrogate. He merely assumes
custody as the natural father.
Adoptive Mother - Also known as the infertile wife. She is the wife
of the natural father and obtains a standard step-parent adoption
of the child.
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EXHIBIT E

Jfcrti!itu. CSuru:ullugu ,\: Enollcrinnlo~m
iTicuicn! (flinic. Jinc.
WILLIAM G. KAROW. MD.. F.A.C.S.

WILL!t..M C. GEtHRY

REFMODVC 1 !VE E ·~ ~/_!(Ri' -'C'~OGY

;.lESft..MCH

DI~EC10R

"-'·'tRICAN B8ARD Of 08S1£1R>CS "-NO GY,.fCOLOGY
ADOLE.SCENT GY~<te.OLOGY

Adoption

placa~ent

and adoptions

re~Jest:

L.A. CHAPTER CHILDRENS HOHE SOCIETY
(213) 306-4654
J1.rs. Jorge
630 Shatto Place
L.A.CA

ADOPTIONS

REQUEST

1980

480

6300

1981

408

6500

1980

94

739

1981

85

805

1980

528

958

1981

524

948

HOLLY F.~ILY SERVICES
Mrs. Sullivan
(213} 484-1441
357 S. Westlake Ave. - L.A.CA

COUNTY BUREAU OF ADOPTION
Mrs. Trader
(213) 738-3673
2550 W. Olympic Bl. - L.A.CA

COUNTY OF L.A. DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTION
~Js. Clemmons
(213} 738-3274
2550 W. Olympic Bl. - L.A.CA
Independent Adoption Placement
1980

486

1981

496

1980 CENSUS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY:
7,477503

-15012301 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD •

SUITE 415 • LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 110025 • 12131 820·3723 I 820·2675

z

0

0

w
::>
z
,_,
E-<

z

0

u

-·l'fl ~~-----.~----~

~ 111 wr!ety of IWE!ii'INIL "We'N - - to lfiUIIIl
oot p~tylftl fl'lf' a clilld-IM clilld 1111 ~ OUI'8.
IM'ftiY p~tyU\1 fCC' l.hllllt'illther l.o eGT'1 1M clillci
1M law does !liOt. dlllee!m 1M dlff~ bet~
clilld. M'!l'inlll cltl1d and II clllJd ~ JOW1!.

one m,~ ~ 'anatlnl ~.'If you

tlke away any part of thlt. lla1 :rou talul away !.he ldd
from 1M naun! mcther and pay It« 1101111e WdiJJ for it..
:rou bur yt.lUI'Illelf a Jlli!IIIIMI full of trouble. ~ 14
t.be pmal fltltl.!ta.
AI1Citlwr ~t Handel Ill ~ Is the !'Jiet
that m!Orlymoo& donoi' INeminatloftll (for 'IIP'IliiMD 'tiJboee
b!JIIb.Mda 11ft lnfl!f'We 01' have &ad ~) have
beer! ~lace fi'W 25 YI!IUS. "ll'a just the l"f:Va"llle at
· the ~te II:IOther l!ltU.IIItkm 1M nobody' a e-rer complained about it. The ~I.e~ llituation II a lit·
!.le bit more compUeated ~the plumblnc'• differ.
ent. a woman actlllllly hu l.o eG'f"1 a e!Uid for lliDe
- ~ and IP'ffl binh and tbel'fl'a a lot &Nat« na. De·
pcM!it.inl spmn Into a eonllllMf' In a dotter's omc. dooea
not eniJill a §l"f::lt delU of rillk. but c:Gnidh"kw!AIIy a
lep.ily we l.hlnk It's l.he I.IIII'M. •
Beyond that. Handell.bina he's found a ~or
two In Callfomilllaw,looplloie~~ he'd !'lldler Dilt ~
!.hal will further prot.eet him and bill clieal.l.
But what If one olllia 8t.lmlflll.e mot.Mra cbanp8 ller
mll'll1 811 JoAn. Bb.imanlln Arelldia jUet did?
!Apl, Mend~
·
uwe .try l.o be a liule more aaretul In t~~electin« OUt
~ate mothen than they wel"f: In that cue.· say1
Hatldel. ·u they clwlged their mlndll. firlt of a11 they
wooldn't ll!t 1M money and lleCOI'Idly, lbey'd ftnd them·

l
I

!!elves Involved in very l.ar1e laW!!Uil.l. I have a lool 1
coovef811lion with our surrogate lllOlbenl dl8etai.!lg not
only tM le-gal ramtficaUons but the mora.II'1I.IJUf1c:AIUonL
1 teil l.Mm. 'Ybu'l"f: B'Oill8 to be l'Uillllnl ~ people wbo simplY do not~ with JOU.' "

In bill ovnultuation. however. Hmdel aaya be b..run't
encoontered 1.o0 much roorallndJ«nadoc <m!r' what he'a
doin!J. "Mo!lt people I aeelllgl'1!e wbolebNrtedly wtth the
~ 't'i'lere'a no doubt In lll.Y mind !.bat the"~e l!'fl
millionll of ~ who would lfO the way oliJI.IM'OiliiCII
puenung If lt wm! made lepi," he .,... "But are there
i!lll.l.lon8 of surrogate ll'IOtben? lilt worth IJOOII t.1!routJb
tile lwllrle ollegislatton and bulld!nl ill'i enliR new of law If there's only four WOIMD who 11ft fOinii.O ® It
a year! Ira a b~ ill.lbjecl.. ~

I
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basic conc~rn,
you want
do 110metmng
M this'"
"lt"s a bt!Sl~• endeavor

'\)
(!)

t1sfoes monetary
!Jonal n~:· er,

1-'i

:::1 :::1

.... .Q

(/)

rn

(!)
~--'

r->·(1)

0
::J

diCOU.,

f
?otentoal

surrogate Karen Smith expects thP
.adoptong couple tn the delivery room woth her

(IJ

8

r-'·

:::1
(1)

"But we've de<:!d«< it wouldn'l ~
to have a cJOf>e r<'lat!onSh!p."
contmued. 'The mother's
to lake
baby nght after 1
r I! and ~
internal mother

'-"'---

lynne Endocott contends wrrogate motherhood
wtll utosfy monetary and emotional needs .

a

diVOMOei!

and

dent With an II -ye!U
year-old of her own.
eu.y pregnandea and ell,lOY

nght then and there."
One woman on the Slll'I'Ogat.e J>ll·
l.h~

l'lem _, SI.JRROO!I.TES. P•C"B

---~·----------------

specified that IIU1'l'Ogate motllera would nave no hl.wtory
of dlaealle. be of Ule prop« race. be good stud<lmts and
more. "That l)aby will be loved beeauee it fultllla the
program. Chances ll!'e it CllllOOl l'ulfill aU the elqle(:ta·
tiona of tile adopting parenl.l. That'a'nOt an ~lion·
al aeceptanee ol' a chll.d."
S&wlclu wj!Jlt on to u.y tl\at the difference betw~ ,

OGATES:
roblems Posed

,

-

&oMs .,... hp

~ &rtll!tt, 11M
-~\ly bollll1 oon~

never had a cltild t>efol'1!, but
KeUou l!he oould become u
:~ve ~te lllOtber who would not change 1\er
• mind and decide to keep tile baby m the end. Kellogg
! revealed that Bartlett bed IAI!IIured her that in the event
'&he truly Wllllled to kee!)Ule baby she would atill give it
; up. reuollin& "1 will make 11n0tber baby for myself."
; Responding to a quution from the audience that q •
•seated tbat surrogate mctberhood wu e!lllentially ''pl'1!·
: IJUidltaled abandonm8Dt," Bartleu. Aid. "Premeditated
: abandonmeut ~ me. This child 1\u more love tl\an
• probably tile ma)Ofity ot the cl\ildren who are con; ceived.ljUI!t can'liii.Y any more."
, A clinical PIIY<:hol.og~~~t and a board member ol' Re·
:ao~ve Infertility Inc .• tl\rough wluch she worlr.B will\ 111·
; fertile oouple!l. Kellogg il&8Ul'ed tbe audience that one of
• her chief coneems is if a wollli!Jl "can hlrve a child and
'
.t up and be all righL
ou have my pi'OIIl.iM ll\at if it doean't work in a COI.lean. I will be tbe first to say 1t." she Insisted. "but
't go to Ule llte111ture ( u there l8 none). We have
1.."''

at Kellogg wd aile has obl!erved so far, however,
the bonding~ appeat!l to be not between

:the surrogate and "her belly" but betwean the surroJ&te and tl\e couple. The surrogate mothers Kellogg hu
Wltb do not speak of the cluld they ll!'e carrying

~worked

-:M "my baby" bill. ra!.hel: "their baby."
'I'm 1M Pl...,.ltlac'

I

She wd tile attitude of many surrogates amounts to
jfunply. "I'm not the motner. I'm the plumbing providing
:J.Ile opportunity for her to be tile mother."
~ It wu precisely that v!ew-:the objee. tifytng of the
iiflumail body-tl\at seemed to dlllturl> the memben1 of a
~~ of rebg100a and etlucs spec!.ali.sts tnvtted to speak
~symp011.1um.

Profesaor Mananne Sawicki, a Catholic sacramental
and d!rt!ctor of the gradu.ate program in rell·
cation at Loyola Marymount Uruvemty. sald
nd the other members of her panel all were
-slruek" by the "dehumanwng" language that seemed
.Jn ;u:eompany the phenomenon of surrogate p!lrenting.
' "I have to t.alt.e the posttton that one may not give
an ovum. My body Ill not a !.tung," Sawickt said.
t doea it mean when l give away my body? When 1
way an ovum!''
at 1t meant to Sawtcld waa that the mother would
"mamt.am the social and paycholog~<:al conneeuon
tile life that wtH be begotten."
~ addition. Sawtcln slud that the chtld.ren of surra-·
•
arrangementil would not be loved unconditionally,
cent.rat:tuall y the!t' iidOpUng parents. already had

I
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'Problems Posed
CMI:l ........

~...

lid! 1 ' -

~

an<~ ~ through 8\ll't'Ogalill
f~mn,. "alwa)11 involvl!!!l an (un·

!IO<M
or<~

oort." With the li\llT(liJate·

Cl'<>llinl! a

tragiC Cll'CUDI•

want children, they should have every entitlement to <lo
that.
"There ia far more activity in thia """" than we can
even comprehend." he said. adding that &nee surrogate
parentin& fall• into a "gray a.rea" of the law, tltet'e
"tremendoul potentl&l for aploitatil:>n by till.I!Crupulouo
individuala . . , Bl& money ia clwl8iJ!s hand&. You ellm •

"n·•~·•ft•l"

material
"toSJI!llaway re~billty, to abdicate or
~er~w retlpOMi·
blllty."
In the llltliatlooofparenthood, !Wmmei
"'\'00 M'lllnU!n<llni to
I cl!J1d to be de• I
~~!"~wed of a parent."
~ lntllcated ba f-..4
~ ehlldnn 'III'OUid be
nw.llld u eommodllleoi or
mantliactur•d ltema.
"When yoo pay money.
theft ia a tend.mey to lhinl<
100 lihollld pt value." he
obaerwed. ~ auch
potentl&l reacUona u "Did
Nlnll Kl!lklgg
!
a good one? Do I have
toweu..t?"
In
Krimmel wondered about the polillntl&l
aay~ m
od<:lpting family and whether the Mt·
uraJ father would clalm l'OO<'tlO nght to the child than hla
Wlfe (lll divoree p~. for example) becauee "I
have a bwl~ rela!Jollllltip but you dOn't"
MOIU!Igll<lr J'*ph Poll&ro. who _..,..., u peraonal
theol~ to Cardinal Timothy MannlnB. Wd the Cath·
otic chureh ill~ to the """"""ngly pro-life" practice of surrogate PM'enUng fill' a number of reasona.
''The "'""' prolllern
pomt of retlecuon that the
Chnsuan or CatholiC Clm•uan hlll! to go through ia the
nature of the marnage," saJd Pollard. "It il for life. between two people and exclus•ve of another love. That
meant~ the trwt ol the womb 1• truly of love. The problem 111 that you'"' mtroduc•ns a thlrd party into the
mom~. The child io a inot of the surrogate mother.
not the husband lilld wlie. That'• why you don't find at·
f.irmatJOn of .rurt'<lgaung m the Catholic church."

'

L~ .'u-6u~eS~

ln&lill the pooalbility of apklitallon when you bl'inC It
Into the eunahlne of the law/'
Rooo warned hla audience. which Inc.! I Jod many cou •
plM mvesupunr the pooiiblllty of havtnr a ehild with •
lll1T<l1Jilte. thai he would need their continued IIJPilOft li
he hoped to get auch potenually "oxploolve" leplatlon
paaa<od. He wd he -lilld a certain amount of outrage
from the "unknowing public" which might lni!IIJ11ret !ua
efforta .. another e:wnple of "Callfanua frultl an<l
1'1--.SUIUIOGATI:II.. ..... 111.

Caltr.

{Lua Aq1 eles Co )

LOS

,.,t

.;SUR.ilOGATES
, ~daao4 ,,...,.. Gdo 1'•1•
nuuo" trymg to !eplize "a!lliWIIve state orgy,"
....,~lib"" uked why the Jl!'OI)Otled surrogate law lnclud·
ed no limllauone on llttorneY'• fee~~ for handling thc.aae-. Rooe. wbo i>l not an attorney. rephed. "Let'a 110(
kJCI<~Urselvee. I work With, well. every other dell< lAo oc- ,
cup1ed by a lawyer. You start lookmg at a bill that hu a
cap on !eea and you're loolung at a dead bill."
Arid what has happened 1n the abeence of legislation?
fn•th" Clll!e ol the two surrogate mothero who have
born cblldren for couple• repreaenlilld by am Handel
and )ua ueodate &mard Sherwyn. Handel said the
adopUone were handled u "stan<llrd atep-parenl adoptJo~~ and were nol in Callfwnla u the adoptin& parentl
lived out ofauu.e.
1:

AN-tin VIew
Pollard remmded the .....,mbly that the -.e of lUI'·
parenung wu not reelly new and thai the
l!u h~Y lu!4 a negative vtew <II.~
or relal.lveo or mybody else" to irlllenunale a
woman. even tar the purpo11e of producing tuwre klnp

)faJ<tr ...,.!em

Dot.

said Sllerwyn. the ma)Ot' problem that l'IOIIIllllll
'1ltlresolved ia what happena wnen the IUI'1'0p!e mother
~to give up the baby.
·
::ln the situation of the surrogate mother who lalla to
gjv' up the baby. we have our bas1c rughtmare. What
lVI!' e:q>ect in r.!atity IS a custody battle. We would hope
tt would be dealt With m the IWtle way u a dilaoluUon of
lnemage Situation, di!Clded in the best intereat of the
ch)ld. The court hu ruled on very few CUM on thiaaubject and In no caBell in th" state of Calliomla."
David Leavitt an attorney IP«ializtJ:ll in adoption
law and an adVIser to the State Bar of Calliomia Com·
mittee on AdoptU>ns, argued. however, thai contracll
bet ween li\llT(liJate ll'lOthel'l!l an<~ adopting couples may
ultimately prove worthle~~ if the lllll'l'OJill't wmll to ,
ke.;p her child.
~
"I'm afraid that no matter what they put on paper
that there ia no ooort tn the land that bas indicalilld the ,
sllgt>teet willlngn""" to enforce a contraet of this kind."
he aaid. "The courta Will not fore" women to part With
babtes they give birth to m the abaence of egreglooa
misconduct on the mother's part."

arqueens.
Pollard brought up the potenl.lal prolllema for the
cluld. "Such • cluld would never make Jl m the priell.·
hood or make a.. a bl@bop or pope," h<t said. explaining
that the cluld of a 3Utl'Ogale would be ruled out b«auH
lUll parent>' conduct w u not beyond repro&<: h.
Polterd allo commented on the brochure publllhed by
the Surrogate Parent Foundation Inc.. wluch aponaored
the sympoelum and whoo!le directoro include both Handel Kellogg and others actively Involved m prodw:ul&
babies through surrogate- parent relai.IOnahiP<L
Saya the brochure, ''The notion of surrogate parent·
mg datell back 4.000 yellt8. According lo th~ Bible. Ge·
""""'chapter 16. Abraham's w1fe Sarah could not con·
ce1ve. so she sent her husband to sleep With her Egyptian lllllld. Hagar. who !>ore Abraham's son. Ishmael, for
them.
"
developed and succeos·
"Arofu:ial msemmal.loo
fully U8l!d tn 1550 by EustacluW! (pbysiCUln to the
pope). The freez1ng ol sperm {wh1ch can mruntam 118
hfe) dates back to 1176, developed by an Jtallan pnest.
Lazaro Spula:t.mt"
Diff•nat Jaterpt<et&tioa
Pollard conteo<ied lh.at ocnptural ochola:ra do not•n·
terpret. Genetns chapter 16 m the a.ame way the Surro~
gate Parent Foundauon 00.,.. He added that the reference to the pope's phys1c1an and an ltahan pnest do not
constitute "a statement of favor from the church."
In two panel d!JicUlll>!Ons covenng lhe legal and leiJIS·
laf.ive aspe<:l8 of surrogate parentlllg, the fact that there
are no dear laws or mtM!h Jega1 precedent for surrogate
parentmg was •tresaed repeatedly. In fact the only
thmg that seemed evtdent from these dJSCU.SSJona was
that not>O<ly knows for sure what Will happen 1f new
laws ar• ool p~, laws spec1f1cally excluding SU!TO·
gate parenung from eJO•ung statutes on baby buytng

w""

and !¥e!hng (which

JS

'GuiltT of Malpra<fl..'
LeaVJtt allo con!ended lhat contracll he bad heard
deccribed unduly favored the adoptmg parenl8 aM dJd
not safeguard the righta of surrogate mothers." Any attorney who would permit a client (surrogate mother) to
8JI!ll the ldnd of contract Mr. Handel hu described to
you would be guilty of malpractice," he said. "Unl- a
better way can be found. r can aMUre you the State Bar
Will fight it totally and probably successfully."
Then he added, "Thill sort of thing can be a bleoaing to
infertile couple•. but lilt hit> the fan, guy•. you're in
ternble trouble li yov start out m the state of Calllornla."

Ideas. both opposing and complimentary, flew back
and forth hke that all day and also mcluded reports from
ferullty spe<:1aJ1st Dr. Wilham Karow and June Rem-

!&ell, a developmental psycho-endocnnologiat, both dinotors of the Surrogate Parent FoundatiOn.
'Really Grut'
When 1t was all over. 1t seemed obv1ous the audience
had plenty to thmk about. and at least one woman weQl
home relieved to know how openly surrogate parentmg
lS bemg discussea and debated,
I
• Siud Sharon Sharpe. who W1th her husband ill oon- 1
s1dermg adopting a ch1ld carr1ed by a surrogate mother. 1
"When 1 f~r3t heard of th1a, l thought It would be t1k:~J
Middle Ages where you go behmd a butcher shop and
Alllllfthem a bag of money. But Um,. really great.."

tllega.J }.laws wh1ch create new re·

gulauon and standards lor contracta and adopuon

procedures re!aung t.D surrogate parent sJluabona or
laws w!uch specllltally proh1b1t surrogate parentmg.
A proposed act reguiatmg •urrogate parenung, creat'E'd by law students m a cJaaa of Professor John A. F1tz~
Randolph's at Wh1tUer CoUegeSchool of Law. was pre·
semed 1o the sympoemm audience, State ....,mbly~ru~n
Ml!r.e R<loo (D.Loo Angeles) told the crowd that he was
oonsldermg apol..-tn!! • ucll an act becawoe "If people

~- ... -..J.t.. ......., •..__.,.,,_ • ..........,__ ~.~~~.~~"""""~ -"--·~·
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EXHIBIT G

Introduced: 4/14/81
Referred: Health,Education &
Social Services
IN THE HOUSE

BY BEIRNE AND METCALFE
HOUSE RILL NO.

tH·THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
TWELFTH LEGISLATURE

FIRST SESSION

A BIU..
I

For an Act entitled:

"An Act relat

to bear

children and

1

child relationship, and providing

8

date. n

9
10

8! IT F.NACTEO BY THE

*

Section 1.

LI~GISLATURE

AS 20.20 h

Sec. 20.20.020.

•

parent

an

OF TKE STATE OF ALASKA:

amended by adding a new section to read:

CONCEPTION BY AGREEMENT.

A written agreement

providing that a woman be impregnated by artificial insemination for
13

the purpose of conceiving a child with sperm from a man other than her

14

husband and providing compensation to the woman for bearing the child

15

may be entered into and is enforceable according to its terms.

18

~orn

A child

to a woman as a result of artificial insemination under an agree-

ment entered into as provided in this section is considered for all
18

purposes the

19

sperm.

natu~al

and

legi~imate

child of the man who furnished the

The rights of a parent are relinquished by the woman and the

relationship of parent and child as to the woman is terminated on birth

:u
'22
2l

of the child.

*

Sec. 2. . ?his Act takes effect on the effective date of an Act which

requires reporting to the court

~ny

compensation or expenses paid to the

mother of a child being adopted and which allows relinquishment of the
25

parent and child relationship on payment to the mother of an agreed-on
~ompensation

for time and services in bearing the child •

.. 1-
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HB 498

~..J:zlm ;§tah~ 1fi£g t5Ia±ur£
House of Representatives
Committee on

Hu.ltli, Sducation & Social Services

Pcucb V
Stata Capitcl
Juneau, Alaska 9'9811

SEX:'TICNAL N:lALYSIS

IDJSE BILL 498: An act relating to bea.ring children and the parent child
relationship.

Section 1

AS 20.20.020

Conception by Agreenent

'!he present chapter on "Children Conceived by Artificial Insemination., is
amended by the addition of a new section Which would legalize the concept
Jcnown as surrogate parenting.
tklder the provisions of this bill, any w:m:m could enter in to a contract
with another m:m other than her husband, for the purposes of bearing him
a chil,d. Up:m birth of the child, the w:mm relinquishes and tenninates
all parental rights to the child. The man is recognized by law as the
natural and legitimate father of the child.
'!he contract 'V.Ollld include the requirerrent that the child be conceived by
artificial insemination. In addition, it Y.Ould stipulate the arrount of
canpensatian the surrogate nother is to receive for her tine and services.
As is tl ~ case with all legal contracts, any other conditions agreed to
by both parties Y.OUld be clearly spelled out in the agreerrent •

.

Secticn 2

This act is dependent up:::m passage of House Bill 497 'Which provides the
enabling language.
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DRAFT 1

SUBSTITU'l'E

BOUSE BILL NO.

84

A bill to establish the legal status of a child conceived
through the artificial insemination of a surrogate; to provide
for the termination of the parental rights of a surrogate; to
require that.certain documents be filed with the state registrar;
and to impose certain duties on the state registrar.
'

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
1

Sec. 1.

As used in this act:

2

(a) "Natural father" means a male of at least 18 years of

3 age whose semen will be used to artificially inseminate a

4 surrogate.
5

(b)

"Surrogate" means a married or single female of at least

6 18 years of age who agrees to be artificially inseminated

with

7 the semen of a natural father, and, if she conceives and bears a
8 child, to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the child

9 as provided in this act.

o2 4 4 o ' a1 (a- 1 > Draft 1

MLS
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1

Sec. 2.

A. child born to a natural father and a surrogate

2 conceived through the artificial insemination of the surrogate

3 with the semen of the .natural father shall

considered to be

4 the legitimate child of the natural father and his spouse if all
5 of the following conditions are met:

6

(a) The natural father provides his semen to a licensed phy-

7 sician under the supervision of the physician.
8

(b) The artificial insemination of the surrogate is per-

9 formed by a licensed physician.

10

Cc) The spouse of the natural father signs a written

11 acknowledgment as provided in section 3.
12

(d) The surrogate signs a consent to the termination of her

13 parental rights as provided in section 4 which is not revoked as
14 described in that section.
15

Ce> If the surrogate is married, the surrogate's husband has

16 acknowledged.the arti£icial insemination of the surrogate before
17 the surrogate is inseminated.
18

Sec. 3.

The spouse of the natural father shall sign in the

19 presence of the licensed physician performing the artificial

20 insemination upon the surrogate a written acknowledgment which

21 acknowledges all of the following:
22

(a) That the spouse is aware that the natural father's semen

23 will be used for the artificial insemination of the surrogate.

24
25

(b) That the spouse will have full parental responsibility

for a child conceived through the artificial insemination of the

26 surrogate with the semen of the natural father.

02440'81 (B-1) Draft 1
-159-

3

Sec. 4.

1

( 1)

Not more than 72

rs

2 child conceived through the artifici

3 surrogate

4 s

semen

semination of a

r, the sur

natur

a written

er the birth of a

r

ate

1

r

r:

5 rights to the
6

(2) The consent requir

7 effective 20

t

r the consent

8 gate revokes her consent in
9 the child custody act of
10 1970, as amended, be

wr

970,

1

(1

sur

unless
init ates an ac i

ing

No .. 91 of the

r

Acts

sections 722.21 to 722.29 of

11 Compiled Laws, to determine the custody

con-

the child.

12 sent executed by the surrogate shall state clearly the

te on

13 which the consent becomes effective and the actions wh

d

14·preclude the consent from becoming effective.
15

(3) The execution of the consent required by subsection (1)

16 shall be witnessed by 2 persons and a duplicate copy of the con17 sent shall be retained by the surrogate.

18

(4) The consent required by subsection (1) shall contain the

19 name of the surrogate at the time of the child's birth and the

20 surrogate's most recent address.
21

(5) The consent required by subsection {1) shall inform the

22 surrogate that she may file a denial of the release of her name
23 with the state registrar at any time and that the denial may be

24 revoked at any time.

The state registrar shall develop a

rm

25 for a surrogate to deny or revoke a denial of release of her name
26 and shall make the form available to the surrogate.

02440'81

(H-1) Draft 1

-160-

4

1

Sec. 5.

(1) Each acknowledgment, consent, or

evoca

2 described in this act shall be notarized and shall

f

3 the state registrar appointed pursuant to section 28 3
4 public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts
5 amended, being s'ection 333.2813 of the Michigan Compil
6

(2) The state registrar shall not disclose

name

7 surrogate unless ordered to do so by a court of record or
8 vided in subsection (3).
9

(3) A child conceived through the artificial

10 a surrogate with the semen of a natural father may obtain
11 name of the surrogate from the consent executed by

sur

12 pursuant to section 4, upon reaching 18 years of
13 surrogate has filed with the state registrar a wr
14 the information not be released.

02440'81 <B-1) Draft 1

Final page.
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House: Rawl
Attorney: Munnerl:,'11
Stenographer: Corley
Date: 1-26-82
No.:

if. 31 '!/
/

A BILL

TO AMEND CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 20, CODE OF LAWS
1976, RELATING TO CARE AND SUPPORT IN DOMESTIC
BY ADDING ARTICLE 15, SO A.S TO ENACT THE SOUTH
PARENTING ACT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE MAKING
HOOD AGREEMENTS, THE ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
AND THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT
PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT; AND TO AMEND SECTION 20-7
RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE F.MULY COURT,
THAT THE FAMILY COURT SHALL HAVE JURISDICTION TO
ACTIONS FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of

S

Chapter 7 of Title 20 of the 1976

SECTION 1.
adding:

II

ARTICLE 15

Surrogate Parenting
Section 20-7-3600.

This article

~ay

be c

as

Surrogate Parenting Act.
ection 20-7-3610.

The purpose of this

existence of and regulate surrogate p
Sectic~

?0-7-3620.

(A)

As used in this

'Child' means a person conce

fo1lo\<Ting artificial insemination

d

~ri th

(B)

1

Court 1 means the family court.

(C)

'Husband' means a surrogate 1 s

years of age, 1·rho agrees pursuant to a
ment to permit the surrogate to be artifici
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semen of a natural father, and, if the surrogate conceives and
a child, to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights, if any,
the child.
"'"'"

(D)

'Judge' means a judge of the family court.

(E)

'Natural father' means a married male of at least eighteen

years of age whose semen will be used to artificially inseminate
a surrogate and who, with the wife, proposes to adopt a child to be
conceived pursuant to a surrogate parenthood agreement.

/

/

,.~----------------------------------
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3
(F)

'Surrogate' means a married female

or

at

years of age who agrees pursuant to a surrogate p
ment to be artificially inseminated with the semen
father, and, if she conceives and bears a Cftild,
relinquish her parental rights to the child.
(G)

'Surrogate parenthood agreement' means a

executed as provided in this article.
(H)

'Wife' means a natural father's spouse, at

years of age, who, with the natural father, proposes
child to be conceived pursuant to a surrogate. p
Section 20-7-3630.

The

s~~ons

and petition in s

proceedings must be served in the manner prescribed
personal service of

s~~~ons

Section 20-7-3640.

(A)

in civil actions.

If a wife and a natural

adopt a child to be conceived pursuant to a sur
a;~eement,

they must file a petition for sur

the court of the county in which they reside or
and her husband reside.
(B)

The petition for surrogate adoption must b

triplicate, verified by the wife and the nat
specify:
(1)

The full names, dates and places

of residence of the wife and the natural father.
(2)

The place and date of the ma

natural father.
( 3)

The f'J.ll names, dates and places of b
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4
residence of the surrogate and her husband.
{4)

The place and date of the marriage of the sur

and her husband.
/'

(5)

That the wife and the

natura~father

intend to ac

custody of the child from the surrogate and her husband pursuant
to a surrogate parenthood agreement.
(6)

The desired name for the child.

(7)

That it is the desire of the wife and the natural father

that the relationship of parent and child be established between
them and the child following the birth of the, child.
(8)

Facts, if any, which excuse consent on the p8.rt of

surrogate or her husband to the adoption.

(C)

A copy of the surrogate parenthood agreement entered

nto

pursuant to the provisions of this article by the wife, the
father, the surrogate, and the husband must be attached to the
petition.
(D)

One copy of the petition must be retained b

the court.

Another copy must be sent to any agency or person partici
the surrogate adoption proceeding.

The third copy of the peti

on

must be served upon the surrogate and her husband as provided
Section 20-7-3630.
Section 20-7-3650.
~d

Every party to a surrogate parenthood

a surrogate adoption proceeding must be a resident of

Any surrogate who enters into a surrogate parenthood agre
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ement
ta
must

5
have given birth to at least one child prior
the agreement.
Section 20-7-3660.

Within twenty days

the summons and petition for surrogate ado?tion
and her husband must file a verified response
copy of which must be served on the natural

r

their attorney.
Section 20-7-3670.

(A)

Upon the filing of

surrogate adoption, the court must order an inves
made by the Children's Bureau of the State
by

S

a private or public \<Telfare organization

main purposes the care and placement of
designated by the

co~.1rt

0

and must further order

investigation be filed with the court by
w~thin

s

sixty days from the issuance of the o

r

unless time therefor is extended by the co
The investigation must consider:
(1)

The capacity and disposi

on of

natural father to give the child to be concei

(2)

The capacity and disposit

natural father to provide the child with

d

rmanence, medical care, and other mate
(3)

The permanence as a family

t

wife and the natural father.
(4)

The moral fitness of the wi

(5)

The mental and physical health of

natural father.

6
(6)

Any other factor considered by the court or

investigating agency to be relevant to the surrogate ad
proceeding.
(C)

The report of the investigation ~usi become a part of

files in the case and must contain a definite recommendation

r or

against the proposed surrogate adoption and state reasons there
provided, that the signer of the report and all persons participat
in, conducting, or associated with the compiling, separation and
filing of the report must be available

~or

examination and cross-

examination by any party to a surrogate adoption proceeding conce
the contents and recommendation contained in the report,

c

deta:l.
(D)

~nd

The judge must review the report prepared

to this section.

filed

If the report recommends that surrogate ad

be permitted, the judge, within ten days after receipt of
must enter an order certifying the

suita~ility

on

t~e

of tte wife and

natural father for surrogate adoption.
If the report recommends that surrogate adoption not be
the judge, within ten days after receipt of the report, must c
a hearing to review the report and to

ta~e

the suitability of the wife and the natural
adoption.

other evidence
fat~er

for s

The wife and the natural father and the surro

husband must attend the hearing.

The court may also

re~

te
re

attendance at the hearing of the persons specified in subsection
of this section.

At the conclusion of the hearing,

~f

satisfied as to the suitability of the wife and the
based on the evidence produced at the hearing, the
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cour~

must,

o

7
ve days of the hearing, enter an order certi
of the wife and the natural father for surrogate
judge is not satisfied as to the suitability
natural father for surrogate adoption based

e

./

at the hearing, the court must, within five days
an order dismissing the petition for surrogate
Section 20-7-3680.

(A)

If an order is entered ce

suitability of the wife and the natural father
pursuant to subsection (D) of Section 20-7-3670, a p
physician, licensed

~~der

the laws of this State,

p

artificial insemination of a surrogate.
(B)

When the inseminating physician is ab

the surrogate is pregnant as the result of an a
he must file notice of the pregnancy with the
a copy to the

w~fe

and the natural father,

h,_l::;se.nd, or the::.r respec-ti·1e attorneys.

(c)
preg~ancy,

sur

Upon rece::.nt of a copy of the

~ot::.ce

the 'v<tife and the natural father must

te and her husband and acknolflledge

to the surrogate is the natural father's
and ac1r.no'tlledged by them in the same manner p
execution and acknowledgment of deeds of re
ther must file the acknowledgement with
(D)
((;
, -

~~

o~

Upon receipt of an

ac~~owledgement

t.h_-:
s c:P.ct.-i
en, tne
must ente"'
··
v-:ur1.cre
-o
~

~

~

"'r:
~"

the natural father's pqtern!ty of the child to

I
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r

e

8
On the next business day after entry of the order
court must send a copy of the order to the Office
and Public Health Statistics of the State Department
-~"""'

Environmental Control.

The order of

filia~ion

is

come e

immediately upon the birth of the child.
Section 20-7-3690.

(A)

Following entry of an order

required by subsection (D) of Section 20-7-3680, a c
relinquishment of parental rights over a child conceived
to a surrogate parenthood agreement must be executed by

s

and her husband.
(B)
b~fore

The consent required by subsection (A) must

e

the birth of the child to become effective

i

child.
(C)

The consent required by subsection (A) must be e

a separate instrument executed before the judge
of the surrogate adoption proceeding.
(D)

The consent required by subsection (A) must

until after the judge has fully explained to the
husband the legal rights of a parent and the fact that
and her husband, by virtue of the consent, voluntari

re

permanently their rights to the child.
Section 20-7-3700.

After the receipt of notice of

sur

pregnancy and the completion of the surrogate's si

care, and control over the child to the natural fathe
The inter:m order must grant to the natural father
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and

11

than interested parties, their counsel, and persons
required by the court to be in attendance.
(B)

All papers and records pertaining to a s
f~"'"',

proceeding must be sealed and kept as a per.manent rec
withheld from inspection, and filed in the office of
of

co~~on

pleas.

No person shall have access to

order of the judge of the court in which the decree
adoption Has entered for good cause shoi..rn.
(C)

All files and records pertaining to the sur

proceedings in the State Children's Bureau or, in
Social Services of the State of South Carolina, or
agency, must be confidential and withheld from
order of court for good cause
(D)
p rc•::;nt

she·~.

The provisions of this section must not b
adoption agency from furnishinG to

e.n~·

biolo~ic'll

parent~

or adoptees nonidentifying

sole discretion of the chief executi •re officer of
inform:'. tion l·;ould serve the best inte res

of

nor must the provisions of this article be construed
dentif~ring

information to any other person, p

the discretion of the chief executive o

ce

established a sufficient reason justifying
~ifying

information.

As used in this subse

rmation' may include but is not limited to
1.

The health of the surrogate.

2.

The health of the child.

":)
..)

re

.

The child's general family bac

rences.
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4.

The length of time the child has been in

custody of the natural father and his wife.
The release of other nonidentifying

info~~~ion

may be made

only at the discretion of the chief executi-ve officer of

tion

agency.
Section 20-7-3740.

(A)

For each surrogate adoption

d

to the provisions of this article, the attorney for the
father and his wife must, within fifteen days of the filing of

e

final decree, transmit to the Office of Vital Records and Pub

c

Health Statistics of the State Department of Health and Environmen
Control a certified copy of the surrogate adoption decree and
Certificate of Adoption with Part II completed and ve

fied

natural father and his wife, and Part III certified by the c
of court.

The court or the State Children's Bureau must c

e

Part I of the Certificate of Adoption and transmit the form to
State Registrar of Vital Records within thirty days of the

~~

of the final decree.
(B)

The State Registrar, upon receipt of a certi

a

ed

of Adoption, must prepare and file an original certificate of bir
in the name of the child.

The certificate of birth must be

ree o

any reference to or indication of the fact that the
and must show the natural father and his wife as the real p
The surname of the natural father must be listed as t

surname for

the child.
Section 20-7-3750.

An appeal is allowed from any final o

,ju:1grr:ent or decree rendered under this article to t:'1e court sy
per;;on against whom any such order, judgment, or
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ree

be

13
made or who may be affected the
appeals from the court in other
surrogate adoption is not subject
reason after a period of one year
Section 20-7-3760.

Prior to the ent

of a

adoption, the natural father and his

must

sworn statement describing money or

r cons

value paid to or exchanged by any

in

proceeding, including anyone consenting to
the child, any relative of a party to
ceeding or the surrogate parenthood
attorney, social worker, or member of the
corporation, association, or other organization
rove or disapprove fees and e
amoQ~~s

in excess of those appro

lation of this section.
provisions of this sec
vic
or be

s.

Any person
~on

is

on, shall be fined an
i~prisoned

no

for a period not to exce

To assure compliance with the p

c

court may require sworn testimony f
in informing, noti

, e

locating, assisting, or in any
sur

te

r

renthood agreement or re

ted

directly or indirectly, led to s
Section 20-7-3770.

(A)

A person cannot b

in which a female agrees to conce

172
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insemination unless that person, together with her or

s

executes a surrogate parenthood agreement as provided

s

article.
(B)

An attorney who represents a prospective natural

r and

his wife cannot represent the surrogate and her husband in
execution of a surrogate parenthood agreement.

Any atto

representing a person or persons executing a surrogate paren
agreement must also sign the agreement, but not as a party.
Section 20-7-3780.

A surrogate parenthood agreement must contain

the following terms:
(A)

semina

That the surrogate agrees to be artificially

with the semen of the natural father by a licensed physician and
the wife of the natural father and the husband of the surrogate

ree

that the insemination shall take place.
(B)

That the surrogate and her husband agree not to

rm

attempt to form a parent-child relationship during

0

the interim order as provided for in this article or
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and
the child.
(c)

That the surrogate and her husband expressly ac

e

intent and purposes of the surrogate parenthood agreement and
voluntarily relinquish all parental rights to the c

and,

request of the natural father and his wife, to execute a
the Rdoption of the child by the natural father and his
(D)

That the surrogate and her husband understand and

assume all risks, including the risk of death, which are
conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and postpart'.1ll'l comp
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~nciden

cations.

to
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(E)

That the surrogate agrees to undergo medical and p

or ps:,rchiatric evaluations and to submit the eva.luat

t

father and his wife and to the inseminating physician, abs
./,'

information which would tend to identify the ·surrogate, and
surrogate agrees to sign medical releases prior to any evaluation.
(F)

That the surrogate agrees to submit to the in

physician any medical and psychological or psychiat

e

relating to the surrogate parenthood agreement which are not
the inseminating physician.
(G)

That the surrogate agrees to adhere, to all medical instruct ons

given to her by the inseminating physician as well as her own
(H)

i

That the surrogate agrees to follow a prenatal

examination schedule to consist of at least one visit per month
+v

the first seven months of pregnancy and at least two visits
during the eighth and ninth months of pregnancy.
( ~)
' .L

That the surrogate agrees that she will not ab rt

child once conceived unless she desires to do so

be

inseminating physician that an abortion is necess

r

health.
That the surrogate agrees to undergo a camp
under the direction and supervision of a

evaluc-~tion,

i

"Ie

cens

to determine whether her physical health is satisfac
compre~ensive

medical evaluation must include

test~

diseases before each insemination.
(K)

That the natural father and his wife agree to

surrogate's compensation in an interest bearing escroy; accoun
.. .

execu~1on

... th e surrogate parenthood agreement, to be paid

OL

on

16
surrogate in full with accrued interest upon the b

d

and the termination of the parental rights of the su

r

husband.
(L)

That the natural father and his wife agree

expenses incurred by the surrogate as a result of
The expenses must include all medical, psychiat

the
r p

c

c

expenses

hospitalization, pharmaceutical, laboratory, and the

incurred in the surrogate's pregnancy, not covered or allowed by her
any me

present health and major medical insurance, includ
expenses

~ncurred

ez:penses

upon order of a licensed physician.

must not include any expenses for lost wages of

te or

s

nonrelated incidentals, unless specifically enume

cal

d

D

r

t

agreement.
(rvf)

That the natural father agrees to unde

medic::..l evc=tluation, under the direction and s

re

a

ive

rvision of a

The comprehensive medical evaluation must include test

icensed

r

venereal

diseases, specifically including syphilis and
be

father must agree to submit to venereal disease

r-e

on

each donation of semen for an artificial ins
agreement.
(N)

t to

That the natural father agrees to s

in

physician any medical evaluations which relate to

(0)

~hat

the

surrog~te

parenthood agreement

11 terminate upon

written notice to the surrogate and her husband from the
~~~~eL

.1. "'- v d

~nd

~

his
•-

~J.·fe
.~

'

if thft

.I.

<';:;

natu'~"al
•
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~a~her
- • •
-

•

~n~
•-

<:.'-

c:e.n&

nat

parenthood agreement which are not made by the

'n1s
-

4
~·
YL- -fe
-

na~

and t

17
inseminating physician determine that pregnancy of
not occurred within a reasonable time.

A

1

s

reas

period not shorter than three months and not longer
.,fl",

(P)

That the natural father and his wife agree to ass

legal responsibility for any child conceived pursuant
agreement.
(Q)

That if the natural father or his

die

termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and her
ect

the surrogate parenthood agreement must remain in full force

surrogate and her husband, the surrogate is entitled to

husband, execute a consent to adoption of the chi

he

or,

compensation and expenses and may elect to keep the chi

or a re

of

a

the child for adoption.
(R)

That a fee for compensation of the surrogate

e

e

to by the natural father and his wife and by the s
surrogate's husband and must be stated in the

surrogate miscarries prior to the fifth month of pre

, no

compensation other than medical expenses will be p

t

surrogate miscarries during or after the fifth month

p

percent of the agreed-upon fee for compensation,

di

will be paid.
Section 20-7-3790.

A surrogate parenthood agreement

agreed to by the parties in addition to the terms re

20-7-3780.
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Section 20-7-3800.

A physician must not artificially ins

a

person who the physician knows to be a surrogate
is professionally satisfied with the mental and physi
'· .
of the surrogate~and an order certifying the/suitability of the wi
and the natural father, granted by the court pursuant to Sec

on

20-7-3670, is presented."
SECTION 2.

Section 20-7-420 of the 1976 Code, as

d

t

Act 102 of 1981, is further amended by adding:
11

(33)

To hear and determine actions for surrogate adoption and

all matters arising from surrogate parenthood

~greements,

but not limited to matters of a contractual nature.u
SECTION 3.

This act shall take effect upon approval
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the

vernor.

ANALYSIS H3491

PROCEDURE FOR SURROGATE PARENTHOOD/ADOPTION

on
j.Locate Surroaate Mother]
0
State Resident
0
18 years old
0
married
0
has borne one child

Section 20-7-3650

~

four party agreement

Section 20-7-3780

Surrogate agrees:
(A)
1. M.D. does artificial insemination.
(B)
2. No attempt at mothering after birth, but can hold.
3. Termination of parental rights at birth and consent
to adoption.
(C)
4. Accept physical and emotional health risks.
(D)
5. Submit to psychological examination and submit results(£ and F)
to father.
(G)
6. Follow medical instructions of attending physician.
(H)
7. Receive pre-natal care.
~;8.
No abortion unless health of mother is endangered.
(I)
(J)
9. Physical exam including V.D. test before every
artificial insemination.
Natural father agrees:
1. Deposit money at time of agreement to be paid at birth(K)
with interest.
2. Expenses paid by father.
(L)
3. Father undergoes medical exam i uding V.O. te
(M and N)
Other provisions:
1. Agreement te
na
in
if no pregnancy resul {0)
within 6 months.
(P)
2. Father acce
1
si
for child.
)
3. In case of
or
oner ( s
agreement is bindi
In case of death of both,
surrogate receives compensation and may keep the
ld
(Q)
or release for a
on.
4. The fee is establi
(R)
5. Miscarriage
ses.
Miscarriage after
(S)
us 10%.
6. Other provisions are
Section 20-7-3790
Section 20-7-3670
Petition s
nc
1. Name~ date of
of all parties.
2. Marriage records.
3. Intent to adopt
i1 d, i
of parental relationship.
4. Proposed name of ild.
5. Facts to excuse consent of surrogate or husband, if any.
6. Copy of Surrogate Pa
Agreement.

-· ~urrr.~ate l't::r·e:llthood/fldopt ion
]lnvestiqation[
Childrens'Bureau, DSS, or other institution
or individual conducts Court ordered nvestigation as to suitability of persons
involved.
Family Court Certifies/Approval for
Or Conducts Hearing

Section 20-7-3

Section 20-7-3670

lArtificial Inseminationz
Section 20-7-3680
Physician charged with the responsibility of being
"professionally satisfied" with the physical and Section 20-7-3800
mental health of the father and surrogate.
~

f Preqnancy J

. . . I Family"" CourtJ

.

. .section 20-7-3680

1. Ver1f1cat1on of pregnancy f1lcd by the phys1c1an.

(B)

2.
3.

(C)

~

Acknowledgement of paternity filed by parties.
Order of Filiation establishing paternity executed
by Court.

Copy of Order of

F'l ·ation sent to DHEC

(D)

(effective at birth)

1.
2.
3.

1.
2.

3.
6.

l

!Sixth Month of Precnancy J
Section 20-7-3700
Court issues an interim order granting custody
to natural father.
Surrogate signs consent to terminate parental Section 20-7-3690 (A)
rights. (But can see and/or hold child within
24 hrs. after birth.}
Both agreements will take effect upon birth of
the child.
~

®ill

ghts of surrogate
Fourteen days after birth, parental
Section 20-7-3710
and her husband are terminated.
Surrogate and her husband will be notified of
this pending order within 4 days of bi
and
(B)
told to raise ar.y objections before
t order
is issued.
t interest
Hearing to determine paternity or
of
ections.(C) and (D)
of the child will be held in case
of
parental
rights
Order to adoption and termination
re
are
no
of surrogate will be issued if
(C)
objections as stated above.
.
""'"

lfui~B

Copy of final decree sent to DHEC

1.
2.
3.
4.

(D)

j Other Conditio~s/Prohibition~iJ
No collatera1 attack aft~r 1 year.
Register money or any thing of value that
is "paid" in such a contract with the
urt
prior to final decree, for Court approval.
Attorney may not represent both sides.
Such contract requi :-ed for anyone enter
into surrogate arrangement.

ks/2/17/82
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Section 20-7-3740
Section 20-7-3750
Section 20-7-3760
Section 20-7-3770
Section 20-7-3770

§ 5172
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of this title extend to the

§ 5173.

PART 7

Uniform Parentage Act
[Added by Stats 1975 ch 1244 § ll]

§ 7000.

Title.
"Parent and child relationship".
Marital status of parents irrelevant.
§ 7003. Establishment of parent and child relationship.
§ 7004. Presumption of natural fatherhood.
§ 7005. Father of child conceived by artificial insemination.
§ 7006. Actions with respect to existence of father and child
§ 7007. Jurisdiction and venue.
§ 7008. Parties.
§ 7010. Judgment.
§ 7011. Fees and costs.
§ 7012. Enforcement of obligations of father.
§ 7013. Continuing jurisdiction.
§ 701-t Clo:>ed hearing and records.
§7015. Actions with respect to existence of mother and child
§ 7016. Written promise to furnish support.
§ 7017. Rights of parent upon other parent's reiinquishment or
Petition to terminate parental rights of father:
§ 7017.1. Fee not to be charged for filing petition to tem1inate
§ 7018. Severability.
§ 7020. Restraining orders; Offenses.
§ 7021. Judgment and orders; Offenses.

§ 7001.
§ 7002.

Cal fur 3d Venue § 20; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:1, Uniform
Action Under Uniform Support Act. Cal Forms-38:2.
§ 7000. [Title.) This part shall be known
and may be cited as the "Uniform Parentage
Act." [1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal fur 3d Family Law§ 68.

§ 7001. ["Parent and child relationship".] As used in this part, "parent and
child relationship means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural
or adoptive parents incident to which the
law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. It includes the
mother and child relationship and the father
and child relationship. [ 197 5 ch 1244 § 11]
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Cal fur 3d
§ 7002.
v:<nt.] The
extends

may
(l) Between a child
mother it mav be established
)o
·birth
the

Act,
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(2) Between a child and the natural fathu
it may be established under this part.
(3) Between a child and an adoptive parent it may be established by proof of adoption. (1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal fur 3d Family

Law§ 154.
§ 7004. [Presumption of natural fatherhood.] (a) A man is presumed to be the
natural father of a child if he meets the
conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the
Evidence Code or in any of the following
subdivisions:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are
or have been married to each other and the
child is born during the marriage, or within
300 days after the marriage is terminated by
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity,
or divorce, or after a decree of separation is
entered by a court.
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the
child's natural mother have attempted to
marry each other by a marriage solemnized
in apparent compliance with law, although
the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be
declared invalid only by a court, the child is
born during the attempted marriage, or
within 300 days after its termination by
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity,
or divorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid
without a court order, the child is born
within 300 days after the termination of
cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the
child's natural mother have married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage
solemnized in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage is or could
be declared invalid, and
(i) With his consent, he is named as the
child's father on the child's birth certificate,
or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child
under a written voluntary promise or by
court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural
child.
(b) Except as provided in Section 621 of
the Evidence Code, a presumption under
this section is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be
rebutted in an appropriate action only by
clear and convincing evidence. If two or
more presumptions arise under this section
which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
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§ 7006

weightier considerations of policy and logic
controls. TilC presumption is rebutted by a
court decree establishing paternity of the
child by another man. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.]
Cal fur 3d ramily Law§§ 86,. 88, 110, 164166, 168, 198, 203; Cal Prachce Rev, Ch
153:1, Uniforrn Parentage Act; Cal Forms-

38:21.

§ 7005. [Father of child conceived by
artificial insemination.] (a) If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with
the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated
in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him
and his wife. The physician shall cer:ify
their signatures and the date of the insemination, and retain the husband's consent as
part of the medical record, where it shall be
kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does
not affect the father and child relationship.
All papers and records pertaining to the
in·U':mination, whether part of the permanent
record of a court or of a file held by the
supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the
court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's
wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of a child thereby conceived.
[1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1978 ch 429 § 34, effective July 17, 1978, operative July 1, 1978;
1979 ch 889 § 1, effective September 22,
1979.] Cal fur 3d I--'.:1mily Law § 155; Cal
Practice Rev, Ch 153:23, Uniform Parentage
Act; Cal Forms-38:1.
§ 7006. [Actions with respect to existence of father and child relationship.] (a) A
child, the child's natural mother, or a man
presumed to be his father under paragraph
(l), (2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section
7004, may bring an action as follows:
(I) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child
relationship presumed under paragraph (1 ),
(2), or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004.
(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under paragraph (1), (2), or
(3) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004 only if
the action is brought within a reasonable
time after obtaining knowledge of relevant
facts. After the presumption has been rebut-
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ted, paternity of the child by another man
may be determined in the same action, if he
has been made a party.
(b) Any interc~ted party may bring an
action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the
father and child relationship presumed under
paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section
7004.
(c) An action to determine the existence
of the father and child relationship with
respect to a child who has no presumed
father under Section 7004 or whose presumed father is deceased may be brought by
the child or personal representative of the
child, the State Department of Social Services, the mother or the personal representative or a parent of the mother if the mother
has died or is a minor, a man alleged or
alleging himself to be the father, or the
personal representative or a parent of the
alleged father if the alleged father has died
or is a minor. The commencement of such
an action shall suspend any pending proceeding in connection with the adoption of
such child, including a proceeding pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 7017, until a
judgment in the action is final.
(d) Except as to cases coming within the
provisions of Section 621 of the Evidence
Code, a man not a presumed father may
bring an action for the purpose of declaring
that he is the natural father of a child
having a presumed father under Section
7004, if the mother relinquishes for, consents
to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent
to, the adoption of the child. Such an action
shall be brought within 30 days after the
man is served as prescribed in subdivision (f)
of Section 7017 with a notice that he is or
could be the father of such child or the birth
of the child, whichever is later. The commencement of such action shall suspend any
pending proceeding in connection with the
adoption of such child until a judgment in
the action is final.
(e) Regardless of its terms, an agreement
between an alleged or presumed father and
the mother or child does not bar an action
under this section.
(f) An action under this section may be
brought before the birth of the child.
(g) The district attorney may also bring
an action under this section in any case in
which he believes that the interests of justice
will be served thereby. [ 197 5 ch 1244 § 11;
1978 ch 429 § 35, effective July 17, 1978,
Operative July 1, 1978; 1979 ch 752 § 1.)
Cal Jur 3d Family Law §§ 169, 304; Cal
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Pmctice Rev, Ch 153:3, Uniform
. 4.ct; C~1J I~)rnJs-38:31.

Parcn(J~.
s ..

n.

§ 7007. [Jurisdicticn and venue.] (a)
superior court has jurisdiction of an act!,·;
brought under this part.
·
(b) A person who has sexual intercou:-~
in this state thereby submits to the juri,z; ,.
tion of the courts of this state as to a~
action brought under this part with re,p-c~·;
to a child who may have been conceived b·.
that act of intercourse.
·
(c) The action may be brought in t~.~
county in which the child resides or is four.~
or, if the father is deceased, in which nr""
ceedings for probate of his estate have be.;n
or could be commenced. [1975 ch 12.;..:
§ 11.] Cal Jur 3d Family Law § 170, Vent::
§ 20. Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:5, Unifom

Parentage Act.
§ 7008. [Parties.] The child may, if ur.der the age of 12 years, and shall, if 12 ye:m
of age or older, be made a party to the
action. If he is a minor and a party to thr
action he shall be represented by a guardi.!r:
ad litem appointed by the court. The natur3l
mother, each man presumed to be the father
under Section 7004, and each man alleged t,l
be the natural father, may be made p:~rtte<.
and shall be given notice of the action in the
manner prescribed in subdivision (f) of Se("·
tion 7017 and an opportunity to be hearJ.
The court may align the parties. (1975 .:h
1244 § 11; 1977 ch 207 § 1; 1978 ch 3SO
§ 13.] Cal Jur 3d Family L:1w § 171; Cl
Practice Rev, Ch 153:7:8:10, Uniform Parentage Act.
§ 7010. [Judgment.] (a) The judgment cr
order of the court determining the existcn..:L
or nonexistence of the parent and chilJ
relationship is determinative for all purpc1~("'
except for action<> brought pursuant to Sec·
tion 270 of the Penal Code.
(b) If the judgment or order of the cou::
is at variance with the child's birth certl11·
cate, the court shall order that a new birth
certificate be issued as prescribed in Artie!~
6 (commencing with Section 10450) t)!
Chapter 8, of Division 9 of the Health 3n..l
Safety Code.
.
(c) The judgment or order may contW1
any other provision directed against the
appropriate party to the proceeding, c0n·
cerning the duty of support, the custody ad
guardianship of the child, visitation pnvl,
leges with the child, the furnishing of bond
or other security for the payment of the
judgment, or any other matter in the b::st
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interest of the child. The judgment or order
may direcl the father to pay the reasonable
expenses of the mother's pregnancy and
confinement.
(d) In determining the amount to be paid
by a parent for support of the child z.nd the
period during which the duty of support is
owed, a court enforcing the obligation of
support shall consider all relevant facts.
[i975 ch 1244 § l L] Cal fur 3d Family Law

§ 174; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 153:1, Uniform
Parentage Act, Ch 154:5, Achon U!1der
Uniform Support Act.

§ 7011. [Fees and costs.) The court may
order reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and
the child's guardian ad litem, and other
costs of the action and pretrial proceedings,
including blood tests, to be paid by the
parties in proportions and at times determined by the court. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.) C1l
fur 3d Family Law§ 173; Cal Practice Rev,
Ch 153:5, Uniform Parentage Act.

§ 7012.
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[Enforcement of obligations of

father.] (a) If existence of the father and
child relationship is declared, or paternity or
a duty of support has been acknowledged or
adjudicated under this part or under prior
law, the obligation of the father may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings
by the mother, the child, the public authority that has furnished or may furnish the
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, support, or funeral, or by
any other person, including a private agency,
to the extent he has furnished or is furnishing these expenses.
(b) The court may order support payments to be made to the mother, the clerk of
the court, or a person, corporation, or
agency designated to administer them for the
benefit of the child under the supervision of
the court.
(c) Willful failure to obey the judgment or
order of the court is a civil contempt of the
court. All remedies for the enforcement of
judgments apply. [1975 ch 1244 § 11.] Cal
fur 3d Family Law § 176; Cal Practice Rev,

Ch 153:1, Uniform Parentage Act.
§ 7013. [Continuing jurisdiction.] The
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a
judgment or order made under this part. A
judgment or order relating to an adoption
may only be modified in the same manner
and under the same conditions as a decree of
adoption may be modified under Section
227b or 227d. {1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1976 ch

404 § 2.] Cal fur 3d Family Law § 175; Cal
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Practice

J(;_'v,

Ch 153:25, Uniform P:m·nt:Jge

Act.
§ 70 14.

£Closed hearing and records.]
Notwithswmling any other law concerning
pnhlic hearings and ;-e.::ords, any hearing or
tri:d held under this part may be held in
closed coun without acimiU;mce of any persen other tilan those necessary to the action
or proceeding. All p.1pers and" records, other
tb~1I. the fmd judg;nent, ~Ji~rtaining to the
action nr
wh:thei part of the
perman;::;t r,:,·orrl
court or of a file in
any public agency or cisewhere, are subject
,·o inspecticn only m exceptional cases up,m
an r;rde:· of the court for goc1d cau,,e shown.
[197:' ch 1244 § 11.] Cqj Jur 3d Family Law
§ 172.
§ 7015. [Actions with respect to existence of molher and child relationship.] Any
interested p:1rty may bring an action to
determine the existence or nonexistence: of a
mother and child rdationsh; 1;. Insofar as
practicaiJL:, the provi~ions of this pan applicable to !lie f::ither and chiid relationship
apj1ly. [1975 sh 12~4 § ll.j Oil fur Jd
Family Law § 169; C:il Pr::.ctice Rev, Ch
153:1, Uniform Parentage Act; Cal FormsJ?:U!.
· § '/016. [Written promise to furnish suppo~t.] (a) Any p:-omis,~ in writing to furnish
support for a chiid, growing out of a presumed or alleged father and child relationship, does not require consideration and is
enforceable according to its terms, subject to
subdivision (d) of Section 7006.
(b) In the best interest of the child or the
mother, the coun rnay, and upon the promisor's r.~quc:st shall, order the promise to be
kept in confidence and designate a person or
agency to receive and disburse on b·::half of
the child all amcmnts paid in performance of
the promise. [1975 ch 1244 § ll.] CallurJd

Family Law§ 292.
§ 7017. [Rights of parent upon otl •.:r
parent's rdinqclishment or consent to adoption of child: Petition to terminate parental
rights of father: Notice] (a)( l) If a mother
relinquishes for or consents to or proposes to
relinquish for or consent to the adoption of
a child who has (1) a pre<>umed father under
subdivision (a) of Section 7004 or (2) a
father as to whom the child is a legitimate
child under prior law of this state or under
the law of another jurisdiction, the father
shall be given notice of the ad,)ption procef'ding and have the rights provided under
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 221),
Title 2, Part 3, Division 1 of the Civil Code,
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unless the f:::ther's relationship to the child
has been previously terminated or determined by a court not to exist or the father
has voluntarily relinquished or consentt:d to
the adoption of such child.
(2) If a father relinquishes or consents to
or proposes to relinquish a child for adoption, the mother shall be given notice of the
adoption proceeding and have the rights
provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 221), Title 2, Part 3, Division l of
the Civil Code, unless the mother's relationship to the child has been previously terminated by a court or the mother has voluntarily relinquished or consented to the adoption of such child.
(b) If a mother relinquishes for, consents
to, or proposes to relinquish for or consent
to the adoption of a child who does not have
(1) a presumed father under subdivision (a)
of Section 7004 or (2) a father as to whom
the child is a legitimate child under prior
law of this state or under the law of another
jurisdiction, or if a child otherwise becomes
the subject of an adoption proceeding and
the alleged father, if any, has not, in writing,
denied paternity, waived his right to notice,
voluntarily relinquished or consented to the
adoption, the agency or person to whom the
child has been or is to be relinquished, or
the mother or the person having custody of
the child, shall file a petition in the superior
court to terminate the parental rights of the
father, unless the father's relationship to the
child has been previously terminated or determined not to exist by a court, or unless
the father has been served as prescribed in
subdivision (f) with a written notice alleging
that he is or could be the natural father of
the child to be adopted or placed for adoption and has failed to bring an action for the
purpose of deciaring the existence of the
father and child relationship pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 7006 within 30
days of service of such notice or the birth of
the child, whichever is later.
(c) In an effort to identify the natural
father, the court shall cause inquiry to be
made of the mother and any other appropriate person by the State Department of Social
Services, a licensed county adoption agency,
or the licensed adoption agency to which the
child is to be relinquished, or in the case of
a stepparent adoption, at the option of the
board of supervisors, a licensed county adoption agency, the county department designated by the board of supervisors to administer the public social services program, or
the county probation department. The in-
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quiry sbll include the following: whether
the mother was married at the time tf
conception of the child or at any time there.
afler; whether the mother was cohabit 1q
with a man at the time of conception c~
birth of the child; whether the mother h~
received support payments or prom1ses l'f
support with respect to the child or i:~
connection with her pregnancy; or whether
any rnan has formally or informally a.;.
knowledged or declared his pos~ible pate;.
nity of the; child. The department or tr.~
licensed adoption agency shall report tre
finding::. to the court.
(d) If, afLer the inquiry, the natural father
is identified to the satisfaction of the cow
or if more than one man is identified as ~
possible Lther, each shall be given notice ci
the proceeding in accordance with subdi\ 1.
sion (f), unless he has been served Wlth J
written notice d!leging that he is or could l'<
the natural father of the child to be adoptee.
or placed or relinquished for adoption and
has failed to bring an action pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 7006 to decbre the
existence of the father and child relationship
within 30 days of serving such notice or the
birth of the child, whichever is later. If an1
of them fails to appear or, if appearing, f3/\
to claim custodial rights, his parental nghts
with reference to the child shall be term!·
n;lted. If the natural father or a man reprc·
scnting himself to be the natural fatl;cr.
claims custodial rights, the court shall prv·
ceed to determine parentage and custod1:d
rights in whatever order the court de~r:l>
proper. If the conn finds that the mJ:\
representing himself to be the natural fa;hc:
is a presumed father under subdivision (a) ci
Section 7004, then the court shall issue ;::'!
order providing that the father's conse;.:
shall be required for an adoption of ttc
child. In all other cases, the court shall issue
an order providing that only the mother·~
consent shall be required for the adoption c:
the child.
(e) It~ after the inquiry, the court is un3::;c
to identify the natural father or any poss1~.:
natural father and no person has appe3rc~
claiming to be the natural father and cbnr.·
ing custodial rights, the court shall enter J~
order terminating the unknown natural fl·
ther's parental rights with reference to the
child.
(f) Notice of the proceeding shall be gi 1 '~:
to every person identified as the natu;~.
father or a possible natural father in accl•r·.
dance with the provisions of the Code ,,:
Civil Procedure for the service of process tn
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a civil action m this state, provided that
publication or posting of the notice of the
proceeding shall not be required. Proof of
giving the notice shall be filed with the court
before the petition is heard. However, if a
person identified as the natural father or
possible natural father cannot be located or
his whereaboL'ts are unknown or cannot be
ascertained, the court may issue an order
dispensing with notice to such person.
(g) Any order requiring or dispensing with
a father's consent for the adoption of a child
may be appealed from in the same manner
as an order of the juvenile court declaring a
person to be a ward of the juvenile court.
[1975 ch 1244 § 11; 1977 ch 207 § 2; 1978
ch 1045 § 1; 1979 ch 752 § 2.] Cal Jur 3d
Family Law § 110; Cal Practice Rev, Ch

153:10, Uniform Parentage Act.
§ 7017.1. [Fee not to be charged for
filing petition to terminate parental rights of
father.] There shall be no filing fee charged
for any petition filed pursuant to subdivision
(b) of Section 7017. [1976 ch 404 § 3.]

§ 7018. (Severability.] If any provision
of this part or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances is held invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the part which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
part are severable. (1975 ch 1244 § 11.]
§ 7020.

[Restraining

orders;

Offenses]

(a) During the pendency of any proceeding
under this part, upon application in the
manner provided by Section 527 of the Code
of Civil Procedure by the party who has
care, custody, and c._mtrol of the minor
child, the superior court may issue ex parte
orders (1) enjoining any party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, or disturbing the peace of the other party or the minor
child; (2) excluding one party from the
dwelling of the party who has care, custody
and control of the child upon showing that
the party to be excluded has assaulted or
threatens to assault the other party or the
minor child and that physical or emotional
harm would otherwise result to the party or
the minor child; and (3) enjoining a party
from specified behavior which the court
determines is neces~ary to effectuate orders
un~er paragraph (1) or (2). In the case in
wh1ch a temporary restraining order is
granted without notice, the matter shall be
made returnable on an order requiring cause
to be shown why the order should not be
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granted, on the earliest day that the bu'>iness
of the court will permit, but not later than
15 days or, if good cau:ce appears to the
court, 20 days from the date the temporary
restraining order is granted. The court may
on motion of the plaintiff or on its own
motion shorten the time for service on the
defendant of the order to show cause.
(b) The court may issue upon notice and a
hearing any of the orders set forth in subdivision (a). Any restraining order granted
pursuant to this subdivision shall remain in
effect, in the discretion of the court, not to
exceed 90 days, unless otherwise terminated
by the court, extended by mutual consent of
the parties or extended by further order of
the court on the motion of any party. Any
extension by mutual consent of the parties
shall not exceed one year.
(c) Any order issued pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) shall state on its face the date
of expiration of the order.
(d) The court shall order the party who
obtained the order or the attorney for the
party to deliver or the clerk to mail a copy
of any order, or extension, modification or
tcfmination thereof, granted pursuant to
subdivision (a) or (b), by the close of the
business day on which the order, extension,
modification, or termination was granted,
and any subsequent proof of service thereof,
to each local Jaw enforcement agency designated by the party or the attorney for the
party, having jurisdiction over the residence
of the party who has care, custody and
control of the minor child and such other
locations where the court determines that
acts of domestic violence against the party
and the minor child are likely to occur.
Each appropriate law enforcement agency
shall make available through an existing
system for verification, information as to the
existence, terms and current status of any
order issued pursuant to subdivision (a) or
(b) to any law enforcement officer responding to the scene of reported domestic violence.
(e) Any willful and knowing violation of
any order granted pursuant to subdivision
(a) or (b) shall be a misdemeanor punishable
under Section 273.6 of the Penal Code.
[1979 ch 795 § 5, operative July 1, 1980;
1980 ch 1158 § 3.)

§ 7021. [Judgment and orders; Offenses]
A judgment entered under this part may
include any orders issued pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 7020. Any such
judgment shall state on its face (1) which
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provisions of the judgment are such orders,
and (2) the date of expiration of such orders,
which shall be one year from the date the
judgment is issued unless extended by the
court after notice and hearing. The judgments, or orders, or extensions thereof shall
be transmitted to law enforcement agenctes

-€":.:,

in the manner provided by subdivision (dl ,
Section 7020. Any willful and knowing ., ::
lation of any such order shall be a mis·meanor punishable under Section 273.c ,
the Penal Code. [ 1979 ch 795 § 6, opera:: .
July 1, 1980; 1980ch 1158 §4.]

PART 8
AUTOMATIC CHECKOUT SYSTEM
[Added by Stats 1981 ch 224 § 1.]

7100.
01.
§ 71
§7103.
§ 7104.
§ 7105.
§ 7106.
§

Readable prices on packages required; Exceptions
Penalty
Liability for losses and expenses incurred; Applicabilit
Unintentional error excepted
·elusive remedies
Sho title
Preem ·on of field

§ 7100. [Readable rices on packages re·
quired; Exceptions] (a) "very retail grocery
store or grocery departme within a general
retail merchandise store whi
uses an automatic checkout system shall ca e to have a
clearly readable price indicated
85 percent of the total number of packa d
sumer commodities offered for sale
are not exempt pursuant to subdivision
The management of any such retai
eery store or grocery department shal etermine the number of consumer com odities
normally offered for sale on a d y basis,
shall determine the consumer c
modities
to be exempted pursuant to this 'ubdivision,
and shall maintain a list of t se consumer
commodities exempt pursua to this subdivision. The list shall be m e available to a
designated representative
the appropriate
local union, the membe of which are responsible for item prici , in those stores or
departments that hav collective bargaining
agreements, seven d s prior to an item or
items being exemp a pursuant to this subdivision. In additio , the list shall be available
and posted in a rominent place in the store
seven days p · r to an item or items being
exempted pu uant to this subdivision.
(b) The ovisions of this section shall not
apply to · y of the following:
( 1) A
consumer commodity which was
not g .erally item-priced on January 1,
1977 as determined by the Department of
Fo
and Agriculture pursuant to subdivisi
(c) of Section 12604.5 of the Business
d Professions Code, as in effect July 8,
977.
(2) Any unpackaged fresh food produce,
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or t consumer commodities which are u~
de ·three cubic inches in size, weigh !C"",,
t n three ounces, and are priced und~:
orty cents ($0.40).
(3) Any consumer commodity offered a, 1
sale item or as a special.
(4) Any business which has as its on:}
regular employees the owner thereof, or tl::
parent, spouse, or child of such owner, or, 1:1
addition thereto, not more than two otr :r
regular employees.
(5) Identical items within a multi-it::rn
p
age.
( Items sold through a vending r.1l·
chine.
(c) Fa the purposes of this section:
(1) "Au
atic checkout system" me!::,
a computer
able of interpreting the ur.:·
versa! product de or any other code wh:.-:-,
is on an item o
ed for sale to dctern;:::~
the price of items
ing purchased, regad·
less of whether the
de entry is accom·
plished manually by a
man or automJ!lcally by a machine.
(2) "Consumer commodi '' includes:
·
(A) Food, including all m rial wh.:t 11cr
solid liquid or mixed and w ther stmj!e
or c~mpound, which
used or i nded fl'f
consumption by human beings or
animals normally kept as househol
<1'·
and all substances or ingredients adde 1''
any such material for any purpose.
'
definition shall not apply to individual p3(kages of ci :_;arettes or individual cigars. .
.
(B) Napkins, facial tissues, toilet ttsSUl~·
foil wrapping, plastic wrapping, paper tO\\C;·
ing, and disposable nlates and cups.

i;

CIVIL
EVIDENCE
§ 621.

§ 226.9. [Adoption by stepparent: Cnnsent: Procedure: Consent of father or
mother outside State; Consent of miilOr parent.) NotwithSU\Jlding any other provi~ions
of this chapter, in case of an adoption of a
child by a stepparent where one natural or
adoptive parent retains his or be: custody
and control of said child, the consent of
either or both parents must be signed in the
presence of a county clerk, probation officer
or county welfare department staff member
of any county of this state on a form prescribed by the State Department of Social
Services and the county clerk, probation
officer or county welfare department staff
member before whom such consent is signed
shall immediately file said consenr with the
clerk of the superior court of the county
where the petition is filed and said clerk
shall immediately file a certified copy of
such consent to adoption with the State
Depr.rtment of Soci<:Il Services.
If the father or mother of a child to be
adopted is outside the State of California at
the time of signing consent, his or her consent may be signed before a notary or other
person authorized to perform notarial acts.
Such consent, when reciting that the person giving it is entitled to sole custody c·f the
minor child, shall, when duly ackncwlcdgc,1
before the county clcrk, probation ot11ccr, or
county \Velfare department staff member be
prima facie evidence of the right or the
pe~son making it to the sole custody of the
chlld and such person's sole right to consent.
A parent who is a minor shall have the
right to sign a consent for the adoption of
his or her child and such consent shall not
be subject to revocation by reason of such
minority. [1963 ch 1806 § 11; 1971 ch 1593
§ 47.17, operative July 1, 1972; 1973 ch 237
§ 1; 1977 ch 1252 § 68, operative July 1,
1978.] Cal Jur 3d Acknowledgments §§ 1 ct

Legitimacy;

Blood
test.
(a) ~xcept as provided in subdivision (b),
the tssue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the
marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of
subdivision (a), if the court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by
the evidence based upon blood tests perfo.rr.1ed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing
With Section 890) of Division 7 are that the
husband is not the father of the child the
question of patemity of the husband sh~ll be
resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests
under subdivision (b) may be raised by the
husband not later than t\VO years from the
child's date of birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests
under subdivision (b) may be raised by the
mother of the child not later than two years
from the child's date of birth if the child's
biological father has filed an affidavit with
the court acknowledging paternity of the
child.
(e) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall
not apply to any case coming within the
provisions of Section 7005 of the Civil Code
or to any case in which the wife, with the
consent of the husband, conceived by means
of a surgical procedure.
(f) The notice of motion for the blood
tests pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be
supported by a declaration under oath submitted by the moving party statino the factual basis for placing the issue
paternity
before the court. This requirement shall not
apply to any case pending before the couft
on September 30, 1980.
(g) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall
not apply to any case which has reached
final judgment of paternity on September 30,
1980. [1965 ch 299 §2; 1975 ch 1244 §13;
1980 ch 1310 § l, effective September 30.

ot

s~q,

12, ~3, 22 et seq., Family Law § 93;
Cal Pra~tJce R.ev,. Ch 150:10:16, Adoption
Proceedmg; WJtkm Summary (8th ed) pp
4698, 4716.

1980; 1981 ch 1180 § 1.] Cal Ju,- 3d Crimi-

nal Law § 2232, Evidence § W4, Fami!v
Law §§ i 63, 164; Flitkjn Evid~nce pp 25l
620; Su;nmary (8th ed) pp 4723, 4724 4729
4732.
'
J

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§ 10619.

Petition 1or adoption

th A fee of elev:n do1Jar~ ($1 1) for each int.liviclual being adopted shall be puid to
f e county clerk ~t the time of filing the petition in nn adoption proo,edin"" e"ceot
~r agency adoptiOns in which the adoption fee is waired and n st:uem~;t -~ro~
~ e ~gency to t~is effect is filed with the petition, which fr:e shfdl be 'paid monthly
y b e county C1erk to the State :F:egistrar of Vital Statistics for the sc· Yices require d y statute of that office.
(Added by Stats.197S, c. SOD, p. 259<!, § 10.)
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§ 181. [Infrbgement of jJCrsonal liberty
or attempt to assume ownership of persons:
Penalty.) Every person who holds, or attempts to hold, any person in involuntary
servitude, or assumes, or attempts to assume, rights of ownership over any person,
or who sells, or attempts to sell, any person
to another, or receives money or anything of
value, in consideration of placing any person
in the custody, or under the power or control of another, or who buys, or attempts to
buy, any person, or pays money, or delivers
anything of value, to another, in consideration of having any person placed ir. his
custody, or under his power or control, or
who knO\vingly aids or assists in any manner
any one thus offending, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for two,
three or four years. [1901 ch 155 § l; 1976
ch 1139 § 131, operative July 1, 1977.) Cal
Jur 3d Criminal §§ 81, 2414; Cal Practice
§ 150:36; Witkin Crimes pp 737, 991.

the punishment for conspiracy to commit
such felony shall be that prescribed for the
lesser degree, except in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, in which case the
punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree.
If the felony is consr-iracy to commit two
or more felonies which have diffcrer:t punishments and the commission of such felonies constitutes but one offense of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for
the felony \<,;hich ha;; the greater maximum
term.
When they conspire to do an act described in subdivision 4 of this section, they
shall be punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison, or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than one year, or by
a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars
($5,000), or both.
When they conspire to do any of the other
acts described in this section they shall be
punishable by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year, or in the
state prison, or by a fine not exceeding five
thousand dollars ($5,000) or both.
All cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted
and tried in the superior court of any county
in which any overt act tending to effect such
conspir:1cy shall be done. [1872; 1873-74 ch
614 § 14; 1919 ch 125 § l; 1943 ch 554 § 1;
1953 ch 32 § 1; 1955 ch 660 § 1; 1965 ch
924 § 1; 1976 ch 1139 § 132, operative July
1, 1977; 1978 ch 579 § 1.) Cal Jur 3d Criminal Law §§ 8, 9, 26, 104, 512, 2354, 2357,

§ 182. [Criminal conspiracy: Acts constituting: Punishment: Venue.] If two or more
persons con~pire:
I. To commit anv crime.
2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another
to be charged or arrested for any crime.
3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit,
action or proceeding.
4. To cheat and defraud any person of any
prop.crty, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses or by false promises
Wllh _fraudulent intent not to perform such
prom1ses.
5. To commit any act injurious to the
public health, to public morals, or to pcn·ert
or obstruct justice, or the due administration
of the laws.
. 6. To commit any crime against the per~n of the President or Vice President of the
United States, the Governor of auv state or
territory, any United States justice. or jll.:lge,
or the secretary· of any of the executive
departments of the United States.
They are punishable as follows:
When they conspire to commit any crime
against the person of any official sp.:'cified in
subdivision 6, they are guilty of :;. felony and
are punishable by imprisonment i:1 t:-te state
prison for five, seven, or nine years.
When they conspire to commit any other
felony, they shall be punishable: in thE.; s~rne
manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of the s:tid fdony.
If the felonv is one for which difftrent
punishments ·are prescribed for difierent degrees, the jury or court which ~nds the
defendant guilty th<;;reof shall determiBe the
degree of the felony defendant conspir:;c to
commit. If the degree is not so cktermined,
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2365, 2369, 2626, 2974, 3141, 3152, 3153,
3155, 3156, 3160, 3162, 3163, 3166, 316S,
3174, 3177, 3181, Monopolies and Restraints
of Trade§ 27, Public Aid and W::lfare § 18·
Witkin Crimes pp 27, 37, 40, 43, 100, 10~
109, 110, 111, 466, 656, 915; Criminal Pro.
cedure p 36.

PENAL

§ 273.

CIVIL

[Payments to p:1rent for phcing

§. 224p. [~dvertising placement or supplymg of chlldren for adoption a mistl~
meanor.] Any person or organization that,
without holding a valid and unrevoked lic.ense. or permit to place children for adopt:on 1ssu~d by the State Department of Soeta] Servtces, advertises in any perioJical or
n~wspaper, by radio, or other public rnedmm,. that he or it will place children for
a~opt101_1, or accept, supply, provide or obtam chddren for adoption, or that causes
any advt:.rtisem~nt to b.c. ~ublished in or by
any. public medtu.m soltca.mg, requesting, or
~skm~ for ~ny ch.tld or children for adoption
JS gm.ty 01 a m1sdemeanor. (19·\5 ch 1317
§ 2; 1~51 ::h 638 § 2; 1971 ch 1593 § 47.2,
operat~ve July I, 1973; 1977 ch 1252 §52,
operative July 1, 1978.] Cal fur Jd Family

child for ndoption: :\btern!ty expenses: Receipt of financial benefits hy parent.] (<:) 1t
is a misdemeanor for any person cr agency

to offer to pay money or anything of value,
or to pay money or anything of va!ue, to a
parent for the pbcemcnt for adoption, for
the cc.nscnt to an adoption, or for cooperation in the completion of an adoption of his
child. This section does not make it unbwful
to pay the maternity-connected medical or
hospital and necessary living expenses of the
mother preceding and during confinement as
an act of charity, as long as the payment is
not conti:1gent upon placement of the child
for adoDtion, consent to the adoption, or
cooperation in the completion of the adop·
tion.
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any parent to
obtain the financi::il benet1ts set forth in
subdivision (a) with the intent to receive
such financial be:H:fits without completing
the adoption or without consenting to the
adoption. (i 967 ch lOSS § 1.] 32 Cal Jur 3d
F:~mily L:-.v §§ 84, 181; H'itkin Cn'mes pp

Law§ 77; Witkin Summary (8th ed) p 469-f.

159, 160, 242, 257, 258, 265, 511, 527, 556,
55 7, 862; Summar;.-· (Srh ed) p ·t690.
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§ 4600

§ 4601.
§ 4602.

§ 4603.
§ 4604.
§ 4605.
§ 4606.
§ 4607.
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Visitation rights: A ward to parent or to other person.
Custody investigation and report thereon: Consideration by court, availability hJ
parties, and receipt in evidence: Repayment to county of such investigation-,
and reports.
Spouse's action for exclusive custody: Entry and modification or revocation of order
or decree.
Duty of district attorney to locate child and party in possession of child.
Expenses of district attorney.
Appointment of counsel to represent minor child.
Mediation.

§ 4600. [Custody order: Consideration of
child's wishes: Order of preference: Plearling
and finding before award of custody to person(s) other than parent, and exclusion of
public from hearing.] (a) The Legislature
finds and declares that it is the public policy
of this state to assure minor children of
frequent and continuing contact \vith both
parents after the par~·nts have separated or
dissolved their marriage, and to encourage
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this
policy.
In any proceeding where there is at issue
the custody of a minor child, the court may,
during the pendency of the proceeding or at
any time thereafter, make such order for the
custody of the child during minority as may
seem necessary or proper. If a child is of
sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to
form an intelligent preference as to custody,
the court shall consider and give due weight
to the wishes of the child in making an
award of custody or modification thereof. In
determining the person or persons to whom
custody should be awarded under paragraph
(2) or (3) of subdivision (b), the court shall
consider and give due weight to the nomination of a guardian of the person of the child
by a parent under Article 1 (commencing
•vith Section 1500) of Chapter l of Part 2 of
Division 4 of the Probate Code.
(b) Custody should be awarded in the
following order of preference according to
the best interests of the child:
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to
Section 4600.5 or to either parent. In making an order for custody to either parent, the
court shall consider, among other factors,
which parent is more likely to allow the
child or children frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent, and
shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
The court, in its discretion, may require
the parents to submit to the court a plan for
the implementation of the custody order.
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(2) If to neither parent, to the person cr
persons in whose home the child has bee:1
living in a wholesome and stable environ·
ment.
(3) To any other person or per,of!,
deemed by the court to be suitahk and able
to provide adequate and proper care and
guidance for the child.
(c) Before the court makes any order
awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent, without the consent ol
the parents, it shall make a finding th::n an
award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child. Allegations that parent3l
custody would be detrimental to the child.
other than a statement of that ultimate fact,
shall not appear in the pleadings. The court
may, in its discretion, exclude the pub\i,;
from the hearing on this issue. [1969 ch
1608 § 8; 1970 ch 1545 § 2; 1972 ch 1007
§ l; 1979 ch 204 § 1, ch 730 § 13, operative:
January l, 1981, ch 915 §3.) Calfur3d
Family Law §§ 205, 229, 232, 235, 237, ]_lS.
243, 771; Cal Practice Rev, Ch 142:33.57,
Proceedino For Separation, Ch 143:33:63.
Nullity Proceeding, Ch 144:51:58:67:153.
Dissolution of Marriage, Ch 146:1, Enforce·
ment of Judgment or Order, Ch 14S: I, j'vfod·
ification of Orders, Ch 149:2, Termination ef
Paren tal Custody. Witkin Procedure 2d, _PE
330, 2358; Summary (8th ed) pp -!.53 1, 4:>8 ',
4590, 4594, 4598, 4599, 4610, 4615, 46-+1.
4673, 4675, 4678, 4680, 4682.

§ 4600.1. [Temporary order pending determination of custody.] In any procecdmg
under Title 2 (commencing with Secttor.
4400) or Title 3 (commencing with Se:non
4500) where there are minor children ot the
marriage, and in any action for excluslYC
custody under Section 4603, a petition for 3
temporary custody order containing th~
statement required by Section 5158 may. be
included with the inital filing of the pentwn
or action or may be filed at any time there·
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after. If the parties have agreed to or
reached an understanding on the custody or
temporary custody of their children, a copy
of the agreement or an affidavit as to their
understanding shall be attached to the petition or action. As promptly as possible after
such filing, the court shall, except in exceptional circumstances, enter an order awarding temporary custody in accordance with
the agreement or understanding, or in accordance with any stipulation of the parties. Jn
the absence of an agreement, understanding,
or stipulation, the court may, if jurisdiction
is appropriate, enter an ex parte order, set a
hearing date within 20 days and issue an
order to show cause on the responding
party. If the responding party does not
appear or respond within the time set, the
temporary order may be extended as necessary, pending the termination of the proceedings. [1976 ch 1399 § 2.) Cal Practice

Rev, Ch 144:51, Dissolution of Marriage.
§ 4600.2. [Award of custody to parent
receiving assistance: Order for support.]
Any order awarding custody to a parent
who is receiving, or in the opinion of the
court is likely to receive, assistance pursuant
to the Burton-Miller Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of
Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code) for the maintenance of the child shall
include an order pursuant to Section 4700 or
4702 directing the noncustodial parent to
pay any amount necessary for the support of
the child, to the exterit of the noncustodial
parent's ability to pay. [1979 ch 1030 § 3.]
§ 4600.5. [Joint custody.] (a) There shall
be a presumption, affecting the burden of
proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have
agreed to an award of joint custody or so
agree in open court at a hearing for the
purpose of determining the custody of the
minor child or children of the marriage.
If the court declines to enter an order
awarding joint custody pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall state in its decision
the reasons for denial of an award of joint
custody.
..(b) Upon the application of either parent,
J?mt custody may be awarded in the discretiOn of the court in other cases. For the
purpose of assisting the court in making a
determination whether an award of joint
c.ustody is appropriate under this subdivis~on, the court may direct that an investigation be conducted pursuant to the provisions
of Section 4602. If the court declines to
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§ 4600.6

enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall state
in its decision the reasons for denial of an
award of joint custody.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "joint
custody" means an order a\varding custody
of the minor child or children to both parents and providing that physical custody
shall be shared by the parents in such a way
as to assure the child or children of frequent
and continuing contact with both parents;
provided, however, that such order may
award joint legal custody without awarding
joint physical custody.
(d) Any order for joint custody may be
modified or terminated upon the petition of
one or both parents or on the court's own
motion if it is shown that the best interests
of the child require modification or termination of the order. The court shall state in its
decision the reasons for modification or termination of the joint custody order if either
parent opposes the modification or termination order.
(e) Any order for the custody of the
minor child or children of a marriage entered by a court in this state or any other
state may, subject to the jurisdictional rec;nirements set forth in Sections 5152 and
5163, be modified at any time to an order of
joint custody in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(f) In counties having a conciliation court,
the court or the parties may, at any time,
pursuant to local rules of court, consult with
the conciliation court for the purpose of
assisting the parties to formulate a plan for
implementation of the custody order or to
resolve any controversy which has arisen in
the implementation of a plan for custody.
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, access to records and information
pertaining to a minor child, including but
not limited to medical, dental, and school
records, shall not be denied to a parent
because such parent is not the child's custodial parent. [1979 ch 915 § 2.) Cal Practice

Rev, Ch 142:33, Proceeding For Separation,
Ch 144:153, Dissolution of Marriage.
§ 4600.6. [Trial] (a) In any case in which
a contested issue of custody of a minor child
is the sole contested issue, the ca<>e shall be
given preference over other civil cases, except matters to which special precedence
may be given by law, for assigning a trial
date and shall be giYen an early hearing.
(b) In any case in which there is more
than one contested issue and one of the
issues is of the custody of a minor child, the
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PRECIS

The author presents various demographic and motivational
data on 125 surrogate mother applicants.

He describes

three groups of complementary motivational factors and
points out the need for the longitudinal studies on
surrogate mothers which he is conducting.
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Recently there has been both an increased

de~~nd

babies accompanied by a decrease in their supply.

for newborn white
Infertile couples

are turning to alternative choices including surrogate motherhood.
A surrogate mother is a

wom~~

who contracts with a man to be impreg-

nated by artificial insemination, carry the child, and after delivery
relinquish the child and all parental rights to the biologic father.
Usually the biologic father is married to an infertile woman who
hopes to adopt the child herself.

The purpose of this study is to

understand the motivation of these women with the intent of following
them during the surrogate mother process to observe how they adjust,
psychologically to the various phases of this procedure.

This kind

of data is needed to assist in the informed consent of the surrogate
and parental applicants as well as to provide a reasonable basis for
any policy decisions regarding surrogate motherhood.

METHOD

So far I have interviewed well over 175 surrogate mother applicants
referred by an attorney Who works with the parental applicants and
surrogate mother applicants.

The interviews were semi-structured and

were administered on at least two separate occasions following their
completion of a

questio~~aire.

Some data were not available on some

applicants but the first 125 were used as the Sai!'\Ple for this study.
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RESULTS

Preliminary findings indicated that

L~e

applicants average about 25

years old; of 118, 56\ were married, 20\ divorced,
and never married.

a~d

24\ single

Of 120, about 42\ were Catholic, 57\ are Protestant

and there was one Jewish applicant.

Of the first 50 applicants, slightly over 40\ were either unemployed at
the time of the interviews. and/or receiving some form of financial aid.
Almost 60\ were working or had a working spouse with a range of incomes
(actual 1980 or projected 1981) from $6,000 to $55,000.

The applicant's

formal education ranged from well below high school to completion of a
Bachelor's Degree.

Almost 20\ did not complete high school; about 55\

either graduated high school or received a GED; about 25\ have some post
high school college courses, business school, nursing school, (LPN or RN);
one applicant received a

Ba~~elor's

Degree.

About 90% of the 125 surrogate applicants said that they required a fee
for their participation with most giving $5,000 as the minimum amount.
Of 124, about 37% said they would participate only for a married couple
unable to have a child, iO% for a married or unmarried couple unable to
have a child, 15\ for a single man or couple (married or unmarried) but
only if unable to have a child, 10\ for a couple for any reason, and 28\
for anyone for any reason.
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The data on the sample of 125 yielded some interesting results about
the applicant's history of pregnancy.

114 (91\) had at least one pre-

vious pregnancy and 101 (81\) had at least one live birth with the
average for this latter group being 1.7.

Those who·had been previously

pregnant to term described a feeling regarding their pregnancy that
varied from a tolerable experience to the best time of their life such
that they wanted to be pregnant the rest of tlle.i.r lives.

This latter

group felt more content, complete, special, adequate, and often felt
an inner glow; some felt more feminine and attractive and enjoyed the
extra attention afforded them.

Those who were never pregnant to term

described wishing to have the experience even if they planned on taving other children of their own later.
In the sample of 125, about 35\ had either a prior voluntary abortion
(26\) or relinquished a child for adoption {9\).

Some women believed

these previous losses would help them to control and minimize any depressive feelings in response to relinquishing the baby.

A few con-

sciously felt that they were participating in order to deal with unresolved feelings associated with the prior losses.

The only applicant

who was herself adopted had been "forced" to relinquish her baby at age
14 and wanted to repeat .the experience of relinquishment and master it.
One applicant with a history of an abortion said that instead of "killing a baby" she wanted to give the gift of a live baby to a needed and
loving family.
Most of

t~e

surrogate applicants denied the significance of their bio-

logic (genetic) contribution to the prospective baby.
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Some felt that

the experiential contribution to child development is more important
than the biologic (genetic), thus minimizing the influence of their
own genetic contribution to the baby.

Most women admitted t.."'la t they

would experience some feelings of loss and sadness but minimized them
saying:
"I'm only an incubator."
"I'd be nestwatching."

"1'11 attach myself in a different way -hoping
it ' s heal thy. "

DISCUSSION
Several factors appear to have a complementary relationship in determining the applicant's decision to be a surrogate mother, including (1) the
perceived desire and need for money, (2) the perceived degree of enjoyment and desire to be pregnant, and (3) the perception of the advantages
outweighing the disadvantages of relinquishing the baby.
factor consisted of two aspects.

This latter

The first is the often expressed strong

wisn to give the gift of a baby to a neeey parent.

The second motivation-

al component regarding relinquishment is L"'le repetition of a previous
voluntary loss of a fetus or baby (by abortion or relinquishment) which
helps master the unresolved feelings connected with these events.

These results are just the tip of the data iceberg needed to help both
the participants in the surrogate mother process and the policy makers
of our society make reasonable and informed decisions.

I am presently

conducting longitudinal studies on the surrogate mother process and will
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report on them soon in an attempt to help foster a reasonable approach
to this very controversial reproductive alternative.
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INTRODUCTION
A surrogate mother is a woman who contracts with a man to be impregnated through artificial insemination, to carry the child, and after
delivery, to relinquish the child, as well as all parental rights, to
the biologic father.

Usually this biologic father is married to an in-

fertile woman who hopes to

eventua~ly

adopt the child.

The purpose of

this ongoing longitudinal research is to observe how these surrogate
mothers adjust psychologically over the course of their pregnancy and
after delivery.

This paper reports some of the psychological data

which emanates from a pilot study on surrogate mothers.

METHOD
Of the over 225 surrogate mother applicants evaluated, with semistructured

int~rviews,

25 have so far become pregnant after being

selected by the various parental applicants; 12 of these 25 have delivered.

Of the 25 surrogates who have been or are pregnant, all but

one was interviewed prior to deciding to participate in the surrogate
mother process.

Most were further interviewed individually during

each trimester and periodically after delivery.

Two were also inter-

viewed on the days immediately following delivery in the hospital, and
direct observations of these two surrogate's interactions with the newborn, including feedings, were made.

Many surrogates also attended a

support group of pregnant and post-partum surrogates that met about
every three weeks.

A registered nurse also observed some of the sur-

rogates during labor, delivery and the post-partum period.*
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Nancy Rerune, R.N.,
Ph.D., a private consulting nurse and Associate Professor of ParentChild Nursing, University of Michigan School of Nursing.
-?00-
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RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
All 25 pregnant surrogate mothers are white due to the fact that all
the parental applicants are white and desired only white surrogate applicants.

The average age at the time of artificial insemination by

donor (A.I.D.) was 25.0.
and 2 were divorced.

At A.I.D. 18 were married, 5 \'lere single,

It is projected that at delivery 19 \'lill be

married, 4 will be single and 2 "lill be divorced.
Protestant and 12 (48%) are Catholic.

Thirteen (52%) are

Three had less than a high

school education, 14 had graduated from high school or had a GED, and
8 had some college or professional training.

The average number of

pregnancies was 1.9 with 1.6 being the average number of live births.
Three surrogates had no previous pregnancies.

Nine (36%) had volun-

tary losses of a fetus or child, by abortion - 4, or by relinguuishing a-child - 4.

One surrogate experienced her mother relinquishing

a younger sibling at birth and is included in this group.

One who had

relinquished a child had also been adopted herself soon after birth.
Twenty-two of the 25 required and will receive (projected) a $10,000
fee.

Twenty-fotirrof the 25 carried a child for a married couple un-

able to have a child; one carried the child for a divorced man.

ADAP'I'ATIONAL DATA
In an earlier paper, this author discussed the motivations of 125 surro-

.
1
gate moth er app 1 ~cants.
sented:

Three groups of motivational factors \'/ere pre-

1) perceived desire and need for money, 2) perceived degree of

enjoyment of and desire to be pregn<mt, and 3) perceived aclv,lntages versus disadvantages of relinquishing the baby.
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This latter factor included
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both the experience of giving the gift of a baby to an infertile
couple and of repeating a prior voluntary loss of a fetus by abortion
or baby by relinquishment.

Each of these three motivational factors

will be discussed as it related to the experience of these pregnant
surrogate mothers.

As stated, 22 of the 25 surrogate mothers did receive or are receiving
a $10,000 fee.

Those 12 who have already delivered and received this

fee did not seem to have any adverse psychological consequences merely
because they received the fee.

As a matter of fact, one surrogate ex-

pressed that spending some of the money on items for the house helped
her to deal with feelings of loss.

Of interest is that one surrogate

who already delivered, changed her mind during the course of the pregnancy

a~d

refused the $10,000 fee once she established a relationship

with the parental couple.

In general, the fee becomes less important

as the pregnancy develops and as the surrogate establishes a relationship with the parents-to-be.

Lerner et a1

2

have described the enjoyment of pregnancy itself, inde-

pendent of the anticipated experience of eventually raising a child.
They described four categories of pregenital motivating factors:
l) narcissism and dependency, 2) identity and body image, 3) power, and
4) guilt and pain dependence •. Most surrogates felt very contented when
they received the special attention dne to their pregnancy.

Sever.-:tl de-

scribed that this pregnancy was doing something and producing something
(a baby) that only a woman could do.

None have described any sense of

power or desire to experience the physical pain or discomfort.
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Many pregnant surrogates found that their experience gratified their wish
to give the gift of a baby to a needy couple.

Thus, many experienced a

sense of accomplishment of doing something worthwhile and valuable; this
was reinforced when they received the appreciation overtly from the parental couple.

For example, one biological father repeatedly said, "You made

my dream come true," much to t;he excitement of the surrogate.

The experience of relinquishing the baby also appeared to help the surrogate
deal with prior unresolved voluntary losses of a fetus or child - either
their own loss or that of a close family member (mother) with whom she· identified.
for

These voluntary losses included abortions or relinquishing the baby

adoptio~

at birth.

For example, one surrogate dealt with her own bio-

logic mother's giving her up for adoption as well as her own relinquishment
of a newborn at age 14.

She related that as a result of having some phone

contact with the parental couple who accepted this child, she felt more
confident about the personality and child caring ability of the unknown
couple who accepted the newborn she relinquished at age 14.

Generally,

these repetitions have often been an attempt to master in a willful act
what was felt to be less in control originally.

So far no surrogate has

consciously experienced the surrogate mother process as a righting of a
·wrong (undoing) or as a punishment which expiates any guilt.

Preliminary findings indicate that pregnant surrogates usually deal with
the anticipated loss in one of several ways.

After quickening, most surro-

gates tended to further deny the feeling that this was "my" child and felt
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like it was "theirs .. (what might be termed non-possessive feelings). Most
also experienced a need to have some contact with the parents (either in
person, by phone, or letter} which facilitated the fostering of empathy
(transient identification).

The surrogates often demonstrated a need to

idealize the parental couples and to repress any agrgressive feelings towards them.

Thus, they tended to feel "they will be good loving parents

and I like them very much."

This idealization and positive feeling tended

to further facilitate empathy {transient identification) and a sense of
sharing in the parental couple's happiness.

One stated that she and the

infertile wife were sharing in the mothering process; she was the biologic
mother while the infertile wife would be the psychologic mother.

The degree of contact with the parental couple varied during the postpartum hospital stay as well as during the pregnancy.

Some couples chose

not to visit the surrogate and their baby in the hospital, while others
established a close relationship in the hospital.

In the latter case.-:;,

the couple often fed the baby with the surrogate either present or absent,
and received special child care instructions from the hospital staff.

Those surrogates who participated in tl1e support group seemed to
closely knit community characterized by a sense of belonging.

foL~

a

This feeling

of comraderieand sharing complemented and tended to support the empathetic
feelings toward the parental couple.

Attachment behaviors 1:o the baby varied qreatly from infrequent dist-;-mt !10ninvolved contacts to frequent and intimate closeness.
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Thns, one surrogate
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held the baby on her lap while feeding in a businesslike manner; another
lovingly held the baby close to her body while feeding and had even considered nursing the baby.

Significantly, this latter surrogate who main-

tained an intimate relationship to the child in the hospital, carried the
baby for a divorced man with no consistent maternal figure in the picture;.

After delivery, the surrogate mothers expressed transient grief symptoms
which are highly variable·.
experienced feeling of loss.

One stated that she had almost no consciously
Another described one episode of deep cry-

ing, while still another related repetitive symptoms such as crying daily
at the time of delivery and sleeplessness, both lasting about one month.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From the preliminary results of this study, I have drawn certain conclusions about recommending the availability of various components to the
multituqe of surrogate mother programs springing up all over the country.
These factors should be made available to those who choose to take advantage of them in order to maximize the psychological outcomes of the surrogate mother process.
1)

A skilled mental health professional should be available
to assist the competent surrogate mother applicants with
a voluntary informed consent.

2)

The surrogate mother and parental couple should be allowed to mutually arrange the extent and nature of any
contact between them.

This would permit the development
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of empathy to the extent desired and needed.

Of course,

the participants should also be made aware of the possible
problems arising from the desired contacts so that their
decision is an informed one.
3)

The pregnant and post-partum surrogate mother should have
the opportunt·ity to participate in a support group experience.

An important aspect of this experience is to have

at least one facilitator-therapist be female.
4)

The pregnant surrogate mother should be offered special
pre-natal classes specifically tailored to the pregnant
surrogate.

She should also have the opportunity to have

the cooperation of a specifically trained female labor
coach (perhaps the teacher of the prenatal classes) who
is familiar with the surrogate mother process.

The preliminary results from my resaerch with the surrogate mothers also
has application to various legal and policy issues.

In my judgment, the

various psychological responses and motivations of the surrogate mother,
as compared to '~nwed mothers", are significantly different so as to warrant different treatment of these two groups under the law.

Also, I have

so far found no evidence to support the notion that surrogate motherhood
with or without a fee, leads to serious adverse psychological consequences
and therefore (as some people feel) should be prohibited.
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As a result of interviewing over 225 surrogate mother applicants, I
have discovered that most of these women have not previously sufficiently explored their own motivations and the possible advantages
and disadvantages of their involvement.

In my judgment, they needed

the added experience of psychiatric interviews to help them give a
competent, voluntary, informed consent.

Therefore, it is my recommendation that regulatory legislation be
~

passed to help guarantee that these women become surrogate mothers
as a result of a voluntary and informed choice.
prevent abuse by unscrupulous

busines~men

This would help to

who might go to a welfare

office with a stack of $100 bills and unduly influence a woman to be
a surrogate mother.
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SURROGATE
MO'"fHERHOOD:

WHAT ARE THE
ETHICAL ISSUES?
by Barbara Eck Menning
Last November a baby was born to a woman in
Kentucky. The woman, "Elizabeth Kane" to use
her media p~eudonym, had agreed to bear a child
for a couple u•ho were infertile due to female problems. Sht> was inseminated by the husband's
semen. and bore the child nine months later. She
surr ,,dered the child to the couple at birth and
collected an estimated $10,000 in exchange for
her efforts.
The intermediary in this birth was Dr. Richard
Levin, a Louisville, Kentucky gynecologist. He is
the first physician to "instiTUtionalize" surrogate
parenting, to use his own words. He formed Surrogate Parenting Associates in Louisville in 1980.
The RESOLVE staff was aware of Dr. levin and his
program from the beginning. We watched with interest as Dr. Levin became more widely known and
quo1ed in a variety of magazines and popular TV
talk show<. At the &arne time, each counselor at
RESOLVE has had re5ervations and conflicts with
the entire issue of surrogate motherhood. As our
members may recall, we have carried two cautionary announcements about this program and its
possible expense in past nPwsletters.
This March l had the opportunity to meet Richard Levin in person. We were both in Atlanta at the
American Fertility Society annual meeting. He
was not there to deliver a paper on his work, but
rather to staff an exhibit on his program. We talked
for about an hour and I voiced some of my reservations. At one point he became dismayed, saying he
know J was an advocate of donor insemination and
that hi~ service was just a kind of "reverse AID,"
where a woman donates an egg. It was then that I
knew J had to write this article.
Ethics may be a science, but it is also intensely
personal. The ethics of surrogate motherhood and
it> comparison or contrast with AID are also very
complex. I do not speak for RESOLVE as an orgonization in writing these thoughts. I am simply
trying to put on the record my grave reservations
concerning this method for helping infertile couples achieve families.
Surrogate motherhood is hardly a new concept.
lt goes back to biblical times. But when one reads
the romanticized stories of barren women achieving children through their maidservants, one must
also recall that the maidservants were slaves, that
they received no money, and that they usually remained close to their surrendered offspring as an
extended family.
As I begin to examine the ethical issues of sur·
wgate parenthood in our time, I must first ask, is it
l<'ga!? The answer to this question is, at bPs!, unclear. It appears to be no accident that Dr. Levin's
program is situated in the one state in the country

EXHIBIT .J
which does nol make it Illegal for a woman to recerve money for bc<ning another couple's child.
However, Dr. Levin i~ currently under invesligation
by the Attorney General's office in Kentucky and
has had to temporarily cea~e p; ocessing i?lppli·
canis pending the outcome of this litigation.
Another person interested in surrogate mothering,
attorney NoeiKeane,lost a lower court decision to
legalize this alternative in the state of Michigan
last year. When Keane attempted to strike down
present laws preventing surrogate mothering for
pay because of 'the right to privacy' of parties involved, the court rejected his request, stating,
wMercenary considerations used to create a parent-child relationship ... strike at the very foundation of human society and are necessarily injurious to the community.h
Second, I feel it is important to ask whether the
fee for this service is reasonable. "How can you put
a price on a baby?" asks Levin in one magazine interview. He hastens to add, "People don't do jobs
without getting paid." The fee paid to the surrogate mother is supposedly not for the baby, but for
her ~potential loss of income, loss of consortium
with her husband, pain and suffering. and potential risk of death," according to the program's lawyer, Katie Brophy. The figure involved would depend on the circumstances. If a good surrogate
candidate wanted $25,000 and couple were willing
to pay that amount, the program would match
them up. The fees to Levin and his staff have been
estimated to be about S5,000 per case, though he
stopped divulging his fees when the media probed
this sensitive area too often. A recent letter to RESOLVE received from Dr. Levin's program informed us, "We must advise you that the fees involved
in the surrogate procedure begin at $15,000,
which includes professional fees a> \vel! as com·
pensation for the mother." I do not !Pel these fees
are reasonable.
And what of the risk of exploitation? "Surrogate
parenthood will be here in time; people are willing
to do anything to have a baby.h These are the
words of a New York Cit;• physician quoted in The
New York Times. He is aware of the desperation of
some infertile couples. Exploitation can be subtle,
appealing to the needs and longings of childless
couples who see that by surrogate motherhood
they could have a baby within a year, when traditional adoption now takes 4-6 years. Infertility itself provides a powerful. coercive force which may
compel couples into choices they would normally
never consider. Sometimes the best advocacy we
can give at agency like RESOLVE is helping people to see that they are vulnerable, are perhaps not
thinking impartially or cautiously, and therefore,
are possibly exploitable.
With such a legally risky situation, one inevitably wonders about the possibility of problems.
Despite what Levin claims are airtight contracts
bet~A.'een all parties, l am concerned that things
can and will go wrong in surrogate motherhood. It
is just a matter of time. These contracts are not enforceable in court, If one of the parties involved
decided to sue. The legitimacy of these agreements depends basically on the good faith of each
person. Already we know of one surrogate who has
chosen not to surrender her child (see accompany·
ing article). What about a baby born defective?
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What If the r£cipient couple change their minds?
the pregnancy ends in miscarriage or stillbirth, d
the couples get their money back? And, If the su1
rogate decided to keep the child, would the fathE
have to pay child support? There are many unan
swered questions; I am sure you can think of man
more.

The statement by Dr. Levin that surrogat<
motherhood is just the reverse of donor insemina
tion cannot go unchallenged. The surrogate is no
merely donating an egg; she is renting her body lot
a nine-month period. The surrogate mother,
because she will carry a pregnancy, has more
medical and emotional risks than the donor in artificial insemination. She has a small but real risk
of maternal death. She has about a 5% risk of
postpartum complications leading to infection, infertility or possible hysterectomy. Then thEere is the
matter of emotional bonding between mother and
child, a subject of which we know little prenatally,
but which seems to be important. We have heard
poignant stories from women who had unplanned
pregnancies and surrendered their babies for adop·
tion. Might there be an infant-mother bond at
birth. u•hich if broken has psychological conse·
quences for both? Who has studied this?
In artificial insemination by donor, the male
donor of a semen specimen has no pregnancy
risks. He also has no connection to, or even
knowledge of, children born as a result of his donation. 'Bonding' issues are not a concern. Since pregnancy will not take place in his body, he has no
surrender decisions. Legally, AID has been written
into the laws of 14 states, and in all other states
AID is at least not declared illegal, so the donor
and the couple choosing artificial insemination
haw very few legal problems.
A very important point of comparison is the fee
for service paid. Of course, a surrogate mother
gives up nine months of her life; the donor just
gives an ejaculate on demand from time to time.
The donor receives about $25-$50 per specimen.
The donor does not set the price (unlike the surrogate mother) nor do AID programs charge "what
the traffic u•ill bear,~ to use Dr. Levin's nou• in·
famous words. The fee for the physician doing the
insemination is relatively standardized too about $20 per insemination on the average. No
one is getting rich from AID couples. The average
AID pregnancy takes about 5 cycles at two ins<'m·
inations a cycle for an average of $700.
There are clearly many differences between
donor insemination and surrogate motherhood.
The first has a medical-legal history of over 30
years and has stood the test of time. The latter
might date back to biblical times, but has yet to be
accepted legally. The ethical issues involved are
complex. Is it legal? Is it a reasonable fee for service? Is there risk of exploitation? All are questions
which have not been answered to my satisfaction. I
have a 'wait and see philosophy' on this. I am willing to change my point of vieu· if safeguards are
enacted to control surrogate motherhood.
I would be heartless if I did not conclude on a
note that speaks to the infertile couples who are
considering this option. I understand the desperation of the infertile couple With a female problem
that cannot be treated. l am one of you. I understand the adoption situation in America, for I have
adopted my family. Had surrogate motherhood
been offered to me when I was most eager, I might
have considered it. I would have looked for
resources to tell me more about it. Whether you
look to a family lawyer, a rabbi. minister, or RE·
SOLVE, I hope the word you hear is CAUTION.

RESOL\~E. I~c.
---------------------------------------·--------~-------

INFERTILiTY COUNSELING • REFERRAL • SUPPORT GROUPS
P. 0. BOX 474. HEL!\10::-:T. !'lASS.

O~l71l-O·l7·1

TELEP!IO~E (1117) 4H4·:l4:t4

RELEASE

RESOLVE, Inc.
P. 0. Box 474, Belmont, MA 02178
(617) 484-2424, 2456

RESOLVE, Inc. is a nationa2 organization with chapters in 4C sz::ates whic! offe:::s
counseling, s<Jpport groups, anc information anc re.ferrc:.l for co;_r;.-12es experiencinq
pro])]ems of infertilit~··.
Vlo::_-J:in~ v.~~th infertilit~~~ .c~peci[:.Ji::~-:s g:. .mecologists with specialized r:.raining in prohlems of ma2e and

urcloqist.:: anC

female infertility RESOLVE meets the needs of couples who are trying tc cope wir:.h the emotional impact
of infartility.

Currently, it is estimar:.ed that 10 million couples in the U.S. are facing inferr:.ility
problems. Not ever"'·one iE a careeT woman over thirty. Problems associated with
birth conr:.rol, infectious disease and physical disabilities of various kinds in
both the man and woman, are only some of the factors which can delay childbearing
for ff6ny couples.
Vic": RESOLVE's network of medical specialists and RESOLVE public education, couples
learn ~hout and are referred to RESOLVE counselors for:
,;

Counseling to address personal, emotional issues the couple
PXperiences as a result of the infertility problem

o

:::tcement in support groups for "''omen and for couples,
supervised by RESOLVE professional staff and designed to
help infertile couples help each other to cope with the
trauma and disappointments of delayed childbearing

o

Information on the medical aspects of infertility, and

o

Referral for treatment and diagnosis.

P

1

The national office of RESOLVE is located in Belmont, Massachusetts, just outside
of Boston. By rtrri ting to RESOLVE, a couple can become members of RESOLVE, entitling
them to the quarterly newsletter, information on membership in local chapters, and
fact sheets and books on infertility which will answer many of the questions and
issues couples typically have about their infertility problems and appropriate
treatment.
The National RESOLVE staff, on behalf of the natiomvide network of chapters, provide
daily phone counseling and respond to literature and information requests from
people from all over the U.S. and Canada. Currently staff handle an average of
25 counseling calls and respond to 100 individual pieces of mail each day from
couples requesting help.
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Professional staff also field requests from chapters and interested groups from all
over the country for information, advice, and organizational support.
Staff respond to requests from the media for information on medical treatment,
testinq, and the emotional aspects of infertility. Examples of RESOLVE media
exposure include an article written by Carol Pogash about her infertility
experience, featured in the August 1982 issue of Redbook Magazine. In March,
RESOLVE was featured in the Boston Globe Living Pages. A.nd, on May 26, 1982, a
Bostor:-based RESOLVE support group was featured on the ABC-Til TODAY SHOW "After
Eight" segment.
RESOLVE today reaches almost 5,000 couples in the U.S. The nar:.ional office is
assisted b~ its national network of chapters and medical specialists and
RESOLVE mem...hers in b'1e Boston area who volunteer to help l1'i th mailing,
correspondence, phone counseling and local prograws.
1·-"el;:::.,ersh::._r: is grorving continually.

'I'ti:: c:::I bs e:r. r;.r_:_bur:eci rc r-e:::enr: favorable
media publicity and increased public awarenesE about infertiJ.ity, the potential
for effective treatment and the eventual success of couples who obtain early
anc ar;pr·opriate treatment. Couples can become members of RESOLVE by calling
(617) 484-2424 or by writing RESOLVE, Inc., P. 0. Box 474, Belmont, 11A 02178.

Contact:

Beverly

?reen~n,

Executive Director
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EXHIBIT K
GENE

A. NAFTULIN, M.D.

SIO NORTH PROSPECT AVENUE, !;:;UITE 206
AOULTANO PEDIATRIC UROLOGY

REDONDO BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90277

DIPLOMATE AMERICAN

MALE INFERTILITY

(213i 374-9670

BOARD OF UROLOGY

June 28, 1982
Elihu Harris
Judiciary Committee Chairman
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, California 95814
Re:

Assembly Bill 3771

Dear Mr. Harris:
I am writing regarding the "surrogate parent bill", This is a subject of
grave concern to me, as a large portion of my practice in the field of
Urology deals with male reproduction and infertility. As you can see,
I am a diplomate of the American Board of Urology and a member of the
American Fertility Society and Pacific Coast Fertility Society. I am
currently consulting urologist for the Male Reproductive Research Center
at .Harbor General-UCLA Medical Center.
It is my strong conviction that it would be premature for there to be
legislative action confirming the validity of "surrogate parenting" at
this time. Unlike donor artifical insemination, which is justifiably a
well-established procedure with limited emotional involvement from the
"donor", surrogate parenting is a new phenomenon with thoroughly uncharted
ramifications scientifically, ethically, legislatively, and most importantly
psychologically- in particular reference with the 11 donor". I fully
recognize and participate in the need for intensified research and treatment
for the infertile couple, In fact, such recent advances as in vitro fertilization, artifical insemination, and diagnostic tools have increased the
likelihood of conception for the infertile couple. But, just as "Laetrile"
should not substitute for bonified cancer remedies because of its potential
harmful side effects medically and psychologically, so should not surrogate
parenting become a readily acceptable means to justify the end of parenthood
without thorough investigation of its potential ramifications.
The surrogate "contract" is expected to streamline the process and validate it
legally of surrogate parenting. It would only seem appropriate that, prior to
establishing the legality of the process, the burden of proof regarding its
appropriateness scientifically and psychologically should rest with the proponents. This at least should include a non-partisan investigative group
with no financial or other potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the outcome of the bill. Only when it has been established as a valid approach
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Re: Assembly Rill
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to the childless couple should consideration be given to the appropriate
method of implementation legally.
Having commented in general, I would like to become more specific at this
time with respect to the criteria outlined for the "surrogate parent 'Dill"
as represented in the quarterly newsletter from the Surrogate Parent Foundation.
One of the requirements of a contract would be "indicating that the surrogate
will relinquish all parental rights immediately after oirth and, 21 legal and
equitable remedies available in the event of a oreach of contract by either
party". To consider the need for these two requirements raises the ugly
specter of the government being in a position to support legal redress on a
woman who bas borne a child and now hesitates to relinquish all maternal
rights. Somehow, the sanctity of motherhood seems to deserve more dignity.
What emotional scars would be left following such an experience; what emotional
experiences would have led to participating in such a contract? Considering
the recent concerns regarding the emotional and legal needs of adopted children,
what effect might there be if a child knew their mother had "prostituted herself" for their birth.
Having considered briefly the potential surrogate mother and child, what about
the couple who enters into this "contract". Practicing in the field of
infertility for several years, I have become quite familiar with the special
needs, fears, and emotional distresses associated with prolonged infertility.
What happens to the surrogate mother and child should the contracting marital
partners separate? Is a legal contract with either financial or other penalties
going to resolve the emotional and social problem presented? Similarly, what
solution would there be for s~ch an emotionally distraught couple whose marriage
is anticipating a child and the surrogate, regardless of legal restriction,
decides to keep the child? I have witnessed such a problem which resulted in
extreme emotional distress no different from grief reaction experienced from
the death or loss of family member. Obviously, there are multiple other issues
that could be raised.
The question is, are we creating a "monster"? Yes, with every scientific or
social advance there are real problems. It is my strong conviction that the
potential benefit of surrogate parenting is far outweighed by the overwhelming
potential for emotional destruction. I urge you to not only defeat Assembly
Bill 3771 but to introduce legislation to disallow it in the State of California.
I have no vested interest in the success or failure of Assembly Bill 3771. It
is my strong belief and that of many coworkers in the field of infertility that
surrogate parenting is at best a misguided approach to a medical problem and,
at worst, a financial scheme perpetrated at the expense of innocent couples.
I would very much appreciate a response to my letter in the way of being kept
abreast of any progress in this legislation,
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Page Three
Re: Assembly Bill 3771

Thank you very much for your attention and consideration.

GAN/jmt
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EXHIBIT L
.TATE OF CAlifORNIA--HEAlTH AND WElfARE AGENCY

.. -----=-=====================

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
· ·+4 P Street, Sacrumcnto, CA 95814
Jl()/445-8956.

November 10, 1982 ·

Ms. Lettie Young, Counsel
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
Stute Capitol, Room 6031
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Ms. Young:
This is in answer to your letter of October 25, 1982, in which you requested
that our department submit comments on AB 3771, the Surrogate Parent Act.
While the State Department of Social Services did not offer support for
AB 3771, we believe that since surrogate parent contracts are now taking place
and have been accepted by some members of the community, statutory safeguards
are needed for the protection of all concerned.
Our department is particularly concerned about adequately protecting the child's
best interests and preventing a potentially harmful situation from developing.
Although the welfare of the child is paramount, it is also important that the
rights of the surrogate mother and of the infertile couple be protected.
A social study, or investigation, should be made of a petition for court
approval of a surrogate parent contract. We recommend that a fee be established
to meet the cost of the study which could be performed by either a public or
private adoption agency. The study should include interviews with the surrogate
mother and her husband, if any, and with the infertile couple. The report of
the study should be made to the court within 90 days of the placement of the
child in the home.
In reference to the question of the long-range impact surrogate parent contracts
will have on children conceived by such an arrangement, our department believes
that it is essential that the study include an adequate means of securing and
preserving social and medical information about the surrogate mother for use
later. We see this as very important for the individual's well being, and vital
in relationship to hereditary health conditions.
The study should include verifications of marriages and dissolutions of marriages
of th~ surrogate parent, as well as of the infertile couple. Reports of physical
examinations of the surrogate mother, the child and the infertile couple should
be included in the report to the court.
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Jd t ,,,_mqll l\n l771 ind icales thal the prer;umptions in Section 621 of the
l.v i '1nn, ·c Codr~ ;md contained j n Civil Cmk sections 7004 and 7005 shall
llt>t ,lpply to a child conceived during a surrogate contract period, we

believe that it would be desirable £or an adoption agency representative
t.o wjtncss consents to adoption to be signed by the surrogate mother,
and her husband, if any. This would assist in insuring that there is
no misunderstanding about the rights of the parties involved, and would
help in ascertaining that the plan was entered into voluntarily. The
consent of the surrogate mother should not be witnessed until she has
been medically discharged from the hospital and the consent of the presumed
father, if any, should not be witnessed until after the birth of the child.
The names of the infertile couple should be on the consent form and should
not be concealed from the consenting parent(s). If a consent from a
presumed father is needed, a statement should be obtained from him that he
is not the natural father of the child and that he will agree to a blood
test to rebut paternity, if necessary.
If the home of the infertile couple cannot be recommended for adoption,
the investigating agency must recommend a suitable alternative plan for
the child. In the event that either the surrogate mother or the infertile
couple breaches the contract for any reasons, custody and support of the
child should be based on Sections 4600 and 4700 of the Civil Code. The
investigating agency should make a recommendation in accordance with the
child's best interests.
~ve

recommend that the funds deposited in escrow for monetary payment to the
surrogate mother be placed under the supervision of the court as part of the
approval of the surrogate parent contract. In cases of breaches of contract,
the funds should be disposed of at the discretion of the court.
In conclusion, the State Department of Social Services has no statistical
information on the number of surrogate parent contracts now being made.
However, we do npt believe that there will be a major impact on the public
adoption agencies because most of the adoptive placements made by public
agencies are of older children who have been in foster care and have been
legally freed from their natural parents so that permanent adoptive plans
can be made for them. There may be more impact on private agency adoptions
and upon independent adoptions since these involve a larger proportion of
infant placements; however, it is not possible to estimate the extent of the
numerical impact.
If additional information is needed, please call Willie Hausey, Deputy Director,
Government and Community Relations, at 5-8956.
Sincerely,

~M
·~

CLAUDE FINN
Deputy Director
Adult and Family Services Division
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EXHIBIT M
PHILIP J. PARKER, M. D.
FRANKLIN-12 OFFICE PLAZP. SUITE 206
26645 W. TWELVE MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD. MICHIGAN 48034
TELEPHONE 477-8575

Written Testimony of Philip J. Parker, M.D., before the Hearing
on Surrogate Parenting Contracts of the Assembly Judiciary Committee of California on Friday, November 19, 1982.
I am a psychiatrist in the Detroit, Michigan area and have been
doing longitudinal psychological research on the surrogate mother
process for several years.
I have enclosed a curriculum vitae
which particularly relates all of the various presentations that
I have made regarding my research on surrogate motherhood.
You have copies of two of my papers in the exhibits. The first
is "Surrogate Mother's Motivation: Initial Findings" which is
presently in press and will be published in the American Journal
of Psychiatry, Volume 140, January 1983 under the title "Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings."
The other paper which you have in the exhibits is "The Psychology of Surrogate Motherhood: An Updated Report of a Longitudinal
Pilot Study."
I have also written another paper entitled "Surrogate Motherhood:
The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation, and Psychiatry" which
will be published in the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry in Volume 5, No. 4, 1982.
I have already testified twice before the House Judiciary SubCommittee on Surrogate Parenting of the State of Michigan House
of Representatives.
In this written testimony I will briefly summarize how the results
of my research with surrogate mothers drew its direct application
to the proposed legislation before the Assembly Judiciary Committee.
I have interviewed over 225 women who have applied to be surrogate
mothers and of these, 25 are presently pregnant or have already delivered. The preliminary results of my research with about one
year follow-up after the first delivery, seems to indicate that
there is no reason, on a psychological basis, at this point, to
prohibit the surrogate mother process totally.
However, regulatory
legislation within a framework of maximum freedom of arrangements
to the participants does seem indicated.
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-2At this time I am unable to correlate ~ny of the personality factors, or motivational factors for the surrogate mothers with
their psychological outcome. Thus, I believe, no evidence presently exists by which to screen out or eliminate any surrogate
mother applicants from the surrogate mother process. Further,
there seems to be no evidence that mandating any external arrangements and thus removing the freedom of choice from the participants,
seems to be of any benefit psychologically to these participants.
On the contrary, the results of my research seem to indicate that
there was an advantage to allowing the surroaate mother applicants
and the parental applicants to arrange between themselves the nature
and extent of the relationship between them. Thus, for example, I
can find no evidence that would tend to indicate that enforced anonymity between the participants would be helpful for their psychological well being.
My psychiatric research on surrogate mothers has shown that most of
the woman have not previously sufficiently dealt with their own motivations and the possible advantages and disadvantages of their
involvement. They needed the added experience of psychiatric interviews to help them give a competent, voluntary, informed consent,
and in my judgment, this type of psychiatric interview should be
guaranteed by a regulatory legislation.
In my judgment, Assembly Bill No. 3771 of California, has insufficient guarantees to help the surrogate mother applicant give a competent, voluntary, informed consent both to become a surrogate mother
and to terminate her parental rights. Thus, I refer to Section 7505
(b) (4) which is found on Page 3, Lines 19-23. Although I agree that
the surrogate mother applicant and the infertile couple should have
separate legal counsel, I believe that more than just voluntariness
and understanding of the terms of the contract, particularly by the
surrogate mother applicant, are necessary. Thus, for example, I believe that the assistance of a psychiatrist or another mental health
professional is needed to help the surrogate mother applicant understand her motivations and the possible advantages and disadvantages.
I would also like to refer you to two small examples in Assembly Bill
No. 3771 which, although they seem insignificant may interfere with
the participant's mutually agreed upon arrangements in the surrogate
mother process.
I am presently working with a surrogate mother who
is having twins and who is presently discussing with her parental
couple the possibility of each of them taking one of the twins. It
seems to me that if such arrangement is mutually agreed upon, it
should be permitted by any regulatory legislation on surrogate motherhood.
However, in Section 7506(a), which is presented on Page 4,
Line 12, there would seem to be statutory preclusion for such an
arrangement.
The statute states "that the surrogate agrees to relinquish all parental rights to, and the custody of, any child conceived
as a result of the insemination to the infertile couple ... " Also, in
Section 7506(h), which is contained on Page 4, Line 39, once again
the term "any child" is stated.
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I would recommend adding the phrase, at the end of Section 7506(a)
and (h) "unless agreed upon otherwise by the parties."
I would also like to mention briefly about the necessity of having
an adoption at all, as part of the surrogate motherhood process. I
would refer the reader to Michigan Substitute for House Bill No.
5184 which included in the exhibits.
I personally favor not having adoption as part of the surrogate mother process and part of
my reasoning and rationale can be found in my paper entitled "Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, Legislation and
Psychiatry." I should mention that Lettie Young, the counsel for
the Assembly Judiciary Committee, has a copy of this paper.
It is time for society to rationally regulate the surrogate mother
process. I think that the potential abuse by unscrupulous businessman going to a welfare office with a stack of $100 bills and unduly
influencing a woman to be a surrogate mother, necessitates passage
of regulatory legislation like Assembly Bill No. 3771. This legislation should require and ensure psychiatric and other necessary
medical input for all parties to help achieve a competent, voluntary, informed consent.
I strongly urge regulation of the surrogate
mother process by such legislation either similar to California
Assembly Bill No. 3771 or Michigan Substitute for House Bill No. 5184.
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Mr. Chairman and Committee members, my name is Ginny Foat.

State Coordinator for California National Organization for Women.

I am

California

NOW is an organization consisting of both women and men working to bring women
into ftul participation in society.

With a membership of over 40,000 California

NOW is the largest feminist organization in the state.
The California NOW Board of Directors discussed the issue of Surrogate
Parenting at our November 1982 meeting.

We heard representatives from all sides

and discussed in-depth the many social, moral, ethical, and legal ramifications of

surrogate parenting.

Attatched for your in£ormation is the resolution adopted by

the Board.
NOW supports the right of an individual to enter into a surrogate arrangement.
We are concerned, however, that all parties to such an arrangement be fully
aware of their legal rights, and that they

be protected from exploitation.

We feel that the responsibilities of all parties must be carefully defined
and that the best way to work out the responsibilities is through carefully
drafted contracts.

At a minimum, each contract should advise the parties that

they should seek the advise of an attorney, and that they may be w:ll ving important
rights under such a contract.
We also have some specific problems with the proposed legislation, AB 3771.
First, AB 3771 would limit the availability of surrogate contracts only to
married, infertile couples.

This limitation is too restrictive, we believer

as is the requirement that a married surrogate must have her husband's permission
to enter into the contract.

The option to enter into a surrogate arrangement must

be available to any individual who chooses it.

Instead of these- requirements,

legislation may be needed to clarify paternity and custody laws relating to
the practice of surrogate parenting.
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We also see an inconsistency in the requirement that the surrogate undergo
psychological screening, yet there is no requirement for such screening of the
adopting couple. Both the surrogate and the adopting parent (s) should urrlergo
equal examination.
The legislation provides for health insurance for the surrogate for the
term of pregnancy, deliver; and a post-delivery period.

Provisions should also

be made for cases of pregnancy-related disability, some of which may last months,

years, or a lifetime.
A major concern of ours is the provision requiring court monitoring of
the contract and the pregnancy.

We fear this could establish a dar:gerous precedent

whereby the court monitors reproductive functions.

We strongly oppose any

provision requiring pre-approval or monitoring by the courts.
While NOW supports the right of an individual to arrar:ge surrogate parenting,
we do not want to divert attention or resources from research on infertility.
Nor do we want to deflect attention from the adoption process, adoption reforms,
or assistance to those seeking to adopt.
And by no means should NOW's
position be constured to detract or interfere in any way with NOW's support
for a woman's right to choose an abortion.
In conclusion, we feel surrogating is an area where the feminist perspective
is needed.

We would be pleased to work with Mr. Roos and all parties concerned

to develop legislation which will meet the needs of

inf~~ile

persons, interested

surrogates, adoption agencies, and the legal and medical communities.
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We reaffirm our committment to the right of every woman to control
her body which includes among other things the right to have and
not to have children· as a single parent, as part of a couple, and
as a surrogate.
We also oppose any attempts by the Legislature to create laws that
in any way limit this right of each woman.
We believe that there is a need to define the rights and duties
of various parties in a surrogate situation but believe that such
responsibilities are best created between the parties through
carefully drafted contracts which define the rights and duties
of each person.
Each contract shall at a minimum advise the parties that they should
seek the advise of an attorney, and that they may be waiving
important rights by the signing of such a contract.
Contracts for childbearing which require pre-approval and continued
monitoring by the courts are an impermissible state intervention
in the area of reproductive freedom.
Nothing in this statement should be read to detract from or interfere
in any way with NOW's position supporting a woman's right to choose
an abortion.
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1214 South Gramercy Place
Los Angeles, California
90019
November 13, 1982
Ron. Elihu Harris
Chairperson, Assembly Judiciary Committee
6031 State Capital
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
The California Adoption Advocacy Network, made up of over 2000 California adoptive
families and other advocates, wishes to thank you for the opportunity to respond
to the Surrogate Parenting Act. Although we do think that practitioners of
surrogate parenting should be regulated through the legislative process, the act,
as proposed4 does not contain strict enough regulations and monitoring of this
practice which could be misused.
Our Network's involvement and concerns are centered around the children (about
1900 now free in the state) who are awaiting adoptive placement. The agencies
responsible for these children are already dividing their attention to provide
studies at no cost to applicants for stepparent and independent adoptions--at
great cost to California taxpayers. The proposed Surrogate Parenting Act would
require that agencies study "infertile couples" to determine their appropriateness
as parents, yet contains no fiscal support to cover the cost of providing these
home studies. Meanwhile, adoptive parents providing permanent, caring families
for those children in the out-of-home-care system pay up to $500 for their home
study.
Agencies are facing fiscal crises that are unprecedented, as the federal government attempts to withdraw from its responsibilities for our nation's children.
The proper, major task of adoption agencies should be that of serving the children
trapped in the chaos of the out-of-home-care system. Our Network members are
opposed to this planned dilution of the resources of California's adoption
agencies. If home studies are to be provided to those seeking surrogate parenting,
private agencies might be established, or existing ones might contract to provide
them. Surrogate parenting practice must not be allowed to sap dwindling resources
from needy children in California.
We urge revision of the home study portion of the Surrogate Parenting Act, either
changing the source of the study of "infertile couples" or charging them the
complete cost of the study, plus some support for the relinquishment adoptions
program.
Sincerely,

Katherine Miller
CAAN Legislative Chairperson
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NACAC is an organization made up of adoptive parents' groups, representing
interests of thousands of families across the nation.

-225-

L~e

'.

'

(:::..__; t

/17
37

r~, ('es

;L·'t(

··'

~'>

F~t.·<LS
t

.....

~'.-:-_

-·-··

too

~mt\ ,~e..s

-

I='~~

-

/~CS
.-,

--

-

35

;/u

-

/~
-f-an,u.

~

1/tJ /~·
~st~

-226- '

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bird, Katherine.
"Surrogate Motherhood."
February 198?, pp. 21-25.

California Lawyer,

Black, Robert C.
"Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood."
New England Law Review 16 (1981):
373-395.
Brophy, Katie Marie.
"A Surrogate Mother Contract To Bear A
Child." Journal of Family Law 20 (1981-82):
263-291.
Erickson, Elizabeth A.
"Contracts to Bear a Child."
Law Review 65 (1978):
611-622.

California

Graham, M. Louise.
"Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of
Choice." Santa Clara Law Review 22 (1982): 291-323.
Handel, William W. and Sherwyn, Bernard A. "Surrogate
Parenting." Trial, April 1982, pp 57-60.
Harris, Lindsey E.
"Artificial Insemination and Surrogate
Motherhood- A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions."
Willamette Law Review 17 (1981) 913-952.
Keane, Noel P. and Breo, Dennis L.
York: Everest House, 1981.

The Surrogate Mother.

New

Mady, Theresa M.
"Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues."
American Journal of Law & Medicine 7 (Fall 1981): 323-352.
Parker, Philip J.
"Motivation of Surrogate Mothers:
Initial
Findings." American Journal of Psychiatry 140 (January
1983): 117-118.
"Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation,
Legislation, and Psychiatry." International Journal of Law
and Psychiatry 5 (1982):
(In Press).
Patterson, Suzanne M.
"Parenthood by Proxy: Legal Implications
of Surrogate Birth." Iowa Law Review 67 (1982):
385-399.
"Surrogate Motherhood in California:
van Hoften, Ellen Lassner.
Legislative Proposals." San Diego Law Review 18 (March 1981):
341-385.

-227-

VIsta Del Mar Child Care Service
3200 MOTOR AVENUE 0 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90034 0 PHONE 836-1223
SILBERT

Assistant Secretaries
CHARLES l. SCHNEIDER
Mns. ACOD A. SHUltEN

J

Presidents Emeritus
Jul)CE IsAAc PACHT

GEORGE KoNHEIM

President
SAMUEL P.

JusncE STANLEY MosK
Jure£ BEN KoENIG
SHELDON APPEL

Mas.

HENRY BAMBERGER

Mn.s.

ToM BARTMAN

BERMAN

Executive Director

November 26, 1982

Board of Directors

MRs. SuE BAUM
:Ore

BENJAMIN BENDAT

HAROLD D. BERKOWITZ
Mns. JEAN REiss BERLFEIN
IRA E. BILSON

Elihu M. Harris, Chairman
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
Room 6032
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814

STANLEY BLACK
PAUL BLACKMAN

STEPHEN CHRYSTIE
DAVRE
DAVIDSON

J.

Mns. LESTER DEUTSCH

RoBERTP. DUBIN
Mns. AAHON R. EsHMAN
Mns. SmKEY FACTOR

:\t FENNING
FEUERSTEIN
BEN FRANKLIN
ERNEST
FRIEDMAN
Mns. HowARD FUHRMAN
MRS. SY FUHRMAN
MRs. MYER GENSBURG
WILLIAM

Mns. lAMES

J.

jACK

G.

Honorable Assemblyman Harris:

GEORGE

ALBERT

H. GERSTEN,

)R.

EUGENE GE'ITELMAN, M.D.
DoNALD T. GILLIN
Mns. EDGAR L. GoLD
Mns. MAx GoLDRING

I was very glad to learn that you are accepting written
testimony regarding the surrogate parenting issue. I was out
of town the day of the hearings in Los Angeles and therefore would
like to take this opportunity to express my feelings regarding
this issue.

?vi ARVIN GoonsoN
SAM GREENEBAUM
Mns. DIXON HARWIN
MARVIN HOFFENBERG

STUART JAFFE
DONALD

B.

Mns. Lours

KAUFMAN
KozBERG

JoHN LEAR
ALVIN A. LEVINE
MAURIELIFF

Mns. SIDNEY LusHING
MRs. I. LEW MINTZ
MRs. 1•v1ANUEL RESNICK
Mns, Goer

Mns.

I have been associated with adoption practices for the past 30
years, having worked with social agencies, local, State and
National organizations interested in adoptions. I have written
widely on the subject, more recently with my research colleagues
published a book entitled, "The Adoption Triangle."

GRANT RtFKIND

DENNIS

RosE

Mns. RussELL RosEN
Huco RosENSTEIN
MRs, RUDOLF ScHAEFER
MRS. MANY A SCHAFF
Mns. :MARGE ScHNITZER
SIDNEY W. ScHUMAN
MicHAEL L. ScnwAB
Mas. MAcRICE ScHWARZ,
LAnnY ScnwtMMER
PERRY STEINER
BRUCE M' STIGLITZ
D.-wm M. STROMBERG
MRS. DAVID M. STROMBERG
MRs. WILLIAM TELLER
MRs. TERRY \VEINTRAUB
Mns. RoBERT YunELSON
WALTER ZIFKIN
Mns. ANN F. ZINNER
TED ZUCKERMAN

Jn.

Chief of Medical Staff
EUGENE CE'ITELMAN,

I feel that my vast experience in this field qualifies me to
speak on this issue.
Without question surrogate parenting presents many serious and
complex legal, ethical and moral issues. Although I am certainly
concerned with these issues, as we all should be, my primary concern
is with the psychological problems.

M.D.

President Associates
'\cfRs. SANFORD SICOLOFF

Our many years of experience with adoptions, particularly the
research that my colleagues and I have been involved in for the
past six years, tells us very clearly that surrogate parenting will
produce serious, complex problems for all the parties involved.
Rather than encourage this kind of unsound and potentially harmful
practice, I believe that we need to explore other alternatives to
meet the needs of the childless couple.

President, Jr. Associates
Mns. STANLEY WISHNER
President, Men~s Ass'n
GUY WOLFF

Prest'dent, Alumni Ass'n
STANLEY RICHARDS

President, Adoption Guild
:\1ICHAEL D. ULL1v1AN
President. Presidents Club
ALBERT H. GERSTEN, Jn.
President. Accountants Guild
jERRY M. COTLIER
President, Attorneys Guild
SHERWIN L. MEMEL
Chairman, Aunts/Uncles Club
DON"ALD

Furthermore, since surrogate parenting is a very expensive
proposition it becomes limited to those in our society who can

T. GILLIN

Advisory Board
Mns. HARRY BRAND
HERMAN C. EPSTEIN, M.D.
BER.S:ARD GELSON

wALTER L. KEEN
SHERWIN L. MEMEL
TACK PAUL

HAROLD PRICE
jUDGE LAURENCE RITIENB.\ND
\iRS, ~1.<\URlCE SELIG:'-1.-'.N
Miss DI:-<AH SHonE

Asst. Executive Director

Director of Community Seroices

Resident Director

Controller

Public Relations Consulwnt

EuD.ZEv

REUBEN PANNOR

ANDREW DIAMOND

RANDALl. MEHL

GENECACH

-228-

0rrhar~·

d111.

c;,ea ... 1th

Home o! Southern Callforn•a-

1)(11(eli Wat through The Jew1sh

Federation~Cot.Jncl/

.#!:CI'Sl'J'I'o'C.ei.._

~~

{'t.~.;J)J
i>CCAEWED

Vista Del Mar Child Care Service

2.

afford this kind of transaction. Therefore, it becomes not
only psychologically unsound, but discriminatory.
Surrogate parenting condones mercenary considerations in the
creation of parent/child relationships and consequently strikes at
the very foundation of human society. We have fought very hard
throughout the years to prevent commercialism to influence or
enter into any way the birth parent's decision to consent to the
adoption of their child.
We feel that this was and is sound
practice which in no way should be reversed.
Should there be no transaction of money for services performed,
the practice of surrogate parenting would still be psychologically
unsound.
We are indeed very concerned with these psychological effects, not
only upon those directly involved, but upon the community at large.
How does one explain to the children of the surrogate mother and
how do her children explain to their friends that their mother gave
birth to a child, chose not to raise the child, but gave the child
to another couple in exchange for a large sum of money?
How do you reassure these children that their mother will not also
give them away if the family is again in need of money?
Our being concerned with the plight of others means that we give
them our children?
Will the surrogate mother's children have the right to see their
half-brothers or sisters or know what is happening with them?
What about the surrogate mother's emotional reaction to this
experience?
Will she feel the same about the child a year or more
after the child is given up? Will she not have the same feelings
of loss and the need to mourn the child,that many mothers experience
who relinquish children for adoption through traditional channels?
How will the new parents explain the circumstances of a child born
to a surrogate mother to that child?
Are they prepared in fact to
view their new relationships as a life-long, continuing experience
in which there may be on-going relationships between all the parties
involved?
How will all of the parties involved handle the many complicated
issues after the initial euphoria has worn off?
These questions are indeed only forerunners of the many complex
and potentially serious issues that need to be addressed and that
I strongly feel are inherent in surrogate parenting.
My many years of experience in adoption tells me that children born
out of these arrangements will know that they were not wanted and
that they would not in fact be raised by the mother who gave birth
to them.
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The proponents of surrogate parenting, who to my knowledge, do
not represent knowledgeable professionals in the field, have given
very little, if any, considerations to these very serious problems.
I firmly believe that we must not allow ourselves at this point in
time to be stampeded into what on the surface seems like a very
simple so".ution for the childless couple.
Sincerely yours,

~~~
Reuben Pannor
Director, Community Services

gm
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